Editing R38-class airship (section)

===Aftermath===

The loss of the R.38, which represented the hope of airship men in Britain, resulted in three official enquiries into the disaster. The first, chaired by Air Vice-Marshal [[John Salmond|Sir John Salmond]] and composed mainly of RAF personnel, was convened on 27 August. Its remit was to consider the general circumstances of the accident, and, although it came to the conclusion that the structure had failed while extreme control forces were being exerted, it was considered necessary to carry out a more detailed technical inquiry into the airship's design. The report also criticized the system by which a single authority was responsible both for the airship's construction and for inspection of the work, and, given the great differences between R.38 and previous British designs, held that the design should have been subjected to a more thorough scrutiny.<ref>{{cite magazine|url=http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1921/1921%20-%200671.html|magazine=[[Flight International|Flight]]|title=R.38 Court of Enquiry|date=13 October 1921|page=671}}</ref>

The Admiralty held a second inquiry into the history of the design of the airship, and into its construction up to the point where it was taken over from the Admiralty by the Air Ministry. In contrast to the previous inquiry, this one concluded that the design did not incorporate any new features which affected the airship's strength, and further maintained that "there was at the time no body in existence which could have been called in to advise on the structural strength of R.38."<ref>{{cite magazine|url=http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1922/1922%20-%200031.html|magazine=[[Flight International|Flight]]|title=Editorial Comment|date=19 January 1922|pages=31–32}}</ref>

The technical Committee of Enquiry, chaired by [[Mervyn O'Gorman]], concluded that no allowance had been made for aerodynamic [[stress analysis|stresses in the design]], and that while no loads had been placed on the structure during testing that would not have been met in normal use, the effects of the manoeuvres made had weakened the hull. No blame was attached to anyone, as this was not part of the committee's remit.<ref>{{cite magazine|url=http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1922/1922%20-%200139.html |title=The Accident to H.M. Airship R. 38|magazine=[[Flight International|Flight]]|date= 2 March 1922| page= 139}}</ref>

The R.38 disaster led to a rigorous investigation of the structure of airships preceding the design of the next two airships built in Britain, the [[R100|R.100]] and the more radical [[R101|R.101]]. What is curious is that the practice of having responsibility for design and ultimately judging the airworthiness of that design remained in the same hands.<ref>Jamison 1994, p. 121.</ref>
Nevil Shute Norway (who was the novelist [[Nevil Shute]]) worked on the design of the R.100 airship for [[Vickers#Aviation|Vickers Ltd.]] from 1924. When he researched previous airship calculations and read the reports of the 1921 R.38 crash he was "unable to believe the words he was reading" that "the civil servants concerned had made no attempt to calculate the aerodynamic forces ... " and he asked one of his chiefs <!-- possibly Barnes Wallis --> "if this could possibly be true. Not only did he confirm it but he pointed out that no one had been sacked over it or even suffered any censure."{{sfn|Slide Rule|1954|pp=55–57}} For the men who built the R.38 its sale to the US Navy represented a last chance to salvage something from the Royal Navy's rigid airship program and its takeover and abandonment by the RAF. The demands of the Exchequer and the US Navy's commander Maxwell converged to cause risks to be taken which were questioned at the time and ignored with fatal consequences.<ref>Jamison 1994, p. 124.</ref>

[[File:R38 Memorial Kingston upon Hull.jpg|thumb|right|R38 memorial, [[Hull General Cemetery|Western Cemetery]], Hull]]