Editing Preventive war (section)

== Case for preventive nuclear war ==
{{See also|First strike (nuclear strategy)}}
Since 1945, World War III between the US and the USSR was perceived by many as inevitable and imminent. Many high officials in the US military sector and some renowned luminaries in non-military fields advocated preventive war. According to their rationale, total war is inevitable, and it was senseless to permit the Russians to develop a nuclear parity with the United States. Hence the sooner the preventive war come the better, because the [[First strike (nuclear strategy)|first strike]] is almost surely decisive and less devastating.<ref>Brodie, Bernard (1959). ''Strategy in the Missile Age'', (New Jersey: Princeton University Press), p 229.</ref><ref>Kaku, Michio & Axelrod, Daniel (1987). ''To Win a Nuclear War: The Pentagon Secret War Plans'', (Boston: South End Press), p 314.</ref>
[[Dean Acheson]]<ref>Trachtenberg, Marc (1988/89). “A ‘wasting asset’: American strategy and the shifting nuclear balance,” ''International Security'', vol 13 (3): p 12-13.</ref>
and [[James Burnham]]<ref>Burnham, James (1947). ''Struggle for the World'', (New York: The John Day Company), p 248, https://ia800504.us.archive.org/25/items/struggleforworld00burn/struggleforworld00burn.pdf</ref> adhered to the version that the war is not inevitable but is already going on, although the American people still do not realize it.

The US military sector widely and wholeheartedly shared the idea of preventive war.<ref>Baldwin, Hanson W. (October 1, 1950). “Hans Baldwin on preventive war,” ''Bulletin of Atomic Scientists'', 6/10, October 1: p 318, https://books.google.com/books?id=_Q0AAAAAMBAJ </ref><ref>Trachtenberg, Marc (1988/89). “A ‘wasting asset’: American strategy and the shifting nuclear balance,” ''International Security'', vol 13 (3): p 10-11.</ref> Most prominent proponents included Defense Secretary [[Louis A. Johnson]], [[Joint Chiefs of Staff|JCS]] Chairman Admiral [[Arthur W. Radford]], Navy Secretary [[Francis P. Matthews]], Admiral [[Ralph A. Ofstie]], Air Force Secretary W. Stuart Symington, Air Force Chiefs [[Curtis LeMay]] and [[Nathan F. Twining]], Air Force Generals [[George Kenney]] and [[Orvil A. Anderson]], General [[Leslie Groves]] (the wartime commander of the [[Manhattan Project]]) and CIA Director [[Walter Bedell Smith]].<ref>Baldwin, Hanson W. (October 1, 1950). “Hans Baldwin on preventive war,” ''Bulletin of Atomic Scientists'', 6/10, October 1: p 318, https://books.google.com/books?id=_Q0AAAAAMBAJ </ref><ref>LeMay, Curtis & Kantor, MacKinlay (1965). ''Mission with LeMay: My Story'', (New York: Doubleday & Company), p 481-482, 485.</ref><ref>Twining, Nathan (1966). ''Neither Liberty nor Safety: A Hard Look at US Military Policy and Strategy'', (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston), p 19.</ref><ref>Ball, Desmond (1982/83). “US strategic forces: How would they be used?” ''International Security'', vol 7 (3): p 42.</ref><ref>Trachtenberg, Marc (1988/89). “A ‘wasting asset’: American strategy and the shifting nuclear balance,” ''International Security'', vol 13 (3): p 5, 19-20, 41.</ref><ref>Dingman, Roger (1988/89). “Atomic diplomacy during the Korean War,” ''International Security'', vol 13 (3): p 69.</ref><ref>Gentile, Gian P. (Spring 2000). “Planning for preventive war, 1945 – 1950,” ''Joint Forces Quarterly'', vol 24: p 70. </ref><ref>Mueller, Karl P. & Castillo, Jasen J. & Morgan, Forrest E. & Pegahi, Negeen & Rosen, Brian (2006). “Striking first: Preemptive and preventive attack in US national security policy,” ''Project Air Force'', (RAND Corporation), p 131-132, 136, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2006/RAND_MG403.pdf</ref><ref>Meilinger, Phillip S. (2012). ''Bomber: The Formation and Early History of Strategic Air Command'', (Alabama: Air University Press), p 290.</ref> [[United States National Security Council|NSC]]-100 and several studies by [[Strategic Air Command|SAC]] and JCS during the Korean War advocated preventive war too.<ref>Rosenberg, David Alan (1983). “The origins of Overkill: Nuclear weapons and American strategy, 1945-1960,” ''International Security'', vol 7 (4): p 33-34.</ref>

