Editing Problem of induction (section)

====Medieval philosophy====
Medieval writers such as [[al-Ghazali]] and [[William of Ockham]] connected the problem with God's absolute power, asking how we can be certain that the world will continue behaving as expected when God could at any moment miraculously cause the opposite.<ref>Franklin, J. (2001), ''The Science of Conjecture: Evidence and Probability Before Pascal'' (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press), 232–233, 241.</ref> [[Duns Scotus]], however, argued that inductive inference from a finite number of particulars to a universal generalization was justified by "a proposition reposing in the soul, 'Whatever occurs in a great many instances by a cause that is not free, is the natural effect of that cause.{{'"}}<ref>''Duns Scotus: Philosophical Writings'', trans. A. Wolter (Edinburgh: 1962), 109–110; Franklin, ''Science of Conjecture'', 206.</ref> Some 17th-century [[Jesuits]] argued that although God could create the end of the world at any moment, it was necessarily a rare event and hence our confidence that it would not happen very soon was largely justified.<ref>Franklin, ''Science of Conjecture'', 223–224.</ref>