Editing Mental image (section)

==In experimental psychology==

[[cognitive psychology|Cognitive psychologists]] and (later) [[cognitive neuroscience|cognitive neuroscientists]] have empirically tested some of the philosophical questions related to whether and how the human brain uses mental imagery in cognition.

[[file:Mental rotation task (diagram).jpg|right|thumb|The types of rotation tests used by Shepard and Metzler]]
One theory of the mind that was examined in these experiments was the "brain as serial computer" philosophical metaphor of the 1970s. Psychologist [[Zenon Pylyshyn]] theorized that the human mind processes mental images by decomposing them into an underlying mathematical proposition. [[Roger Shepard]] and Jacqueline Metzler challenged that view by presenting subjects with 2D line drawings of groups of 3D block "objects" and asking them to determine whether that "object" is the same as a second figure, some of which rotations of the first "object".<ref>Shepard and Metzler 1971</ref>  Shepard and Metzler proposed that if we decomposed and then mentally re-imaged the objects into basic mathematical propositions, as the then-dominant view of cognition "as a serial digital computer"<ref>Gardner 1987</ref> assumed, then it would be expected that the time it took to determine whether the object is the same or not would be independent of how much the object had been rotated.  Shepard and Metzler found the opposite: a linear relationship between the degree of rotation in the mental imagery task and the time it took participants to reach their answer.

This [[mental rotation]] finding implied that the human mind—and the human brain—maintains and manipulates mental images as topographic and topological wholes, an implication that was quickly put to test by psychologists.  [[Stephen Kosslyn]] and colleagues<ref>Kosslyn 1995; see also 1994</ref> showed in a series of neuroimaging experiments that the mental image of objects like the letter "F" are mapped, maintained and rotated as an image-like whole in areas of the human visual cortex.  Moreover, Kosslyn's work showed that there are considerable similarities between the neural mappings for imagined stimuli and perceived stimuli.  The authors of these studies concluded that, while the neural processes they studied rely on mathematical and computational underpinnings, the brain also seems optimized to handle the sort of mathematics that constantly computes a series of topologically-based images rather than calculating a mathematical model of an object.

Recent studies in neurology and neuropsychology on mental imagery have further questioned the "mind as serial computer" theory, arguing instead that human mental imagery manifests [[motor imagery|both visually and kinesthetically]].  For example, several studies have provided evidence that people are slower at rotating line drawings of objects such as hands in directions incompatible with the joints of the human body,<ref>Parsons 1987; 2003</ref> and that patients with painful, injured arms are slower at mentally rotating line drawings of the hand from the side of the injured arm.<ref>Schwoebel et al. 2001</ref>

Some psychologists, including Kosslyn, have argued that such results occur because of interference in the brain between distinct systems in the brain that process the visual and motor mental imagery.  Subsequent [[neuroimaging]] studies<ref>Kosslyn et al. 2001</ref> showed that the interference between the motor and visual imagery system could be induced by having participants physically handle actual 3D blocks glued together to form objects similar to those depicted in the line-drawings.  Amorim et al. have shown that, when a cylindrical "head" was added to Shepard and Metzler's line drawings of 3D block figures, participants were quicker and more accurate at solving mental rotation problems.<ref>Amorim et al. 2006</ref>  They argue that motoric embodiment is not just "interference" that inhibits visual mental imagery but is capable of facilitating mental imagery.

As cognitive neuroscience approaches to mental imagery continued, research expanded beyond questions of serial versus parallel or topographic processing to questions of the relationship between mental images and perceptual representations. Both brain imaging (fMRI and ERP) and studies of neuropsychological patients have been used to test the hypothesis that a mental image is the reactivation, from memory, of brain representations normally activated during the perception of an external stimulus. In other words, if perceiving an apple activates contour and location and shape and color representations in the brain's visual system, then imagining an apple activates some or all of these same representations using information stored in memory. Early evidence for this idea came from neuropsychology. Patients with brain damage that impairs perception in specific ways, for example by damaging shape or color representations, seem to generally to have impaired mental imagery in similar ways.<ref>{{cite journal|last1=Farah|first1=Martha J.|title=Is visual imagery really visual? Overlooked evidence from neuropsychology|journal=Psychological Review|date=Sep 30, 1987|volume=95|issue=3|pages=307–317|doi=10.1037/0033-295x.95.3.307|pmid=3043530}}</ref> Studies of brain function in normal human brains support this same conclusion, showing activity in the brain's visual areas while subjects imagined visual objects and scenes.<ref>{{cite journal|last1=Cichy|first1=Radoslaw M.|last2=Heinzle|first2=Jakob|last3=Haynes|first3=John-Dylan|title=Imagery and Perception Share Cortical Representations of Content and Location|journal=Cerebral Cortex|date=June 10, 2011|volume=22|issue=2|pages=372–380|doi=10.1093/cercor/bhr106|url=http://psych.wisc.edu/postlab/readings/Cereb.%20Cortex-2012-Cichy-372-80.pdf|pmid=21666128|doi-access=free}}</ref>

The previously mentioned and numerous related studies have led to a relative consensus within [[cognitive science]], psychology, neuroscience, and philosophy on the neural status of mental images.  In general, researchers agree that, while there is no [[homunculus]] inside the head viewing these mental images, our brains do form and maintain mental images as image-like wholes.<ref>Rohrer 2006</ref>  The problem of exactly how these images are stored and manipulated within the human brain, in particular within language and communication, remains a fertile area of study.

One of the longest-running research topics on the mental image has basis on the fact that people report large individual differences in the vividness of their images.  Special questionnaires have been developed to assess such differences, including the [[Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (VVIQ)]] developed by [[David Marks (psychologist)|David Marks]]. Laboratory studies have suggested that the subjectively reported variations in imagery vividness are associated with different neural states within the brain and also different cognitive competences such as the ability to accurately recall information presented in pictures<ref>Marks, 1973</ref> Rodway, Gillies and Schepman used a novel long-term change detection task to determine whether participants with low and high vividness scores on the VVIQ2 showed any performance differences.<ref>Rodway, Gillies and Schepman 2006</ref> Rodway et al. found that high vividness participants were significantly more accurate at detecting salient changes to pictures compared to low-vividness participants.<ref>Rodway et al. 2006</ref> This replicated an earlier study.<ref>Gur and Hilgard 1975</ref>

Recent studies have found that individual differences in VVIQ scores can be used to predict changes in a person's brain while visualizing different activities.<ref>Cui et al. 2007</ref> [[Functional magnetic resonance imaging]] (fMRI) was used to study the association between early visual cortex activity relative to the whole brain while participants visualized themselves or another person bench pressing or stair climbing. Reported image vividness correlates significantly with the relative fMRI signal in the visual cortex. Thus, individual differences in the vividness of visual imagery can be measured objectively.

Logie, Pernet, Buonocore and Della Sala (2011) used behavioural and fMRI data for mental rotation from individuals reporting vivid and poor imagery on the VVIQ. Groups differed in brain activation patterns suggesting that the groups performed the same tasks in different ways. These findings help to explain the lack of association previously reported between VVIQ scores and mental rotation performance.

Beyond visual imagery is the Plymouth Sensory Imagery Questionnaire which measures seven senses. This form of imagery assessment correlates with the VVIQ for visual imagery and shows how other senses vary dependent on individual differences.<ref>Andrade, J., May, J., Deeprose, C., Baugh, S. J., & Ganis, G. (2014). Assessing vividness of mental imagery: The Plymouth sensory imagery questionnaire. British Journal of Psychology, 105(4), 547-563| https://doi.org/10.1111/bjop.12050</ref>