Editing Operation Anadyr (section)

===Military deception===
{{further|Military deception}}

Perhaps the most fundamental deception in Operation Anadyr was the code name itself. To an American intelligence analyst poring over intercepted Soviet military communications, "Anadyr" would suggest anything but a movement of Soviet troops to the [[Caribbean]]. The [[Anadyr River|Anadyr]] is a river that flows into the [[Bering Sea]], and also the name of a Soviet [[Anadyr (town)|district capital]] and a [[Anadyr Ugolny Airport|remote bomber base]], both in the far east of the Soviet Union. Thus, both American analysts and rank-and-file Soviet soldiers, prone to starting rumors and leaking information, would most likely have expected the operation to be a military exercise in the northern vastness of the USSR.<ref>{{harvp|Hansen|2002|p=50}}</ref>

In the early planning stages of Operation Anadyr, only five senior officers on the General Staff were privy to the details of the deployment or its actual location. They alone prepared every feature of the enterprise, enough work to keep scores of staff busy for weeks, but so stringent was the demand for secrecy that no one else was allowed into this small coterie. The plans were handwritten to deny knowledge of the operation to even a single secretary.<ref>{{harvp|Gribkov|Smith|1994|p=24}}</ref>

The logistical preparations for Anadyr were equally covert. Men and matériel were moved by railway to four northern ports and four on the Black Sea. Foreigners were barred from the ports during this period, and most loading occurred under the cover of darkness. Troops awaiting the voyage were restricted to barracks and denied contact with the outside world. The same restrictions were placed on the sailors of the transport ships. During the wait, Soviet soldiers kept busy by constructing false superstructures with plywood to hide the ships' defenses, and even on-deck field kitchens. Metal sheets were placed over missiles and missile launchers, which were too large to be stored below decks on most vessels, to prevent detection by [[infrared]] surveillance. Other military equipment was stored below decks. Agricultural equipment and other non-military machinery was placed on deck to add to the subterfuge. Once underway, the Soviet troops were not allowed on deck, except at night, and even then only in small groups.<ref name="Hansen_52_53">{{harvp|Hansen|2002|pp=52–53}}</ref>

Instructions to the troops and ship crews were carried by special couriers to prevent Western intelligence services from intercepting electronic communications regarding the operation. The ships' captains received their instructions, which revealed their final destination, only after they had put out to sea. The instructions were given to them by a [[KGB]] officer aboard who had been entrusted with the envelope prior to departure. Every vessel carried thick folders of information on various countries for the officers aboard to review. Only after the destination was revealed were they specifically instructed to study Cuba.<ref name="Hansen_52_53"/>

Soviet denial and deception measures were equally rigid upon the ships' arrival in Cuba. The vessels unloaded at eleven ports to complicate adversarial surveillance. While non-military equipment was unloaded in daylight, matériel with obvious military qualities was unloaded and transported to its end destination only at night. The same applied to major troop movements, and Soviet military positions were generally in sparsely populated areas of the island. The Soviet troops were even forbidden to wear their uniforms, in order to make the Soviet military presence deniable. Instead, they wore civilian attire. Simultaneously, as a false explanation for the presence of the men and equipment, the Soviet media trumpeted the massive agricultural assistance that the Soviets were ostensibly providing to their Cuban comrades.<ref>{{harvp|Gribkov|Smith|1994|pp=38–40}}</ref>