Editing Lockheed MC-130 (section)

===Post-Vietnam developments===
In 1974 the Combat Talon program was nearly dismantled as the Air Force sought to reverse its Vietnam emphasis on special operations. The 1st Special Operations Wing was redesignated the 834th Tactical Composite Wing and its Combat Talons of the 8th SOS became a [[Tactical Air Command|TAC]] asset. However the use of 1st SOS "Yank" Talons in a sea surveillance role off [[North Korea]] in 1975 revived interest in the Combat Talon,<ref name="ct160">Thigpen (2001), p. 160.</ref> as did the Israeli [[Operation Entebbe|hostage rescue at Entebbe Airport]]. The same year, a Combat Talon of the 1st Special Operations Wing was deployed in support of US Marines forces on [[Koh Tang]] island during the [[Mayaguez incident]], dropping a single [[BLU-82]] 6,800&nbsp;kg (15,000&nbsp;lb) bomb to enable their extraction.<ref>{{cite web|last=Grandolini|first=Albert|title=Cambodia 1954–1999; Part 2|url=http://www.acig.info/CMS/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=234&Itemid=47|publisher=ACIG.org|access-date=6 February 2013|url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141218015419/http://www.acig.info/CMS/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=234&Itemid=47|archive-date=18 December 2014}}</ref> However, as late as 1978–79, Air Force Special Operations Forces was still disregarded by many staff planners, who saw it as a drain on resources and not a force enabler, and wanted the entire Talon force transferred to the [[Air National Guard]].<ref name="cult">Koskinas (2006), p. 103.</ref> In early 1977 the Combat Talon was redesignated ''MC-130E'' by Headquarters Air Force for all three variants of the aircraft.<ref name="ct168"/>

By November 1979, the Combat Talon force of 14 MC-130Es was divided among three squadrons, the first two of which were operationally deployed, and the third at Hurlburt essentially the force training squadron:<ref name="ct184">Thigpen (2001), p. 184.</ref>
* [[1st Special Operations Squadron]], Kadena Air Base, Okinawa – (four MC-130 Yanks);
* 7th Special Operations Squadron, Ramstein Air Base, Germany – (four MC-130 Clamps); and
* [[8th Special Operations Squadron]], [[Hurlburt Field]], Florida – (six MC-130 Clamps).

