Editing Nguyễn Khánh (section)

==1963 and 1964 coups==
{{Main|1963 South Vietnamese coup|January 1964 South Vietnamese coup}}
Khánh participated in the [[1963 South Vietnamese coup]] led by General [[Dương Văn Minh]] that deposed Diệm, playing a minor role. Khánh expected a large reward, but the junta instead sidelined him, excluding him from the twelve-man Military Revolutionary Council (MRC).<ref name=l161>Logevall, p. 161.</ref> In mid-December he was moved from the [[II Corps (South Vietnam)|II Corps]] in the [[Central Highlands (Vietnam)|central highlands]] to the command of the [[I Corps (South Vietnam)|I Corps]] of the [[Army of the Republic of Vietnam]], based around [[Huế]] and [[Đà Nẵng]] in the far north of the Republic of Vietnam. This, it was speculated, was to keep him as far away from Saigon as possible, as he was regarded by the others as being untrustworthy.<ref name=kb/><ref name=s230>Shaplen, p. 230.</ref>

This was contrary to Khánh's request for a transfer to the [[IV Corps (South Vietnam)|IV Corps]] in the [[Mekong Delta]] close to Saigon, where most of the unconventional fighting was taking place. In an interview with journalist Robert Shaplen, Khánh made no attempt to hide his annoyance at not being given a more important job. With respect to the 1963 coup, he cryptically commented,
"It is too soon yet to tell the whole story, but someday I will tell it to you".<ref name="s230"/> He began to plot against Minh's junta. Khánh claimed that "After the November coup, there was much relaxation, wining and dining, and little prosecution of the war effort."<ref name=m294>Moyar (2006), p. 294.</ref> He claimed he had built up intelligence infrastructure to weed out the Việt Cộng under Diệm's rule, but that the other generals had disbanded it and released communist prisoners.<ref name=m294/>

At the time, Saigon was plagued by infighting. A civilian government and cabinet led by Prime Minister [[Nguyễn Ngọc Thơ]] was appointed, but was hindered by vetoes by the generals.<ref name="j437">Jones, p. 437.</ref> All twelve generals in the MRC had equal power and the power of veto.<ref name="s221">Shaplen, p. 221.</ref> The press strongly attacked Thơ, accusing his government of being "tools" of the MRC.<ref name="s223">Shaplen, p. 223.</ref> Minh was criticised for being lethargic and uninterested in running the country, while communist attacks increased and the military situation deteriorated.<ref>Shaplen, pp. 221–224.</ref>

At the end of December, Khánh was approached by General [[Đỗ Mậu]], one of the principal tacticians in the removal of Diệm. Mậu had been the head of military security under Diệm and had a deep understanding of most of the senior officers and their strengths and weaknesses.<ref name=s230/> The MRC feared Mậu and sidelined him, causing him to plot.<ref name=s231/> Mậu began to recruit rebels. The most important link in Mậu's plan was Colonel [[Nguyễn Chánh Thi]], who led the 1960 coup attempt against Diệm. Mậu persuaded the junta to install Thi as Khánh's deputy in the I Corps. He tricked the junta into doing so by reasoning that Khánh had largely been responsible for putting down the 1960 revolt and that Thi would be an ideal mechanism to keep Khánh, whom the MRC distrusted, in check. Mậu's real reason was to use Thi would be a bridge between himself and Khánh. He was correct in thinking that the 1960 conflict would be irrelevant in the shifting allegiances over time and that the pair would work together for their current aims.<ref name=s231/>