In Congress, preventive warriors counted Deputy Secretary of Defense [[Paul Nitze]],<ref>Later, Nitze distanced himself from a “small group” of believers in preventive war. Nitze, Paul H. (1976). “Assuring strategic stability in an era of Détente,” ''Foreign Affairs'', vol 54 (2): p 212.</ref> expert on the Soviet Union [[Charles E. Bohlen]] of the State Department, Senators [[John L. McClellan]], [[Paul H. Douglas]], [[Eugene D. Millikin]], [[Brien McMahon]] (Chairman of the Atomic Energy Committee), [[William Knowland]] and Congressman [[Henry M. Jackson]]. The diplomatic circle included distinguished diplomats like [[George Kennan]], [[William C. Bullitt]] (US Ambassador to Moscow), and [[John Paton Davies]] (from the same embassy).<ref>''[[FRUS]]'' (1949), vol I: p 284. </ref><ref>Trachtenberg, Marc (1988/89). “A ‘wasting asset’: American strategy and the shifting nuclear balance,” ''International Security'', vol 13 (3): p 8-9, 20, 47.</ref><ref>Trachtenberg, Marc. (2007). “Preventive war and US foreign policy,” ''Security Studies'', vol 16 (1): p 4-5.</ref><ref>Mueller, Karl P. & Castillo, Jasen J. & Morgan, Forrest E. & Pegahi, Negeen & Rosen, Brian (2006). “Striking first: Preemptive and preventive attack in US national security policy,” ''Project Air Force'', (RAND Corporation), p 127, 131-132, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2006/RAND_MG403.pdf</ref><ref>Albertson, Trevor D., (2015). “Ready for the worst: Preemption, prevention and American nuclear policy,” ''Air Power History'', vol 62 (1): p 32.</ref>

[[John von Neumann]] of the Manhattan Project and later a consultant for the [[RAND Corporation]] expressed:  "With the Russians it is not a question of whether but of when… If you say why not bomb them tomorrow, I say why not today?"<ref>Blair, Clay (February 25, 1957). “Passing of a great mind: John von Neumann, a brilliant, jovial Mathematician, was a prodigious servant of science and his country,” ''Life'': p 96, https://books.google.com/books?id=rEEEAAAAMBAJ&pg=PA89</ref><ref>Chen, Janet & Lu, Su-I & Vekhter, Dan (1999). "Von Neumann and the development of game theory," (Stanford University), https://cs.stanford.edu/people/eroberts/courses/soco/projects/1998-99/game-theory/neumann.html</ref> Other renowned scientists and thinkers, such as [[Leo Szilard]], [[William L. Laurence]],<ref>Trachtenberg, Marc (1988/89). “A ‘wasting asset’: American strategy and the shifting nuclear balance,” ''International Security'', vol 13 (3): p 7-8.</ref> James Burnham,<ref>Burnham, James (1947). ''Struggle for the World'', (New York: The John Day Company), p 248,  https://ia800504.us.archive.org/25/items/struggleforworld00burn/struggleforworld00burn.pdf</ref> and [[Bertrand Russell]].<ref>Perkins, Ray (Winter 1994/95). "Bertrand Russell and preventive war," ''Journal of the Bertrand Russell Archives'', vol 14: p 135-153.</ref>
joined the preventive effort. The preventive war in the late 1940s was argued by “some very dedicated Americans.”<ref>Twining, Nathan (1966). ''Neither Liberty nor Safety: A Hard Look at US Military Policy and Strategy'', (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston), p 49.</ref><ref>Meilinger, Phillip S. (2012). ''Bomber: The Formation and Early History of Strategic Air Command'', (Alabama: Air University Press), p 314.</ref> “Realists” repeatedly proposed the preventive war.<ref>Oppenheimer, Ernest (December 1, 1947). “The challenge of our time,” ''Bulletin of Atomic Scientists'', vol 3 (12): p 370, https://books.google.com/books?id=pA0AAAAAMBAJ</ref> "The argument—prevent before it is too late—was quite common in the early atomic age and by no way limited to “the lunatic fringe.”<ref>Trachtenberg, Marc (1988/89). “A ‘wasting asset’: American strategy and the shifting nuclear balance,” ''International Security'', vol 13 (3): p 7-8.</ref> A famous atomic scientist expressed a concern: In 1946, public discussion of international problems, in the United States at least, "has moved dangerously towards a consideration of so-called preventive war. One sees this tendency perhaps most markedly in the trend of news in Americans newspapers."<ref>Urey, Harold C. (November 1, 1946a). “Atomic energy and world peace,” ''Bulletin of Atomic Scientists'', vol 2 (9-10): p 2, https://books.google.com/books?id=WgwAAAAAMBAJ</ref> 

