Editing Infiltration tactics (section)

=== Britain ===
[[File:Vimy Ridge 1917-barrage map.jpg|thumb|Map detailing exact positions and timing of the planned [[creeping barrage]] for the Canadian assault on [[Vimy Ridge]], April 1917]]
The British Army pursued a doctrine of integrating [[Technology during World War I|new technologies]] and updating old ones to find advantages in trench warfare.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Griffith |first1=Paddy |title=Battle Tactics of the Western Front: the British Army's Art of Attack, 1916-18 |date=1994 |publisher=Yale University Press |location=London |isbn=978-0300066630 |pages=110 }}</ref>

At the [[Battle of Neuve Chapelle]], March 1915, a well-planned British attack on German trenches, coordinated with short but effective artillery bombardment, achieved a local breakthrough. Though ammunition shortages and command and control issues prevented exploiting the gains, this demonstrated the importance of a combined infantry-artillery doctrine.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Sheffield |first1=Gary David |title=The chief: Douglas Haig and the British Army |date=2011 |publisher=Aurum |location=London |isbn=978-1-84513-691-8 |pages=110–111 }}</ref>

Initial experiences in trench warfare, shared between British and French, led both to increase pre-bombardment (requiring dramatically increased artillery munitions production), and also to supply infantry with more firepower, such as light mortars, light machine guns, and rifle grenades. While the British hoped that this new combination of arms, once improved and properly executed, could achieve decisive breakthroughs, the French moved from their pre-war grand ''la percée'' doctrine to more limited and practical tactical objectives. At this same time, the Germans were learning the value of deep trenches, defense in depth, defensive artillery, and quick counter-attacks.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Philpott |first1=William |title=Warfare 1914-1918 |url=https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/warfare_1914-1918 |website=International Encyclopedia of the First World War (WW1) |access-date=6 December 2017 |at=Tactical Systems Emerge }}</ref>

This came to a head with the British [[Somme Offensive]] on 1 July 1916. [[Douglas Haig]], commanding the [[British Expeditionary Force (World War I)|British Expeditionary Force]] (BEF), planned on an ambitious large-scale quick breakthrough, with an extensive artillery bombardment targeting the German front-line defenses, followed by a [[creeping barrage]] leading a mass infantry assault.<ref name="Bloody victory">{{cite book |last1=Philpott |first1=William |title=Bloody victory: the sacrifice on the Somme and the making of the twentieth century |date=2010 |publisher=Abacus |location=London|isbn=9780349120041 |edition=Pbk. }}</ref>{{rp|106–10}}{{rp|117–21}} Despite planning, execution was flawed, perhaps resulting from the [[Kitchener's Army|rapid expansion of the British Army]]. The British losses on the first days were horrific. British operations improved over the next several months of the campaign, however.<ref name="Bloody victory" />{{rp|113–6}}{{rp|183–282}} Learning the limits of battle planning and bombardment, they abandoned single grand objectives, and adopted a "bite and hold" doctrine (equivalent to the French ''grignotage'') of limited, local objectives to what could be supported by available artillery in close cooperation.<ref name="Bloody victory" />{{rp|345–84}} Combining this with new arms was still promoted; Britain's new secret weapon, the tank, made its first appearance midway through the Somme operations. Though not yet effective, their promise of breakthroughs in the future was held out.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Sheffield |first1=Gary |title=The Somme |date=2004 |publisher=Cassell |location=London |isbn=978-0-304-36649-1 |pages=[https://archive.org/details/somme0000shef/page/112 112–124] |edition=Pbk. |url=https://archive.org/details/somme0000shef/page/112 }}</ref>

The British [[Third Army (United Kingdom)|Third Army]] employed tactics giving platoons more independence at the [[Battle of Arras (1917)|Battle of Arras]] in April 1917 (most notably the [[Battle of Vimy Ridge|capture of Vimy Ridge]] by the [[Canadian Corps]]), following the reorganisation of British infantry platoons according to the new Manual SS 143. This still advocated wave attacks, taking strongpoints and consolidating before advancing, part of "bite-and-hold" tactics, but this did allow for more local flexibility, and set groundwork for low-level unit initiative, an important aspect of infiltration tactics.<ref>{{cite web|title=Instructions for the training of platoons for offensive action, 1917|url=https://archive.org/details/instructionsfort00washrich|website=Internet Archive|access-date=7 October 2017}}</ref>