Mậu recruited a second figure in the form of General [[Trần Thiện Khiêm]], who had worked with Mậu during the November coup. Khiêm had assisted Diệm in putting down the 1960 plot and had since been demoted from being Chief of Staff of the ARVN to the commander of the [[III Corps (South Vietnam)|III Corps]] that surrounded Saigon. Khiêm readily joined the plot and controlled the troops near the capital.<ref name=s231>Shaplen, p. 231.</ref> Khiêm, Khánh and Mậu kept in touch surreptitiously on a regular basis, supplementing their forces with an assortment of [[Republic of Vietnam Marine Corps|Marine]], [[Republic of Vietnam Air Force|Air Force]] and [[ARVN Special Forces|Special Forces]] officers.<ref name=k352>Karnow, p. 352.</ref> Another notable recruit was the chief of the Civil Guard, [[Dương Ngọc Lâm]]. He was under investigation by the junta for swindling military funds and was readily converted. Another was General [[Dương Văn Đức]], who had recently returned from exile in Paris.<ref>Shaplen, pp. 231–232.</ref>

At the time, there was innuendo that the MRC would become neutralist and stop fighting the communists, and that they were plotting with French President [[Charles de Gaulle]], who supported such a solution in order to remove the US presence. De Gaulle had just recognized the People's Republic of China as the legitimate government of China, a move that angered the US government, which still recognized the Republic of China on Taiwan as the rightful government of China, and was supporting the neutralization of South East Asia.<ref>Karnow p. 357</ref> The French recognition of the People's Republic of China led American officials to see de Gaulle's neutralist plans as pro-communist. Khánh's allies concocted documents purporting to show that Generals Minh, [[Lê Văn Kim]] and [[Trần Văn Đôn]] were making neutralist moves, and the papers were leaked to some senior American officials.<ref name=s232>Shaplen, p. 232.</ref> Khánh sometimes plotted while in Saigon on military affairs, and told various American officials that Đôn, Kim and General [[Mai Hữu Xuân]], along with Minh, were "pro-French and pro-neutralist" and part of de Gaulle's plan. Khánh claimed the fact that Đôn had invited two members of the [[French National Assembly]], both from de Gaulle's party, to dine with him, Kim and Minh as proof.<ref name=l162>Logevall, p. 162.</ref> The American ambassador in Saigon, [[Henry Cabot Lodge Jr.]], believed in the rumors that Kim and Đôn favored neutrality for South Vietnam in the Cold War.<ref>Karnow pp. 357–358</ref>

On 28 January, Khánh flew from Huế to Saigon in civilian clothes, ostensibly for a dental appointment.<ref name=k352/> A number of American officers and embassy officials were alerted to be in their offices at two o'clock in the morning of 30 January. The US Ambassador, [[Henry Cabot Lodge Jr.]], was kept fully informed throughout the night.<ref name=s233>Shaplen, p. 233.</ref>

Before dawn on 30 January, Khánh surrounded the military headquarters at [[Tan Son Nhut Air Base|Tân Sơn Nhứt Air Base]]. Meanwhile, Khiêm had overslept when he was supposed to seal off the homes of the junta members. Despite this, by daybreak, Khánh had taken over the government without a shot having been fired.<ref name=k352/> In his first radio broadcast on the same morning, Khánh assailed the MRC's performance during its three months at the top. He said, "The political, economic, and social situation in the countryside still offers no promising prospect. There has not been one single compensation worthy of the sacrifices accepted daily by the soldiers."<ref name=s234>Shaplen, p. 234.</ref>

US officials in Washington were caught off guard by the coup. Although Khánh had already told [[CIA]] officer [[Lucien Conein]] (who helped to plan the coup against Diệm) in December 1963 that he intended to hold a coup, it was filed away among the many political rumour documents that were received by the American representatives. Following the coup, he was promoted by the Americans as South Vietnam's new hope.<ref name=versus>{{cite magazine|title=South Viet Nam: The U.S. v. the Generals|date=1 January 1965|magazine=[[Time (magazine)|Time Magazine]]}}</ref> In a dispatch to Washington, Cabot Lodge wrote: "We have everything we need in Vietnam. The United States has provided military advice, training, equipment, economic and social help, and political advice...Therefore, our side knows how to do it. We have the means to it. We simply need to do it. This requires a tough and ruthless commander. Perhaps Khánh is it".<ref name="Karnow p.358">Karnow p. 358</ref>