Editing Rentier state (section)

== Examples ==
The emergence of the new [[oil state]]s and their increasing importance in [[International trade|world trade]] in the 1970s brought a renewed interest in thinking on rentier economies in the aforementioned disciplines of [[political science]] and [[international relations]].<ref name="Beblawi 1987"/> Examples of rentier states include oil-producing countries in the [[MENA]] region<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://pomeps.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/POMEPS_Studies_33.pdf|title=POMEPS Studies 33: The Politics of Rentier States in the Gulf – Project on Middle East Political Science|website=pomeps.org|language=en-US|access-date=2019-02-02}} [https://web.archive.org/web/20190202212742/https://pomeps.org/2019/01/30/pomeps-studies-33-the-politics-of-rentier-states-in-the-gulf/ Abstract].</ref> including [[Saudi Arabia]], [[United Arab Emirates]], [[Iraq]], [[Iran]], [[Kuwait]], [[Qatar]], [[Libya]] and [[Algeria]] as well as a few states in Latin America, all of whom are members of [[OPEC]].<ref name="Beblawi 1987"/><ref>{{Cite journal |jstor = 421917|title = The State in the Middle East and North Africa|journal = Comparative Politics|volume = 20|issue = 1|pages = 1–18|last1 = Anderson|first1 = Lisa|year = 1987|doi = 10.2307/421917}}</ref> African states such as [[Nigeria]], [[Gabon]], [[Angola]], [[Ghana]], [[Uganda]] and [[South Sudan]] are also important oil producers with rentier economies, earning income from trading natural resources.

Rentier state theory has been one of several theories advanced to explain the predominance of authoritarian [[regime]]s in the Middle East and the apparent lack of success of [[Democracy in the Middle East|democracy in the region]].<ref>{{Cite journal |jstor = 1519880|title = Oil Wealth and Regime Survival in the Developing World, 1960-1999|journal = American Journal of Political Science|volume = 48|issue = 2|pages = 232–246|last1 = Smith|first1 = Benjamin|year = 2004|doi = 10.1111/j.0092-5853.2004.00067.x}}</ref><ref name="Abulof">{{cite journal|doi=10.1057/jird.2014.32|title='Can't buy me legitimacy': The elusive stability of Mideast rentier regimes|journal=Journal of International Relations and Development|volume=20|pages=55–79|year=2017|last1=Abulof|first1=Uriel|s2cid=147600985|url=https://www.researchgate.net/publication/273528594}}</ref> While many states export resources or license their development by foreign parties, rentier states are characterized by the relative absence of revenue from domestic taxation, as their naturally occurring wealth precludes the need to extract income from their citizenry. According to Douglas Yates, the economic behavior of a rentier state{{cquote|embodies a break in the work-reward causation ... [r]ewards of income and wealth for the rentier do not come as the result of work but rather are the result of chance or situation.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.semp.us/biots/biot_227.html |title= SEMP – Evidence based disaster management|website=www.semp.us |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20051029103149/http://www.semp.us/biots/biot_227.html |archive-date=October 29, 2005}}</ref>}} Hazem Beblawi has argued that this could create a "rentier mentality,"<ref name="Beblawi 1987"/> while political scientist [[Fareed Zakaria]] has posited that such states fail to develop politically because, in the absence of taxes, citizens have less incentive to place pressure on the government to become responsive to their needs. Instead, the government essentially 'bribes' the citizenry with extensive social welfare programs, becoming an ''allocation'' or ''distributive state''.  The budget, in effect, is little more than an expenditure programme.<ref>Beblawi 1987, p. 387</ref>

Moreover, because control of the rent-producing resources is concentrated in the hands of the authorities, it may be used to alternately coerce or coopt their populace, while the distinction between public service and private interest becomes increasingly blurred.<ref>Beblawi 1987, p. 388</ref> There is, in the words of [[Noah Feldman]] in his book ''After Jihad'':{{cquote|no fiscal connection between the government and the people. The government has only to keep its people in line so that they do not overthrow it and start collecting the oil rents themselves.<ref>Feldman, N. (2003). ''After Jihad: America and the Struggle for Islamic Democracy'', New York, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, p. 139.</ref>}}