Editing Mancur Olson (section)

===Academic work===
In his first book, ''[[The Logic of Collective Action|The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups]]'' (1965), he theorized that what stimulates people to act in groups is incentive; members of large groups do not act in accordance with a common interest unless motivated by personal gain (economic, social, etc.). While small groups can act on shared objectives, large groups will not work towards shared objectives unless their individual members are sufficiently motivated.<ref>Mancur Olson Jr., 1965, 2nd ed., 1971. ''The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups'', Harvard University Press, [http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674537514 Description], [http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?recid=24500&content=toc Table of Contents], and [https://books.google.com/books?id=jzTeOLtf7_wC&pg=PA5=ONEPAGE preview].</ref>

In 1982, he expanded the scope of his earlier work in an attempt to explain ''[[The Rise and Decline of Nations]]'' (1982). He argues that groups such as cotton farmers, steel producers, and [[labor unions]] have an incentive to form [[lobby groups]] and influence policies in their favor. These policies will tend to be [[protectionist]], which will hurt [[economic growth]]; but because the benefits of such policies are concentrated, and their costs are diffused throughout the whole population, there will be little public resistance to them. As distributional coalitions accumulate, nations burdened by them will fall into economic decline. His work influenced the formulation of the [[Calmfors–Driffill hypothesis]] of [[collective bargaining]].<ref>Mancur Olson, 1982. ''The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities'', Yale University Press, 1982. [https://books.google.com/books/yup?vid=ISBN9780300030792 Description], chapter-preview [https://books.google.com/books/yup?id=vKxxtjJz--wC&printsec=find&pg=PA7=onepage&q&f=false links], and review [http://yalepress.yale.edu/yupbooks/book.asp?isbn=9780300030792 quotes].</ref>

In his final book, ''[[Power and Prosperity]]'' (2000), Olson distinguished between the economic effects of different types of government, in particular, [[tyranny]], [[anarchy]], and [[democracy]]. Olson argued that under anarchy, a "roving bandit" only has the incentive to steal and destroy, whilst a "[[Stationary bandit theory|stationary bandit]]"—a tyrant—has an incentive to encourage some degree of economic success as he expects to remain in power long enough to benefit from that success. A stationary bandit thereby begins to take on the governmental function of protecting citizens and their property against roving bandits. In the move from roving to stationary bandits, Olson sees the seeds of [[civilization]], paving the way, eventually for democracy, which by giving power to those who align with the wishes of the population, improves incentives for good government.<ref>Mancur Olson, 2000. ''Power and Prosperity: Outgrowing Communist and Capitalist Dictatorships'', Oxford University Press. [https://books.google.com/books?id=BX3cZqSbHlMC&pg=PA241=ONEPAGE Description] and chapter-preview [https://books.google.com/books?id=BX3cZqSbHlMC links.] ''[[Foreign Affairs]] ''[http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/55913/richard-n-cooper/power-and-prosperity-outgrowing-communist-and-capitalist-dictato review].</ref> Olson's work on the roving vs. stationary bandits is influential in analysis of the political and economic order structured in [[warlord]] states and societies.{{citation needed|date=October 2021}}