====Eagle Claw====
[[File:1st Special Operations Squadron.jpg|thumb|left|{{center|'''1st Special Operations Squadron'''}}]]
Following the [[Iran Hostage Crisis|seizure of the U.S. embassy]] in [[Tehran]], Iran, on 4 November 1979, training operations for a rescue mission of the 53 hostages began as early as 7 November by Talon crews at Kadena AB, and 26 November by crews at Hurlburt.<ref name="ct182">Thigpen (2001), p. 182.</ref> At that time only seven Combat Talons had the [[Aerial refueling|in-flight refueling]] capability necessary for the mission, which was to be mounted out of either Egypt or [[Diego Garcia]] ([[Masirah Island]] did not become available as a base until April 1980).<ref>Thigpen (2001), p. 184. 62-1843, 63–7785, 64–0564, and 64-0565 of the 1st SOS, and 64-0562, 64–0567, and 64-0572 of the 8th SOS. In-flight refueling of helicopters was rejected as an option because the [[Lockheed HC-130|HC-130s]] available to refuel them had no IFR capability themselves.</ref> All were assigned to the operation,<ref name="ct184" /> a complex two-night plan called [[Operation Eagle Claw|''Eagle Claw'']]. Talon crews using [[night vision goggles]] practiced blacked-out landings to insert [[Delta Force]] operators and [[U.S. Army Rangers]] deep into Iran, and developed several methods for delivering extra fuel for the US Navy [[CH-53 Sea Stallion|RH-53D Sea Stallion]] helicopters chosen to carry out the rescued hostages. Four transcontinental, all-component, two-night rehearsals were held between December 1979 and March 1980, including a full-scale rehearsal 25–26 March that involved every element of the final plan except three EC-130s chosen to fly in fuel for the helicopters.<ref>Thigpen (2001), pp. 194–207. Electing to use EC-130s to ground refuel the helicopters instead of air-dropping blivets was not formally approved until April. The method was favored by ground commander Col [[Charles Alvin Beckwith|Charles Beckwith]], however, and so had been successfully rehearsed many times. Preparatory work to lay out the Desert One airstrip, acquire the EC-130s, and stage essential materiel to Egypt had preceded the formal approval of ''Eagle Claw's'' final form by weeks. Talons played the role of the three EC-130s in the full-scale rehearsal. The Holloway Commission criticized the task force for failing to conduct such a rehearsal, but since it did in fact occur, the commission may have been contending that another or multiple independently assessed "dress" rehearsals was desirable after the final form was approved by the JCS on 16 April, in hopes that the command and control difficulties would have been uncovered.  With a 1 May deadline because of a decreasing number of hours of darkness, there was no time to lay on further "dress  rehearsals", and all of the elements used on 24 April were in fact successfully executed 25–26 March. The entire training process was a five-month evolution of the two-night concept, employing techniques never before tried that had to be perfected before they could be rehearsed with other components. The ''ad hoc'' nature of this process, with its components scattered at various sites and stressing a "piece of the pie" for all the military services that resulted in helicopters and crews who were not special operations-trained, failed to build a team mentality, and it was this failure that the Holloway Commission targeted. The inclusion of the Navy helicopters proved particularly damaging because their air refueling probes had been removed, resulting in the necessity of the Desert One refueling point where the debacle occurred, whereas the Air Force special ops helicopters could have been aerial refueled in flight.</ref>

The four Talons (including a spare) of the 1st SOS staged to Masirah Island off the coast of [[Oman]] on 19 April 1980, to lead the Night One infiltration phase, while the three of the 8th SOS deployed to [[Qena|Wadi Qena]], Egypt, on 21 April to lead the Night Two exfiltration phase.<ref name="ct213">Thigpen (2007), pp. 213–215. Of the eight crews assigned, five were from 8th SOS and three from 1st SOS. The extra 1st SOS Talon and its crew were both a spare and the primary aircraft for ''Elbow Rub'', an alternative, highly classified project to heavily damage Iran's power grid had it been ordered as a retaliatory mission for harming the hostages (Thigpen, p. 203).</ref> To establish a "normal" C-130 presence in Egypt, Talons of the 7th SOS (none of which had aerial refueling capability) conducted regular flights using [[Military Airlift Command]] call signs in and out of Wadi Qena between 2 January and 8 April 1980. They also used the deception to discreetly pre-position needed equipment, including ammunition for [[Lockheed AC-130|AC-130 gunships]], at the staging base.<ref name="ct196">Thigpen (2001), p. 196.</ref> The Talon crews also manned three borrowed [[Lockheed EC-130|EC-130E ABCCC]] aircraft configured to carry 68,100 L (18,000 U.S. gal) of jet fuel in six collapsible bladders for refueling the helicopters.<ref>Thigpen (2001), p. 213. The aircraft were obtained without crews and without their communications capsules from the 42nd Airborne Command and Control Squadron at [[Keesler Air Force Base]], Mississippi, the first on 15 March 1980, and the other two on 14 April.</ref> After returning to Masirah, three of the 8th SOS Night One crews would be flown to Wadi Qena to carry out the Night Two mission.<ref>Thigpen (2001), p. 211. The seventh primary crew, including author Thigpen, waited at Wadi Qena to lead the Night Two phase. The three crews would have been those of the lead Talon (''Dragon 1''), and two of the EC-130s, ''Republic 4'' and ''Republic 6''. Most of the crew of ''Republic 4'' died at Desert One.</ref>

