Editing Recognition heuristic (section)

=== Trade-offs ===

The recognition heuristic is a model that relies on recognition only. This leads to the testable prediction that people who rely on it will ignore strong, contradicting cues (i.e., do not make trade-offs; so-called noncompensatory inferences). In an experiment by [[Daniel M. Oppenheimer]] participants were presented with pairs of cities, which included actual cities and fictional cities.  Although the recognition heuristic predicts that participants would judge the actual (recognizable) cities to be larger, participants judged the fictional (unrecognizable) cities to be larger, showing that more than recognition can play a role in such inferences.<ref>{{cite journal | last1 = Oppenheimer | first1 = D. M. | year = 2003 | title = Not so Fast! (and not so Frugal!): Rethinking the Recognition Heuristic | url = https://escholarship.org/content/qt90b4f50x/qt90b4f50x.pdf?t=op2mse | journal = Cognition | volume = 90 | issue = 1 | pages = B1–B9 | doi = 10.1016/s0010-0277(03)00141-0 | pmid = 14597272 | s2cid = 16927640 | access-date = 2023-02-27 | archive-date =  | archive-url =  | url-status =  }}</ref>

Newell & Fernandez<ref name="Newell 2006" /> performed two experiments to try to test the claims that the recognition heuristic is distinguished from [[Availability heuristic|availability]] and [[Fluency heuristic|fluency]] through binary treatment of information and inconsequentiality of further knowledge. The results of their experiments did not support these claims. Newell & Fernandez  and Richter & Späth tested the non-compensatory prediction of the recognition heuristic and stated that "recognition information is not used in an all-or-none fashion but is integrated with other types of knowledge in judgment and decision making."<ref>{{cite journal | last1 = Richter | first1 = T. | last2 = Späth | first2 = P. | year = 2006 | title = Recognition is used as one cue among others in judgment and decision making | url = https://www.uni-kassel.de/fb01/fileadmin/groups/w_270518/pub_richter/Richter_Spaeth_in_press.pdf | journal = Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition | volume = 32 | issue = 1 | pages = 150–162 | doi = 10.1037/0278-7393.32.1.150 | pmid = 16478347 | access-date = 2023-02-27 | archive-date = 2016-08-04 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20160804055138/https://www.uni-kassel.de/fb01/fileadmin/groups/w_270518/pub_richter/Richter_Spaeth_in_press.pdf | url-status = dead }}</ref>

A reanalysis of these studies at an individual level, however, showed that typically about half of the participants consistently followed the recognition heuristic in every single trial, even in the presence of up to three contradicting cues.<ref>{{Cite journal|vauthors=Pachur T, Bröder A, Marewski JN|year=2008|title=The recognition heuristic in memory-based inference: Is recognition a noncompensatory cue?|journal=J. Behav. Decis. Mak.|volume=21|issue=2|pages=183–210|doi=10.1002/bdm.581|hdl=11858/00-001M-0000-0024-FB80-1|hdl-access=free}}</ref> Furthermore, in response to those criticisms, Marewski et al.<ref>{{Cite journal|vauthors=Marewski JN, Gaissmaier W, Schooler LJ, Goldstein DG, Gigerenzer G|year=2010|title=From recognition to decisions: extending and testing recognition-based models for multi-alternative inference|journal=Psychon. Bull. Rev.|volume=17|issue=3|pages=287–309|doi=10.3758/PBR.17.3.287|pmid=20551350|s2cid=1936179|url=http://www.dangoldstein.com/papers/Marewski_Recognition_PBR2010.PDF|doi-access=free|access-date=2023-02-27|archive-date=2023-01-30|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230130124232/http://www.dangoldstein.com/papers/Marewski_Recognition_PBR2010.PDF|url-status=live}}</ref> pointed out that none of the studies above formulated and tested a compensatory strategy against the recognition heuristic, leaving the strategies that participants relied on unknown. They tested five compensatory models and found that none could predict judgments better than the simple model of the recognition heuristic.