Editing Intentionality (section)

===Adverbialism===
''Adverbialists'' hold that intentional states are properties of subjects. So no independent objects are needed besides the subject, which is how adverbialists avoid the problem of non-existence.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Koons |first1=Robert C. |last2=Pickavance |first2=Timothy |title=The Atlas of Reality: A Comprehensive Guide to Metaphysics |publisher=John Wiley & Sons |isbn=978-1-119-11611-0 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=dewmDgAAQBAJ |language=en |chapter=12 The Non-Existent and the Vaguely Existent|date=9 February 2017 }}</ref> This approach has been termed "adverbialism" since the object of the intentional state is seen as a modification of this state, which can be linguistically expressed through adverbs. Instead of saying that ''Mary is thinking about Superman'', it would be more precise, according to adverbialists, to say that ''Mary is thinking in a superman-ly manner'' or that ''Mary is thinking superman-ly''. Adverbialism has been challenged on the grounds that it puts a strain on natural language and the metaphysical insights encoded in it.<ref name="Bourget" /> Another objection is that, by treating intentional objects as mere modifications of intentional states, adverbialism loses the power to distinguish between different complex intentional contents, the so-called many-property-problem.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Jackson |first1=Frank |title=Symposium: The Adverbial Theory of Perception |journal=Metaphilosophy |date=1975 |volume=6 |issue=2 |pages=127–135 |doi=10.1111/j.1467-9973.1975.tb00242.x |url=https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-9973.1975.tb00242.x |language=en |issn=1467-9973 |access-date=2020-11-11 |archive-date=2021-08-30 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210830120035/https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-9973.1975.tb00242.x |url-status=live |url-access=subscription }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Woodling |first1=Casey |title=The Limits of Adverbialism About Intentionality |journal=Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy |date=2016 |volume=59 |issue=5 |pages=488–512 |doi=10.1080/0020174X.2016.1140071 |s2cid=171200406 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/WOOTLO-13 |access-date=2020-11-11 |archive-date=2021-08-16 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210816172602/https://philpapers.org/rec/WOOTLO-13 |url-status=live |url-access=subscription }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=D'Ambrosio |first1=Justin |title=A New Perceptual Adverbialism |journal=Journal of Philosophy |date=2019 |volume=116 |issue=8 |pages=413–446 |doi=10.5840/jphil2019116826 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/DAMANP |hdl=1885/214157 |s2cid=204526763 |hdl-access=free |access-date=2020-11-11 |archive-date=2021-06-23 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210623033715/https://philpapers.org/rec/DAMANP |url-status=live }}</ref>