Editing Indeterminism (section)

===Ancient Greek philosophy===

====Leucippus====
The oldest mention of the concept of '''chance'''<!--boldface per WP:R#PLA; 'Chance (philosophy)' redirects here--> is by the earliest philosopher of [[atomism]], [[Leucippus]], who said:
<blockquote>"The cosmos, then, became like a spherical form in this way: the atoms being submitted to a casual and unpredictable movement, quickly and incessantly".<ref>"ὁ τοίνυν κόσμος συνέστη περικεκλασμένῳ σχήματι ἐσχηματισμένος τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον. τῶν ἀτόμων σωμάτων ἀπρονόητον καὶ τυχαίαν ἐχόντων τὴν κίνησιν συνεχῶς τε καὶ τάχιστα κινουμένων" [[Hermann Alexander Diels|H.Diels-W.Kranz]] ''Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker'', Berlin Weidmann 1952, 24, I, 1</ref></blockquote>

====Aristotle====
{{main|Four causes}}
[[Aristotle]] described four possible causes (material, efficient, formal, and final). Aristotle's word for these causes was αἰτίαι (''aitiai'', as in ''[[wikt:aetiology|aetiology]]''), which translates as causes in the sense of the multiple factors responsible for an event. Aristotle did not subscribe to the simplistic "every event has a (single) cause" idea that was to come later.

In his ''[[Physics (Aristotle)|Physics]]'' and ''[[Metaphysics (Aristotle)|Metaphysics]]'', Aristotle said there were [[Accident (philosophy)|accidents]] (συμβεβηκός, ''[[sumbebekos]]'') caused by nothing but chance (τύχη, ''tukhe''). He noted that he and the early physicists found no place for chance among their causes.

{{quote|We have seen how far Aristotle distances himself from any view which makes chance a crucial factor in the general explanation of things. And he does so on conceptual grounds: chance events are, he thinks, by definition unusual and lacking certain explanatory features: as such they form the complement class to those things which can be given full natural explanations.<ref name="Hankinson">{{cite book |chapter=Causes |title=Blackwell Companion to Aristotle |last=Hankinson |first=R.J. |year=2009 |page=223}}</ref>|R.J. Hankinson |"Causes" in ''Blackwell Companion to Aristotle ''}}

Aristotle opposed his accidental chance to necessity:
<blockquote>
    Nor is there any definite cause for an accident, but only chance (τυχόν), namely an indefinite (ἀόριστον) cause.<ref>Aristotle, ''[[Metaphysics (Aristotle)|Metaphysics]]'', Book V, 1025a25</ref>
</blockquote>
<blockquote>
    It is obvious that there are principles and causes which are generable and destructible apart from the actual processes of generation and destruction; for if this is not true, everything will be of necessity: that is, if there must necessarily be some cause, other than accidental, of that which is generated and destroyed. Will this be, or not? Yes, if this happens; otherwise not.<ref>Aristotle, ''[[Metaphysics (Aristotle)|Metaphysics]]'', Book VI, 1027a29-33</ref>
</blockquote>

====Pyrrhonism====
The philosopher [[Sextus Empiricus]] described the [[pyrrhonism|Pyrrhonist]] position on causes as follows:

<blockquote>...we show the existence of causes are plausible, and if those, too, are plausible which prove that it is incorrect to assert the existence of a cause, and if there is no way to give preference to any of these over others – since we have no agreed-upon sign, [[criteria of truth|criterion]], or proof, as has been pointed out earlier – then, if we go by the statements of the [[Dogma]]tists, it is necessary to [[epoche|suspend judgment]] about the existence of causes, too, saying that they are no more existent than non-existent<ref>[[Sextus Empiricus]] ''Outlines of Pyrrhonism'' Book III Chapter 5</ref></blockquote>

====Epicureanism====
[[Epicurus]] argued that as atoms moved through the void, there were occasions when they would "swerve" (''[[clinamen]]'') from their otherwise determined paths, thus initiating new causal chains. Epicurus argued that these swerves would allow us to be more responsible for our actions, something impossible if every action was deterministically caused. For [[Epicureanism]], the occasional interventions of arbitrary gods would be preferable to strict determinism.