Editing Richard Helms (section)

===Israel: Six Day War===
Liaison with [[Israeli Intelligence Community|Israeli intelligence]] was managed by [[James Jesus Angleton]] of CIA counterintelligence from 1953 to 1974.<ref>Colby (1986) p. 365.</ref><ref>[[Edward Jay Epstein|Epstein]] (1989) pp. 40–41, 100.</ref> For example, the Israelis quickly provided the CIA with the Russian text of [[Khrushchev's Secret Speech]] of 1956 which severely criticized the deceased Soviet dictator [[Joseph Stalin]].<ref>Weiner (2007) pp. 123–125. DCI Dulles then leaked the text to ''The New York Times''.</ref> In August 1966 [[Mossad]] had arranged for Israeli acquisition of a Soviet [[MiG-21]] fighter from a disaffected [[Iraq Air Force|Iraqi pilot]]. Mossad's [[Meir Amit]] later came to Washington to tell DCI Helms that Israel would loan America the plane, with its up-until-now secret technology, to find out how it flew.<ref>[[Dan Raviv]] and [[Yossi Melman]], ''Every Spy a Prince: The Complete History of Israel's Intelligence Community'' (London: Sidgwick and Jackson 1989 [as ''Imperect Spies'']; New York: Houghton Mifflin 1990) at 142.</ref> At a May 1967 [[United States National Security Council|NSC]] meeting Helms voiced praise for Israel's military preparedness, and argued that from the captured MiG-21 the Israelis "had learned their lessons well".<ref>[[Ian Black (journalist)|Ian Black]] & [[Benny Morris]], ''Israel's Secret Wars: A History of Israel's Intelligence Services'' (London: Hamish Hamilton 1991; New York: Grove Weidenfeld 1991) pp. 206–210, quote 209.</ref><ref>In 1966 Helms had provided Johnson with a CIA memorandum "How We Have Helped Israel" May 19, 1966, cited in Ranelagh (1986) pp. 580 and 787, n46.</ref>

[[File:Hatzerim Mirage 20100129 1.jpg|thumb|French [[Dassault Mirage]]: key warplane of [[Israeli Air Force]] during the 1967 war]]
In 1967, CIA analysis addressed the possibility of an armed conflict between Israel and neighboring Arab states, predicting that "the Israelis would win a war within a week to ten days."<ref>Powers (1979) p. 202 (quote).</ref><ref>CIA analyst [[Sherman Kent]] estimated that "Israel would win a war within two weeks without any American aid." Ranelagh (1986) pp. 473–474.</ref><ref>Regarding CIA's forecast Weiner (2007) p. 277 seems to give primary credit to James Angleton's contacts in Israeli intelligence.</ref> Israel "could defeat any combination of Arab forces in relatively short order" with the time required depending on "who struck first" and circumstances.<ref>Helms (2003) pp. 298–299. The CIA's Office of Current Intelligence (OCI) had indicated a crisis looming since early 1967 and had set up a special task force to track it.</ref> Yet CIA's pro-Israel prediction was challenged by [[Arthur Goldberg]], the [[United States Ambassadors to the United Nations|American ambassador to the United Nations]] and Johnson loyalist.<ref>Ranelagh (1986) pp. 473–474. Goldberg had "claimed that CIA estimates of Israeli strength were overly optimistic." Soon thereafter Israel sent President Johnson warnings that "Israel would be defeated by the Arabs if American assistance were not immediately forthcoming."</ref> Although Israel then had requested "additional military aid" Helms opines that here Israel wanted to control international expectations prior to the outbreak of war.<ref>Helms (2003) pp. 298–299, at 298 (quote).</ref>

As Arab war threats mounted, President Johnson asked Helms about Israel's chances and Helms stuck with his agency's predictions. At a meeting of his top advisors Johnson then asked who agreed with the CIA estimate and all assented.<ref>Helms (2003) p. 299.</ref> "The temptation for Helms to hedge his bet must have been enormous".<ref>Ranelagh (1986) pp. 473–474 (quote).</ref> After all, opinions were divided, e.g., Soviet intelligence thought the Arabs would win and were "stunned" at the Israeli victory.<ref>Andrew and Mitrokhin (2005) pp. 229–230.</ref> Admiral [[Stansfield Turner]] (DCI 1977–1981) wrote that "Helms claimed that the high point of his career was the Agency's accurate prediction in 1967." Helms believed it had kept America out of the conflict. Also, it led to his entry within the inner circle of the Johnson administration, the regular 'Tuesday lunch' with the President.<ref>Turner (2005) at 119 (quote).</ref>

In the event, Israel decisively defeated its neighborhood enemies and prevailed in the determinative [[Six Day war]] of June 1967. Four days before the sudden launch of that war, "a senior Israeli official" had privately visited Helms in his office and hinted that such a preemptive decision was imminent. Helms then had passed the information to President Johnson.<ref>Helms (2003) pp. 299–300.</ref><ref>The Israeli official was probably [[Meir Amit]] the chief at Mossad (Israeli foreign intelligence), who had visited Helms then. Black and Morris, ''Israel's Secret Wars'' (New York: Grove Weidenfeld 1991) p. 221. In the days before the war "Amit found 'no differences' between the Israeli and U.S. appreciations of the military situation."</ref><ref>Meir Amir visited Helms with information shortly before the war. Raviv and Melman, ''Every Spy a Prince: The Complete History of Israel's Intelligence Community'' (1989, 1990) p. 161.</ref> The conflict reified America's "emotional sympathy" for Israel. Following the war, America dropped its careful balancing act between the belligerents and moved to a position in support of Israel, eventually supplanting France as Israel's chief military supplier.<ref>Ranelagh (1986) p. 580 (quote; military aid "soared" after war).</ref><ref>Black and Morris, ''Israel's Secret Wars'' (1991) pp. 234–235.</ref>

