Editing Huemul Project (section)

==Announcement==
On 16 February 1951, Richter claimed he had successfully demonstrated fusion. He re-ran the experiment for members of the CNEA, later claiming that they had witnessed the world's first [[thermonuclear reaction]].{{sfn|Cabral|1987|p=82}}

On 23 February, a technician working for the project expressed his concerns about the claims, suggesting that the measurement was likely due to the accidental tilting of the [[spectrograph]]'s photographic plate while the experimental run was being set up.{{sfn|Mariscotti|1992|pp=9–10}} Richter refused to re-run the experiment. Instead, a week later he ordered the reactor to be disassembled so a new one could be built that included a magnetic confinement system. Meanwhile, plans for a new Laboratory 1 were started with this new design, this time to be buried underground. A {{convert|14|m|adj=on}} deep hole in hard rock was constructed, but Richter changed the design and had the hole filled in with concrete.{{sfn|Mariscotti|1992|p=10}}

On 2 March, [[Edward G. Miller, Jr.|Edward Miller]], the U.S. Assistant Secretary of Station for Inter-American Affairs, visited Argentina. This was ostensibly to visit the [[Pan American Games]], but in reality was in advance of calling a meeting of American leaders later that month to discuss [[China]]'s entry into the [[Korean War]]. Perón gave Miller an introduction to Richter's work, and Miller filed a memo on it on 6 March.{{sfn|Cabral|1987|p=83}} During this period, Perón seized the Argentine newspaper ''[[La Prensa (Buenos Aires)|La Prensa]]'', whose editor fled to the U.S. This led to harsh criticism in the U.S. Miller suggested a policy of "masterful inaction", not actively denying support for the project, but simply never providing any.{{sfn|Cabral|1987|p=83}}

The leadership meeting was to take place between 26 March and 7 April, by which time the Chinese "emergency" had passed and the war was entering a new phase. Perón then took the opportunity to announce Richter's results to the world. On 24 March, Perón held a press conference at [[Casa Rosada]] and stated that:

<blockquote>
On February 16, 1951, in the atomic energy pilot plant on Huemul Island... thermonuclear experiments were carried out under conditions of control on a technical scale.{{sfn|Cabral|1987|p=85}}
</blockquote>

Perón justified the project by noting that Argentina's enormous energy shortage would be addressed by building nuclear plants across the country, and that the energy would be bought and sold in containers the size of a milk bottle.{{sfn|Newton|1992|p=379}} He went on to note that the country was simply unable to afford the cost of developing a uranium-based energy program, or that of a system using [[tritium]], normally generated in special fission plants. Richter's fuel meant the reaction could only take place in a reactor, not a bomb, and he then recommitted the country to exploring only peaceful uses of atomic energy. Richter added that he understood the secret of the [[hydrogen bomb]], but that Perón had forbidden any work on it.{{sfn|Cabral|1987|p=85}}

The next day Richter held another press conference on the topic, a meeting that became known as the "10,000 word interview".{{sfn|Cabral|1987|p=86}} He explained that a hydrogen bomb required a fission trigger,{{efn|The interview occurred prior to the first test of a hydrogen bomb, when the operational concept was still secret.}} and that the country was unable and unwilling to build such a device. Very little explanation of the Thermotron was mentioned, beyond the announcement that he used the [[Doppler effect]] to measure speeds of 3,300&nbsp;km/s and that the fuel was either [[lithium hydride]] or deuterium which was introduced into pre-heated hydrogen. He was careful to explain that these were small-scale experimental results, and refused to state whether it would work well at the industrial scale.{{sfn|Cabral|1987|p=88}} On 7 April, Perón awarded Richter the gold Peronista Party Medal in a highly publicized event.{{sfn|Hagood|2014|p=268}}

With the U.S. refusing any support for the program, Richter turned to other countries for equipment. In April, [[Prince Bernhard of Lippe-Biesterfeld|Prince Bernhard of The Netherlands]] visited Perón, and offered technical help to the project from [[Philips]]. A visit by [[Cornelis Bakker]], later the director of [[CERN]], was arranged and a [[synchrotron]] and [[Cockcroft–Walton generator]] were suggested as possible products of interest. Perón wrote to Richter to arrange the visit, during which Richter refused to show Bakker any of the reactors. In spite of this, Perón offered to fund the purchase of a Cockcroft–Walton generator and a synchrotron from the company.{{sfn|Mariscotti|1992|pp=11–12}}