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Gerrymandering
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===Increased incumbent advantage and campaign costs=== The effect of gerrymandering for incumbents is particularly advantageous, as they are far more likely to be re-elected under conditions of gerrymandering. For example, in 2002, according to political scientists [[Norman Ornstein]] and [[Thomas E. Mann|Thomas Mann]], only four challengers were able to defeat incumbent members of the U.S. Congress, the lowest number in modern American history.<ref name="7_buck_trust.html">{{cite web|url=http://www.centrists.org/pages/2004/07/7_buck_trust.html|title=Iowa's Redistricting Process: An Example of the Right Way to Draw Legislative|date=22 July 2004|publisher=Centrists.Org|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20091107114029/http://www.centrists.org/pages/2004/07/7_buck_trust.html|archive-date=7 November 2009|access-date=5 August 2009}}</ref> Incumbents are likely to be of the majority party orchestrating a gerrymander, and are usually easily renominated in subsequent elections, including incumbents among the minority. Mann, a senior fellow of governance studies at the [[Brookings Institution]], has also noted, "Redistricting is a deeply political process, with incumbents actively seeking to minimize the risk to themselves (via bipartisan gerrymanders) or to gain additional seats for their party (via partisan gerrymanders)".<ref>Mann, Thomas E. "Redistricting Reform." The Brookings Institution. Brookings.edu, 1 June 2005. Web. 5 February 2013. <http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2005/06/01politics-mann></ref> The bipartisan gerrymandering Mann mentions refers to the fact that legislators often draw distorted legislative districts even when doing so does not give their party an advantage. Gerrymandering of state legislative districts can effectively guarantee an incumbent's victory by "shoring up" a district with higher levels of partisan support, without disproportionately benefiting a particular political party. This can be highly problematic from a governance perspective, because forming districts to ensure high levels of partisanship often leads to higher levels of partisanship in legislative bodies. If a substantial number of districts are designed to be polarized, then those districts' representation will also likely act in a heavily partisan manner, which can create and perpetuate partisan gridlock. Gerrymandering can thus have a deleterious effect on the principle of democratic accountability. With uncompetitive seats/districts reducing the fear that incumbent politicians may lose office, they have less incentive to represent their constituents' interests, even when those interests conform to majority support for an issue across the electorate as a whole.{{Citation needed|date=January 2014}} Incumbent politicians may look out more for their party's interests than for those of their constituents.{{Citation needed|date=January 2014}} Gerrymandering can affect campaign costs for district elections. If districts become increasingly stretched out, candidates may incur higher costs for transportation and [[campaign advertising]] across a district.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.ced.org/reports/solving-the-problem-of-partisan-gerrymandering|title=Let the Voters Choose|date=13 March 2018|work=Committee for Economic Development|access-date=7 June 2019}}</ref> The incumbent's advantage in campaign fundraising is another benefit of having a gerrymandered seat.
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