The first phase of the rescue mission began the evening of 24 April, led by Lt Col Robert L. Brenci of the 8th SOS in Talon 64-0565, ''Dragon 1''.  The 1st SOS Talons successfully secured the forward operating location ("Desert One") in the Iranian Desert, but the helicopter portion of the mission ended in disaster. Although the mission was an embarrassing failure costing eight lives, seven helicopters, and an EC-130E aircraft in a ground accident, the MC-130s performed nearly flawlessly.<ref name="ct228">Thigpen (2001), p. 228.</ref> Planning initiatives for a second rescue attempt, under the project name ''Honey Badger'', began two weeks after the failed raid and continued through November. Combat Talon participation in ''Honey Badger'' amounted largely to tactics development, but ECM improvements included [[Chaff (countermeasure)|chaff]] and [[Flare (countermeasure)|flare]] dispensers and new ALR-69 threat receivers that improved its defensive countermeasures capability well beyond that existing prior to ''Eagle Claw''.

====Urgent Fury====
[[File:8th Special Operations Squadron.svg|thumb|left|{{center|'''8th Special Operations Squadron'''}}]]
Five Combat Talons of the 8th Special Operations Squadron participated in ''[[Operation Urgent Fury]]'', the United States invasion of [[Grenada]] between 25 and 31 October 1983.<ref>Thigpen (2001), p. 177. The MC-130Es were 64–0562, −0572, −0568, −0567, and −0551.</ref> Unlike previous operations that involved months of planning, training, and reconnaissance, the 8th SOS prepared in less than 72 hours after being alerted.<ref>Thigpen (2001), p. 276.</ref> Its assignment was to insert Rangers of the 1st and 2nd Ranger Battalions at night to capture [[Point Salines International Airport]], defended by both Cuban and Grenadan troops, in the opening moments of the operation. The five Talons divided into three elements, two of them leading formations of Special Operations Low Level-equipped (SOLL) C-130 transports.<ref>Thigpen (2001), pp. 281–282.</ref>

In clouds at {{convert|500|ft|abbr=on}} above the sea and {{convert|20|mi|abbr=on}} west of its objective, the lead Talon (64-0562) experienced a complete failure of its APQ-122 radar. Reorganization of the mission formations delayed the operation for 30 minutes, during which U.S. Marines made their amphibious landing. To compound the lack of surprise, the [[U.S. Department of State]], apparently in a [[good faith]] but inept diplomatic gesture, contacted Cuban authorities and compromised the mission, further alerting the defenses, including a dozen [[ZU-23-2]] antiaircraft guns. An [[AC-130 Spectre]] gunship, directed to observe the main runway for obstructions, reported it blocked by construction equipment and barricades. Loadmasters aboard the inbound Combat Talons reconfigured them for a parachute drop in less than thirty minutes.<ref>Thigpen (2001), p. 282.</ref>

Talon 64-0568, flown as ''Foxtrot 35'' by 8th SOS commander Lt Col James L. Hobson<ref>[https://www.af.mil/About-Us/Biographies/Display/Article/106751/major-general-james-l-hobson-jr/ Major General James L. Hobson, Jr.], Air Force.mil. Retrieved 6 April 2016</ref> and with the commander of the [[Twenty-Third Air Force]], Maj Gen William J. Mall, Jr., aboard as a passenger, combat-dropped runway clearing teams from the Ranger Battalions on the airport, despite being targeted by a searchlight and under heavy AAA fire. Two Spectre gunships suppressed the AAA so that the other Combat Talons and the SOLL C-130s could complete the parachute drop of the Rangers, with the only damage to the Talons being three hits by small arms fire to 64–0572.<ref>Thigpen (2001), pp. 181–186.</ref> For his actions, Hobson was awarded the [[MacKay Trophy]] in 1984.<ref name="Thigpen 2001, p. 296">Thigpen (2001), p. 296.</ref>