Editing Operation Linebacker II (section)

===Planning===
[[File:OperationLinebacker--II.jpg|thumb|[[B-52]] bombing crews at [[Andersen Air Force Base]], [[Guam]] being briefed on the operation.]]
In the wake of Operation Linebacker, the U.S. had a force of 207 [[B-52]] bombers available for use in Southeast Asia.<ref>Tilford, p. 224.</ref> A total of 54 bombers (all B-52Ds) were based at [[U-Tapao RTAFB]], Thailand, while 153 were based at [[Andersen Air Force Base]], [[Guam]] (55 B-52Ds and 98 B-52Gs). This deployment comprised nearly half of the Air Force's manned bomber fleet, and [[Strategic Air Command]] (SAC) commanders were initially reluctant to risk the expensive aircraft and their highly trained crews in such an operation; the production line for B-52s had long since been shut down, and losses could not be replaced.<ref>Michel p. 272</ref><ref>Within the administration, the operation was opposed by Secretary of Defense Laird, his deputy, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Thomas Moorer. Ambrose, p. 403.</ref> The use of large numbers of B-52s was unprecedented in the war and the proposed mass attacks on targets within {{convert|10|nmi|km|-1}} of Hanoi "represented a dynamic change in the employment of air resources".<ref>Herman L. Gilster, ''The Air War in Southeast Asia''. Maxwell Air Force Base AL: Air University Press, 1993, p. 75.</ref>

The new operation, given the title Linebacker II, was marked by top-down planning by the SAC headquarters at [[Offutt AFB]]. Due to the restrictive time frame imposed by President Nixon (only three days) and the experience of Linebacker (in which North Vietnamese fighter aircraft had posed the highest threat to the bombers), SAC's plan called for all of the bombers to approach Hanoi at night in three waves, each using identical approach paths and flying at the same altitude.<ref>''Linebacker II'', p. 41. During Linebacker, 14 American aircraft were lost to SAMs, three were lost to AAA fire and MiGs shot down 27. Tilford, p. 241.</ref>

Once the aircraft had dropped their bombs, they were to execute what SAC termed "post-target turns" (PTT) to the west. These turns had two unfortunate consequences for the bombers: the B-52s would be turning into a strong headwind, slowing their ground speed by {{cvt|100|kn|mph+km/h}} and prolonging their stay in the target area and the PTT would point the emitter antennas of their [[Electronic warfare|Electronic Warfare]] (EW) systems away from the radars they were attempting to jam, degrading the effectiveness of the cells, as well as showing the largest radar cross-section to the missile guidance radars.<ref>Brig. Gen. James R. McCarthy and LtCol George B. Allison, Linebacker II, Maxwell Air Force base AL: Air War College, 1979, p. 121.</ref> The aircraft employed had significantly different EW capabilities; the B-52G carried fewer [[Radio jamming|jammers]] and put out appreciably less power than the B-52Ds but had more efficient engines and larger fuel tanks, hence they were assigned to longer range mission routes.<ref name = 'McCarthy6'>McCarthy and Allison, 1979, p. 6.</ref>