Bernard Brodie noted that at least prior to 1950, preventive war was a “live issue … among a very small but earnest minority of American citizens.”<ref>Brodie, Bernard (1959). ''Strategy in the Missile Age'', (New Jersey: Princeton University Press), p 227-228.</ref> The dating of Brodie is too short, as the preventive war doctrine has had increasing support since the Korean War started.<ref>''FRUS'' (1950), vol III: p 197-204. </ref> The late summer 1950 saw “a flurry of articles” in the public press dealing with preventive war. One of them in [[Time magazine]] (September 18, 1950) called for a buildup, followed by a “showdown” with the Russians by 1953.<ref>Trachtenberg, Marc (1988/89). “A ‘wasting asset’: American strategy and the shifting nuclear balance,” ''International Security'', vol 13 (3): p 21.</ref> “1950 may have marked the high tide of ‘preventive war’ agitation…”<ref>Trachtenberg, Marc (1988/89). “A ‘wasting asset’: American strategy and the shifting nuclear balance,” ''International Security'', vol 13 (3): p 24. </ref> According to [[Gallup poll]] of July 1950, right after the outbreak of the War, 14% of the polled opined for the immediate declaration of war on the USSR, the percentage which only slightly declined by the end of the War.<ref>Trachtenberg, Marc (1988/89). “A ‘wasting asset’: American strategy and the shifting nuclear balance,” ''International Security'', vol 13 (3): p 5.</ref><ref>Mueller, Karl P. & Castillo, Jasen J. & Morgan, Forrest E. & Pegahi, Negeen & Rosen, Brian (2006). “Striking first: Preemptive and preventive attack in US national security policy,” ''Project Air Force'', (RAND Corporation), p 149-150, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2006/RAND_MG403.pdf</ref> “So preventive war thinking was surprisingly widespread in the early nuclear age, the period from mid-1945 through late 1954.”<ref>Trachtenberg, Marc (2007). “Preventive war and US foreign policy,” Security Studies, vol 16 (1): p 5.</ref>

