Editing Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carrier (section)

===Strategic Defence and Security Review 2010===
{{main|Strategic Defence and Security Review 2010}}
On 19 October 2010, the government announced the results of its Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR). The review stated that only one carrier was certain to be commissioned; the fate of the other was left undecided. The second ship of the class could be placed in "extended readiness" to provide a continuous single carrier strike capability when the other was in refit or provide the option to regenerate more quickly to a two carrier strike ability. Alternatively, the second ship could be sold in "cooperation with a close ally to provide continuous carrier-strike capability".<ref name="sdsr-factsheet9">{{cite web |url=http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/sites/default/files/resources/Factsheet9-Carrier-Strike.pdf |title=Fact Sheet 9: Carrier Strike|date=19 October 2010|publisher=HM Government |access-date=27 October 2010|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120817213607/http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/sites/default/files/resources/Factsheet9-Carrier-Strike.pdf|archive-date=17 August 2012|url-status=live}}</ref>

It was also announced that the operational carrier would have catapult and arrestor gear (CATOBAR) installed to accommodate the carrier variant of the F-35 rather than the short-take off and vertical-landing version.<ref name="sdsr">{{cite web |url=http://www.direct.gov.uk/prod_consum_dg/groups/dg_digitalassets/@dg/@en/documents/digitalasset/dg_191634.pdf |title=Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review |date=19 October 2010 |publisher=HM Government |access-date=19 October 2010 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20101222022127/http://www.direct.gov.uk/prod_consum_dg/groups/dg_digitalassets/%40dg/%40en/documents/digitalasset/dg_191634.pdf |archive-date=22 December 2010}}</ref><ref name=FG_UK_swap_JSFs /> It was decided to use the next-generation [[Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System]] (EMALS) catapult and [[Advanced Arresting Gear]] (AAG) instead of the more conventional systems which the design had originally been specified to be compatible with.<ref name="hobbsp345">{{harvnb|Hobbs|2013|p=345}}</ref>

The decision to convert ''Prince of Wales'' to CATOBAR was reviewed after the projected costs rose to around double the original estimate. On 10 May 2012, the Defence Secretary, [[Philip Hammond]], announced in Parliament that the government had decided to revert to its predecessor's plans to purchase the F-35B rather than the F-35C, and to complete both aircraft carriers with [[Aircraft ski-jump|ski-jumps]] in the STOVL configuration.<ref name="10 May 2012 announcement text" /> MoD sources indicated that the cost of installing EMALS and AAG on ''Prince of Wales'' would have risen to £2&nbsp;billion, of which about £450&nbsp;million of which was the cost of the equipment and the remainder the cost of installation.<ref name="hobbsp345"/> The total cost of the work that had been done on the conversion to a CATOBAR configuration, and of reverting the design to the original STOVL configuration, was estimated by Philip Hammond to be "something in the order of £100&nbsp;million".<ref name="Hammond on Radio 4">{{cite web |url= http://fullfact.org/articles/how_do_you_solve_a_problem_like_an_expensive_aircraft_carrier-27178 |publisher=fullfact.org |access-date=20 May 2012 |author=Bentley, Matt |date=11 May 2012 |title=How do you solve a problem like an expensive aircraft carrier? |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120630092904/http://fullfact.org/articles/how_do_you_solve_a_problem_like_an_expensive_aircraft_carrier-27178 |archive-date=30 June 2012 |url-status=live}}</ref> In later testimony before a parliamentary committee, [[Bernard Gray]], Chief of Defence Materiel, revealed that even though the carriers had been sold as adaptable and easy to convert for CATOBAR, no serious effort had been made in this direction since 2002.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.theregister.co.uk/2013/02/06/defence_committee_carrier_badness/|title=The truth on the Navy carrier debacle? Industry got away with murder|first1=Lewis|last1=Page|work=The Register|access-date=7 August 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161111125058/http://www.theregister.co.uk/2013/02/06/defence_committee_carrier_badness//|archive-date=11 November 2016|url-status=live}}</ref>