Editing Hawthorn Ridge Redoubt (section)

===German preparations===

[[File:Map commune FR insee code 80753.png|thumb|{{centre|Map of Beaumont-Hamel}}]]
The headwaters of the [[Ancre]] river flow west to Hamel through the Ancre valley, past Miraumont, Grandcourt, Beaucourt and St. Pierre Divion. On the north bank, pointing south-east, lie the Auchonvillers spur, with a lower area known as Hawthorn Ridge, Beaucourt spur descending from Colincamps and Grandcourt spur crowned with the village of [[Serre-lès-Puisieux|Serre]]. Shallow valleys link the spurs, the village of Beaumont-Hamel lies in the valley between Auchonvillers and Beaucourt spurs. A branch in the valley known as Y Ravine lies on the side of Hawthorn Ridge. In 1916, the front of VIII Corps lay opposite the line from Beaucourt to Serre, facing the series of ridges and valleys, beyond the German positions to the east. The German front line ran along the eastern slope of Auchonvillers spur, round the west end of Y Ravine to Hawthorn Ridge, across the valley of Beaumont-Hamel to the part of Beaucourt spur known as Redan Ridge, to the top of the Beaucourt valley to Serre. An intermediate line known to the British as Munich Trench began at Beaucourt Redoubt and ran north to Serre. The second position ran from Grandcourt to Puisieux and the third position was {{cvt|3|mi}} further back.{{sfn|Edmonds|1993|pp=424–425}}

[[File:Hawthorn Ridge (1 July 1916).png|thumb|{{centre|Map of the Hawthorn Ridge sector on 1 July 1916, British line in red, German blue; German barbed wire: dotted blue}}]]
No man's land was about {{cvt|500|yd}} wide from the Ancre northwards and narrowed to about {{cvt|200|yd}} beyond the redoubt on Hawthorn Ridge. The ground was flat and unobstructed, except for a sunken road from the Auchonvillers–Beaumont-Hamel road and a low bank near the German front trench. The German front had several shallow salients, flanks, a [[bastion]] at the west end of Y Ravine and cover in the valleys to the east. Beaumont-Hamel commanded the valley, which the VIII Corps divisions were to cross and had been fortified. Beaucourt Ridge further back, gave a commanding view to German artillery observers, who could see the gun flashes of British field artillery, despite the guns being dug in. British observers could not see beyond the German support trenches and the convex slope on the British side of no man's land, making it difficult for heavy artillery to hit the front position, parts of which were untouched by the preliminary bombardment.{{sfn|Edmonds|1993|pp=424–425}}

As signs of an Allied offensive increased during 1916, the lessons of the [[Second Battle of Artois]] and the [[Battle of Hébuterne]] in 1915, were incorporated into the defences of the Somme front.{{sfn|Humphries|Maker|2010|p=199}}{{efn|From {{nowrap|7 to 13 June}} 1915, the Second Army attacked a German salient on a {{cvt|1.2|mi}} front at Toutvent Farm near Serre, against the [[52nd Infantry Division (German Empire)|52nd Division]] and gained {{cvt|900|m|order=flip}} on a {{cvt|2|km|order=flip}} front, leaving a salient known as the {{lang|de|Heidenkopf}} north of the Auchonvillers–Beaumont-Hamel road, at a cost of {{nowrap|10,351 casualties,}} {{nowrap|1,760 being}} killed; German casualties were {{circa| 4,000 men.}}{{sfn|Humphries|Maker|2010|p=199}}}} Observation posts were built in each defence sector, more barbed wire was laid and more {{lang|de|Moritz}} telephone interception stations were installed, at the same time that more emphasis was laid on German telephone security. In early March and from {{nowrap|15 to 19 May,}} the chief engineer of the [[2nd Army (German Empire)|2nd Army]] inspected the first position in the area of the 26th Reserve Division; only in the area of RIR 119 at Beaumont-Hamel and the trenches to the west around Hawthorn Ridge Redoubt, were there enough shell-proof concrete posts. German infantry made a great effort to gather intelligence, patrol and raid the British lines to snatch prisoners; the British became more experienced in responding to local attacks and began to use the same tactics. In May, Soden wrote that at least {{nowrap|10,000 rounds}} of artillery ammunition were necessary, to ensure the success of a raid. On the night of {{nowrap|10/11 June,}} a raiding party of RIR 119 failed to get forward when the German artillery fired short.{{sfn|Sheldon|2006|pp=112–115}}