Editing Operation Rolling Thunder (section)

===Strategic persuasion===
Under the doctrine of "gradualism", in which threatening destruction would serve as a more influential signal of American determination than destruction itself, it was thought better to hold important targets "hostage" by bombing trivial ones. From the beginning of Rolling Thunder, Washington dictated which targets would be struck, the day and hour of the attack, the number, and types of aircraft and the tonnages and types of ordnance utilized, and sometimes even the direction of the attack.<ref>Morocco, p. 55.</ref> Airstrikes were strictly forbidden within {{convert|30|nmi|km|-1}} of Hanoi and within {{convert|10|nmi|km|-1}} of the port of [[Haiphong]]. A thirty-mile buffer zone also extended along the length of the Chinese frontier. According to U.S. Air Force historian Earl Tilford:

<blockquote>Targeting bore little resemblance to reality in that the sequence of attacks was uncoordinated and the targets were approved randomly—even illogically. The North's airfields, which, according to any rational targeting policy, should have been hit first in the campaign, were also off-limits.<ref>Tilford, p. 109.</ref></blockquote>

[[File:A-4E attacking train in North Vietnam c1965.jpeg|thumb|A U.S. Navy [[Douglas A-4 Skyhawk]] attacking a train in North Vietnam with a ''Zuni'' rocket]]

Although some of these restrictions were later loosened or rescinded, Johnson (with McNamara's support) kept a tight rein on the campaign, which continuously infuriated the American military commanders, right-wing members of Congress, and even some within the administration itself.<ref>Morocco, p. 57.</ref> One of the primary objectives of the operation, at least to the military, should have been the closure of Haiphong and other ports by aerial mining, thereby slowing or halting the flow of seaborne supplies entering the north. Johnson refused to take such a provocative action, however, and such an operation was not implemented until 1972. There was also little consultation between Johnson and the military chiefs during the target selection process. Even the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General [[Earle Wheeler]], was not present for most of the critical discussions of 1965 and participated only occasionally thereafter.<ref>Thompson, p. 80.</ref>

[[File:Rolling Thunder route packages.jpg|thumb|[[Route Package]] organization]]

The majority of strikes during Rolling Thunder were launched from four air bases in [[Thailand]]: [[Korat Royal Thai Air Force Base|Korat]], [[Takhli Royal Thai Air Force Base|Takhli]], [[Udorn Royal Thai Air Force Base|Udorn]], and [[Ubon Royal Thai Air Force Base|Ubon]].{{efn|Only one South Vietnam-based squadron (based at [[Da Nang Air Base|Da Nang]]) participated in the DRV missions.}} The aircraft refueled from aerial tankers over [[Laos]] before flying on to their targets in the DRV. After attacking their targets (usually by [[dive-bombing]]) the strike forces would either fly directly back to Thailand or exit over the relatively safe waters of the Gulf of Tonkin. It was quickly decided that, in order to limit airspace conflicts between air force and naval strike forces, North Vietnam was divided into six target regions called "[[Route Package|route packages]]", each of which was assigned to either the Air Force or Navy and into which the other was forbidden to intrude.<ref>{{cite journal |url=http://www.airforcemag.com/magazinearchive/pages/1999/november%201999/1199pack.aspx?signon=false |title=Route Pack 6 |first= Walter |last=Boyne |journal=Air Force Magazine |date=November 1999}}</ref>

[[File:A-4E Skyhawks attacking Phuong Dinh bridge Vietnam 1967.jpg|thumb|A-4E Skyhawks attacking Phuong Dinh bridge in 1967]]

Naval strikes were launched from the aircraft carriers of [[Task Force 77 (U.S. Navy)|Task Force 77]], cruising off the North Vietnamese coast at [[Yankee Station]]. Naval aircraft, which had shorter ranges (and carried lighter bomb loads) than their air force counterparts, approached their targets from seaward with the majority of their strikes flown against coastal targets.{{efn|This also helped account for the lower number of aircraft and pilot losses suffered by the Navy. Fighters had only to defend a 90-degree arc in front of the strike force, SAM exposure was more limited, and coastal targets made the shorter distances of search and rescue operations more conducive to success.}}{{cn|date=May 2025}}

On 3 April the Joint Chiefs persuaded McNamara and Johnson to launch a four-week attack on North Vietnam's lines of communication, which would isolate the country from its overland sources of supply in China and the Soviet Union. About one-third of the North's imports came down the [[Hanoi–Lào Cai railway]] from China, while the remaining two-thirds came by sea through Haiphong and other ports.<ref>Thompson, p. 26.</ref> For the first time in the campaign, targets were to be chosen for their military, rather than their psychological, significance.<ref>Morocco, p. 58.</ref> During the four weeks, 26 bridges and seven ferries were destroyed.<ref>Morocco, p. 61.</ref> Other targets included the extensive North Vietnamese radar system, barracks, and ammunition depots.<ref name=Drew>Drew 1986.</ref>

The panhandle of southern North Vietnam remained the primary focus of operations, and total sorties flown there rose from 3,600 in April to 4,000 in May.<ref name="Morocco, p. 63">Morocco, p. 63.</ref> Slowly moving away from the destruction of fixed targets, "armed reconnaissance" missions, in which small formations of aircraft patrolled highways, railroads, and rivers, searching for targets of opportunity, were authorized. These missions increased from two to 200 sorties per week by the end of 1965.<ref name="Morocco, p. 63"/> Eventually, armed reconnaissance missions constituted 75 percent of the total bombing effort, in part because the system through which fixed targets were requested, selected, and authorized was so complicated and unwieldy.<ref>Tilford, p. 108.</ref>