Editing Metaphysical necessity (section)

=== Metaphysical necessity and essentialism ===
Essentialist philosophers argue that metaphysical necessity, grounded in the essences or natures of objects, is absolute, with logical necessity as a subset.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Fine |first=Kit |date=1994 |title=Essence and Modality: The Second Philosophical Perspectives Lecture |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2214160?origin=crossref |journal=Philosophical Perspectives |volume=8 |pages=1 |doi=10.2307/2214160|url-access=subscription }}</ref> [[Essentialism]] holds that some truths are necessary due to the intrinsic nature of objects or propositions, such as water’s chemical composition (H₂O) or an object’s origin. For example, while it is logically possible for a lectern to be made of ice, essentialists argue it is metaphysically impossible if its essence requires a different material. Similarly, [[Elizabeth II|Queen Elizabeth II’s]] parentage is essential to her identity, ruling out logical possibilities of different origins.{{cn|date=May 2025}}

Shalkowski argues that logical necessity depends on a prior metaphysical necessity, as model-theoretic accounts of logical truths (e.g., truth in all models) assume modal constraints about what counts as a possible model. Essentialists view logical necessities as truths about the essences of logical items (e.g., propositions) or universal truths across all objects, while nonlogical metaphysical necessities are specific to certain entities. By constraining genuine possibilities to those consistent with essences, metaphysical necessity is seen as absolute, unlike logical necessity, which overgenerates possibilities by ignoring specific essences.{{cn|date=May 2025}}