Editing Multiple drafts model (section)

===Information processing and consciousness===
The role of information processing in consciousness has been criticised by [[John Searle]] who, in his [[Chinese room]] argument,<ref name="searle">{{cite journal |last=Searle |first=John |date=1980 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070611104618/http://members.aol.com/NeoNoetics/MindsBrainsPrograms.html |title=Minds, Brains and Programs |journal=Behavioral and Brain Sciences |volume=3 |issue=3 |pages=417–424 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |doi=10.1017/S0140525X00005756 |url=http://members.aol.com/NeoNoetics/MindsBrainsPrograms.html |archive-date=2007-06-11|url-access=subscription }}</ref> states that he cannot find anything that could be recognised as conscious experience in a system that relies solely on motions of things from place to place. Dennett sees this argument as misleading, arguing that consciousness is not to be found in a specific part of the system, but in the actions of the whole. In essence, he denies that consciousness requires something in addition to capacity for behaviour, saying that philosophers such as Searle, "just can't imagine how understanding could be a property that emerges from lots of distributed quasi-understanding in a large system".<ref>Dennett (p.&nbsp;439).{{full citation needed|{{subst:DATE}}|date=September 2023}}</ref>