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Metaethics
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==== Ethical subjectivism ==== [[Ethical subjectivism]] is one form of moral anti-realism. It holds that moral statements are made true or false by the attitudes and/or conventions of people, either those of each society, those of each individual, or those of some particular individual. Most forms of ethical subjectivism are [[moral relativism|relativist]], but there are notable forms that are [[moral universalism|universalist]]: * [[Ideal observer theory]] holds that what is right is determined by the [[Attitude (psychology)|attitudes]] that a hypothetical ''ideal observer'' would have. An ideal observer is usually characterized as a being who is perfectly rational, imaginative, and informed, among other things. Though a subjectivist theory due to its reference to a particular (albeit hypothetical) subject, Ideal Observer Theory still purports to provide [[Moral universalism|universal]] answers to moral questions. * [[Divine command theory]] holds that for a thing to be right is for a unique being, God, to approve of it, and that what is right for non-God beings is obedience to the divine will. This view was criticized by Plato in the ''[[Euthyphro]]'' (see the [[Euthyphro problem]]) but retains some modern defenders ([[Robert Merrihew Adams|Robert Adams]], [[Philip L. Quinn|Philip Quinn]], and others). Like ideal observer theory, divine command theory purports to be [[Moral universalism|universalist]] despite its subjectivism.
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