The preventive warriors remained minority in America’s postwar political arena, and Washington’s elder statesmen soundly rejected their arguments.<ref>Trachtenberg, Marc (1988/89). “A ‘wasting asset’: American strategy and the shifting nuclear balance,” ''International Security'', vol 13 (3): p 11.</ref><ref>Mueller, Karl P. & Castillo, Jasen J. & Morgan, Forrest E. & Pegahi, Negeen & Rosen, Brian (2006). “Striking first: Preemptive and preventive attack in US national security policy,” ''Project Air Force'', (RAND Corporation), p 121, 127-128, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2006/RAND_MG403.pdf</ref> However, during several of the East-West confrontations that marked the first decade of the Cold War, well-placed officials in both the Truman and Eisenhower administrations urged their Presidents to launch preventive strikes on the Soviet Union.<ref>Mueller, Karl P. & Castillo, Jasen J. & Morgan, Forrest E. & Pegahi, Negeen & Rosen, Brian (2006). “Striking first: Preemptive and preventive attack in US national security policy,” ''Project Air Force'', (RAND Corporation), p 121, 127-128, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2006/RAND_MG403.pdf</ref> Entry in Truman’s secret personal journal on January 27, 1952 tells: 
{{Blockquote|
It seems to me that the proper approach now would be an ultimatum with a ten-days expiration limit informing Moscow that we intend to blockade the China coast … and that we intend to destroy every military base in Manchuria … by means now at our control and if there is any further interference we shall eliminate any ports or cities necessary to accomplish our peaceful purposes. This means all-out war. It means Moscow, St. Petersburg, Mukden, Vladivostok, Beijing… and every manufacturing plant in China and the Soviet Union will be eliminated. This is the final chance for the Soviet Government to decide whether it desires to survive or not.<ref>Kaku, Michio & Axelrod, Daniel (1987). ''To Win a Nuclear War: The Pentagon Secret War Plans'', (Boston: South End Press), p 73. </ref>}}
In 1953, Eisenhower wrote in a summary memorandum to his Secretary of State, [[John Foster Dulles]]: In present circumstances, "we would be forced to consider whether or not out duty to future generations did not require us to initiate war at the most propitious moment we could designate.”<ref>Eisenhower, Dwight, (September 8, 1953). " Memorandum by the President to the Secretary of State," ''Office of the Historian'', https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d89</ref> In May 1954, the JCS’s Advance Study Group proposed to Eisenhower to consider “deliberately precipitating war with the USSR in the near future,” before Soviet thermonuclear capability became a real menace.<ref>Rosenberg, David Alan (1983). “The origins of Overkill: Nuclear weapons and American strategy, 1945-1960,” ''International Security'', vol 7 (4): p 33-34. </ref> The same year, Eisenhower asked in a meeting of National Security Council: “Should the United States now get ready to fight the Soviet Union?” and pointed out that “he had brought up this question more than once at prior Council meetings and he had never done so facetiously.”<ref>Trachtenberg, Marc (1988/89). “A ‘wasting asset’: American strategy and the shifting nuclear balance,” ''International Security'', vol 13 (3): p 39.</ref><ref>Mueller, Karl P. & Castillo, Jasen J. & Morgan, Forrest E. & Pegahi, Negeen & Rosen, Brian (2006). “Striking first: Preemptive and preventive attack in US national security policy,” ''Project Air Force'', (RAND Corporation), p 137-138, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2006/RAND_MG403.pdf</ref> By the fall 1954, Eisenhower made his mind up and approved a ''Basic National Security Policy'' paper which stated unequivocally that “the United States and its allies must reject the concept of preventive war, or acts intended to provoke war.”<ref>Rosenberg, David Alan (1983). “The origins of Overkill: Nuclear weapons and American strategy, 1945-1960,” ''International Security'', vol 7 (4): p 33-34.</ref><ref>Mueller, Karl P. & Castillo, Jasen J. & Morgan, Forrest E. & Pegahi, Negeen & Rosen, Brian (2006). “Striking first: Preemptive and preventive attack in US national security policy,” ''Project Air Force'', (RAND Corporation), p 127-128, 137, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2006/RAND_MG403.pdf</ref><ref>Trachtenberg, Marc. (2007). “Preventive war and US foreign policy,” ''Security Studies'', vol 16 (1): p 6.</ref>

Winston Churchill was more resolved on the preventive war. He argued repeatedly in the late 1940s that matters needed to be brought to a head with the Soviets before it was too late, while the United States still enjoyed a nuclear monopoly.<ref>Kissinger, Henry A. (1961). ''The Necessity for Choice: Prospects of American Foreign Policy'', (New York: Harper & Row Publishers), p 178-179.</ref><ref>Trachtenberg, Marc (1988/89). “A ‘wasting asset’: American strategy and the shifting nuclear balance,” ''International Security'', vol 13 (3): p 9-10. </ref><ref>Trachtenberg, Marc. (2007). “Preventive war and US foreign policy,” ''Security Studies'', vol 16 (1): p 5.</ref><ref>Mueller, Karl P. & Castillo, Jasen J. & Morgan, Forrest E. & Pegahi, Negeen & Rosen, Brian (2006). “Striking first: Preemptive and preventive attack in US national security policy,” ''Project Air Force'', (RAND Corporation), p 121, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2006/RAND_MG403.pdf</ref> Charles de Gaulle in 1954 regretted that now it was too late.<ref>Trachtenberg, Marc. (2007). “Preventive war and US foreign policy,” ''Security Studies'', vol 16 (1): p 5.</ref> Curtis LeMay<ref>LeMay, Curtis & Kantor, MacKinlay (1965). ''Mission with LeMay: My Story'', (New York: Doubleday & Company), p 485.</ref> and [[Henry Kissinger]]<ref>Kissinger, Henry A. (1979). ''The White House Years'', (Boston & Toronto: Little, Brown and Company), p 62.</ref> later expressed the same regret over missed opportunity.