Editing Neutral monism (section)

=== Antecedents ===
Early examples of neutral monism are found in [[Indian philosophy]].<ref name=Silberstein2017>{{cite journal |last=Silberstein |first=Michael |date=2017-11-26 |title=Panentheism, Neutral Monism, and Advaita Vedanta |url=https://www.researchgate.net/publication/321453990_PANENTHEISM_NEUTRAL_MONISM_AND_ADVAITA_VEDANTA |journal=[[Zygon (journal)|Zygon]] |volume=52 |issue=4 |pages=1123-1145 |doi=10.1111/zygo.12367 |access-date=2024-08-13}}</ref><ref name=Cumming2023>{{cite web |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/CUMROS |title=The Nondual Mind: Vedānta, Kashmiri Pratyabhijñā Shaivism, and Spinoza |last=Cumming |first=James H. |date=2023 |website=[[PhilPapers]] |access-date=2024-08-13}}</ref> [[Baruch Spinoza]] and [[David Hume]] provided accounts of reality that may also be interpreted as neutral monism. Spinoza's metaphysics in ''[[Ethics (Spinoza book)|Ethics]]'' argues for a monistic worldview, as well as a neutral one where body and mind are the same.<ref>{{Cite book|last1=Rosencrantz|first1=Gary|last2=Hoffman|first2=Joshua|title=Historical Dictionary of Metaphysics|publisher=ScareCrow Press|year=2010|isbn=978-0810859500|page=287}}</ref> [[H. H. Price]] argues that Hume's [[empiricism]] introduces a "neutral monist theory of sensation" as both "matter and mind are constructed out of sense-data".<ref>{{Cite book|last=Price|first=H. H.|title=Perception|year=1932|location=London|page=105}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last=Backhaus|first=Wilf K.|title=Is Hume a Neutral Monist?|date=1991|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/swphilreview19917216|journal=Southwest Philosophy Review|volume=7|issue=2|pages=1–15|doi=10.5840/swphilreview19917216|issn=0897-2346|url-access=subscription}}</ref>

In the late 19th century, physicist [[Ernst Mach]] theorized that physical entities are nothing apart from their perceived mental properties.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Ernst|first=Mach|url=http://worldcat.org/oclc/1147811644|title=Analysis of Sensations, and the Relation of the Physical to the Psychical|date=2019|publisher=Forgotten Books|isbn=978-0-243-66619-5|oclc=1147811644}}</ref> Mach ultimately surmises that "both object and ego are provisional fictions of the same kind".<ref>{{Citation |last1=Mach |first1=Ernst |title=Knowledge and Error: Sketches on the Psychology of Enquiry |date=1976 |pages=79–91 |chapter=Knowledge and Error |chapter-url=https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-94-010-1428-1_7 |place=Dordrecht |publisher=Springer Netherlands |doi=10.1007/978-94-010-1428-1_7 |isbn=978-90-277-0282-1 |access-date=2021-10-04 |last2=Hiebert |first2=Erwin N.|author-link2=Erwin N. Hiebert}}</ref>