Editing Illusion of control (section)

==Demonstration==
The illusion of control is demonstrated by three converging lines of evidence: 1) laboratory experiments, 2) observed behavior in familiar games of chance such as lotteries, and 3) self-reports of real-world behavior.<ref name="illusions116">{{harvnb| Thompson|2004|p=116}}</ref>

===Laboratory experiments===
One kind of laboratory demonstration involves two lights marked "Score" and "No Score". Subjects have to try to control which one lights up. In one version of this experiment, subjects could press either of two buttons.<ref name="Jenkins1965">{{cite journal | vauthors = Jenkins HM, Ward WC | title = Judgment of contingency between responses and outcomes | journal = Psychological Monographs | volume = 79 | issue = 1 | pages = SUPPL 1:1-SUPPL 117 | date = 1965 | pmid = 14300511 | doi = 10.1037/h0093874 }}</ref> Another version had one button, which subjects decided on each trial to press or not.<ref name="allan_jenkins">{{cite journal | vauthors = Allan LG, Jenkins HM |year=1980 |title=The judgment of contingency and the nature of the response alternatives |journal=Canadian Journal of Psychology |volume=34 |pages=1–11 |doi=10.1037/h0081013|s2cid= 11520741}}</ref> Subjects had a variable degree of control over the lights, or none at all, depending on how the buttons were connected. The experimenters made clear that there might be no relation between the subjects' actions and the lights.<ref name="allan_jenkins" /> Subjects estimated how much control they had over the lights. These estimates bore no relation to how much control they actually had, but was related to how often the "Score" light lit up. Even when their choices made no difference at all, subjects confidently reported exerting some control over the lights.<ref name="allan_jenkins" />

===Observed behavior in games===
Ellen Langer's research demonstrated that people were more likely to behave as if they could exercise control in a chance situation where "skill cues" were present.<ref name="langer1975">{{cite journal| vauthors = Langer EJ |year=1975 |title= The Illusion of Control |journal=[[Journal of Personality and Social Psychology]]|volume=32 |issue=2 |pages=311–328 |doi=10.1037/0022-3514.32.2.311|s2cid=30043741 }}</ref><ref name="headstails">{{cite journal | vauthors = Langer EJ, Roth J |year=1975 |title= Heads I win, tails it's chance: The illusion of control as a function of the sequence of outcomes in a purely chance task |journal=[[Journal of Personality and Social Psychology]] |volume=32 |issue=6 |pages=951–955 |doi=10.1037/0022-3514.32.6.951}}</ref> By skill cues, Langer meant properties of the situation more normally associated with the exercise of skill, in particular the exercise of choice, competition, familiarity with the stimulus and involvement in decisions. One simple form of this effect is found in [[casino]]s: when rolling [[dice]] in a [[craps]] game people tend to throw harder when they need high numbers and softer for low numbers.<ref name="plous171" /><ref>{{Cite journal | vauthors = Henslin JM |year=1967 |title=Craps and magic |journal=American Journal of Sociology |volume=73 |issue=3 |pages=316–330 |doi=10.1086/224479|s2cid=143467043 }}</ref>

In another experiment, subjects had to predict the outcome of thirty coin tosses. The feedback was rigged so that each subject was right exactly half the time, but the groups differed in where their "hits" occurred. Some were told that their early guesses were accurate. Others were told that their successes were distributed evenly through the thirty trials. Afterwards, they were surveyed about their performance. Subjects with early "hits" overestimated their total successes and had higher expectations of how they would perform on future guessing games.<ref name="plous171" /><ref name="headstails" /> This result resembles the ''[[Confirmation bias#Preference for early information|irrational primacy effect]]'' in which people give greater weight to information that occurs earlier in a series.<ref name="plous171" /> Forty percent of the subjects believed their performance on this chance task would improve with practice, and twenty-five percent said that distraction would impair their performance.<ref name="plous171" /><ref name="headstails" />

Another of Langer's experiments replicated by other researchers involves a lottery. Subjects are either given tickets at random or allowed to choose their own. They can then trade their tickets for others with a higher chance of paying out. Subjects who had chosen their own ticket were more reluctant to part with it. Tickets bearing familiar symbols were less likely to be exchanged than others with unfamiliar symbols. Although these lotteries were random, subjects behaved as though their choice of ticket affected the outcome.<ref name="langer1975" /><ref>{{harvnb|Thompson|2004|p=115}}</ref>  Participants who chose their own numbers were less likely to trade their ticket even for one in a game with better odds.<ref name="Social behavior" />

===Self reported behavior===
Yet another way to investigate perceptions of control is to ask people about hypothetical situations, for example their likelihood of being involved in a motor vehicle accident. On average, drivers regard accidents as much less likely in "high-control" situations, such as when they are driving, than in "low-control" situations, such as when they are in the passenger seat. They also rate a high-control accident, such as driving into the car in front, as much less likely than a low-control accident such as being hit from behind by another driver.<ref name="illusions116" /><ref>{{Cite journal|title=It won't happen to me: Unrealistic optimism or illusion of control? | vauthors = McKenna FP |journal=British Journal of Psychology |year=1993 |volume=84 |issue=1 |pages=39–50|doi=10.1111/j.2044-8295.1993.tb02461.x}}</ref><ref name=hardman />