In the afternoon of the third day of the war, the American [[Signals intelligence|SIGINT]] spy ship [[USS Liberty (AGTR-5)|''USS Liberty'']], outfitted by the [[National Security Agency|NSA]], was attacked by Israeli warplanes and torpedo boats in international waters north of Sinai. This U.S. Navy ship was [[USS Liberty incident|severely damaged with loss of life]].<ref>Powers (2002, 2004) pp. 251–252 [1983].</ref><ref>Marchetti and Marks (1974, 1980) p. 257: The American "[[Joint Chiefs of Staff]] 'proposed a quick, retaliatory air strike on the Israeli naval base which launched the attack'" but their "recommendation was turned down".</ref> The Israelis quickly notified the Americans and later explained that they "had mistaken the ''Liberty'' (455 feet long) for the Egyptian coastal steamer ''El Quseir'' (275 feet long). The US government formally accepted the apology and the explanation."<ref>Powers (2002, 2004) p. 252 [1983].</ref> Some continue to accept this position.<ref>Raviv and Melman, ''Every Spy a Prince'' (1989, 1990) p. 162. Twenty years later neither country offered a "coherent explanation" which left many U.S. Navy veterans angry. "The Israelis said their forces had simply made a mistake." In Tel Aviv both the CIA station chief and the U.S. naval attache eventually agreed. "In the heat of battle, the Israeli navy and air force had ingloriously competed" to sink the ship.</ref><ref>Mistakes in war, episodes of [[friendly fire]] happen. The CIA, e.g., mistakenly bombed a British ship in Guatemala in 1954. Cf., Marchetti and Marks (1974, 1980) p. 253.</ref> Yet "scholars and military experts," according to author [[Thomas Powers]], state that "the hard question is not whether the attack was deliberate but why the Israelis thought it necessary."<ref>Powers (2002, 2004) pp. 251–252 [1983] (quotes).</ref><ref>Ranelagh (1986) p. 253: "subsequent accumulation of evidence suggests that the attack was at the instigation of Israeli intelligence" to give Israel a free hand in the war.</ref><ref>Powers (2002, 2004) pp. 266–270 [2001], review of James Bamford's book ''Body of Secrets'' (2001) on the NSA, which provides new information and theories about why the ship was attacked.</ref> In his memoirs ''A Look Over My Shoulder'', Helms expressed his bewilderment as to how and why the USS ''Liberty'' was attacked: "One of the most disturbing incidents in the six days came in the morning of June 8 when the Pentagon flashed a message that the U.S.S. ''Liberty'', an unarmed U.S. Navy communications ship, was under attack in the Mediterranean, and that American fighters had been scrambled to defend the ship. The following urgent reports showed that Israeli jet fighters and torpedo reports had launched the attack. The seriously damaged ''Liberty'' remained afloat, with thirty-four dead and more than a hundred wounded members of the crew. Israeli authorities subsequently apologized for the accident, but few in Washington could believe that the ship had not been identified as an American naval vessel. Later, an interim intelligence memorandum concluded the attack was a mistake and "not made in malice against the U.S." When additional evidence was available, more doubt was raised. This prompted my deputy, Admiral [[Rufus Taylor]], to write me his view of the incident. "To me, this picture thus far presents the distinct possibility that the Israelis knew that ''Liberty'' might be their target and attacked anyway, either through confusion in Command and Control or through deliberate disregard of instructions on the part of subordinates."...I had no role in the board of inquiry that followed, or the board's finding that there could be no doubt that the Israelis knew exactly what they were doing in attacking the ''Liberty''. I have yet to understand why it was felt necessary to attack this ship or who ordered the attack."<ref>{{cite book | url=https://books.google.com/books?id=mF3fAAAAMAAJ | title=A Look over My Shoulder: A Life in the Central Intelligence Agency | isbn=9780375500121 | last1=Helms | first1=Richard | last2=Hood | first2=William | last3=Kissinger | first3=Henry | year=2003 | publisher=Random House }}</ref> In his CIA special collection interview, Helms said, "...I don't think there can be any doubt that the Israelis knew exactly what they were doing. Why they wanted to attack the 'Liberty,' whose bright idea this was, I can't possibly know. But any statement to the effect that they didn't know that it was an American ship and so forth is nonsense."<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/11_8_oral.pdf |title=RICHARD HELMS INTERVIEW, BY ROBERT M. HATHAWAY, 8 NOVEMBER 1984 |website=Central Intelligence Agency, pp. 14}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/5076de59993247d4d82b5b43 |title=RICHARD HELMS INTERVIEW, BY ROBERT M. HATHAWAY, 8 NOVEMBER 1984 |website=CIA.gov Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room}}</ref>

On the morning of the sixth day of the war, President Johnson summoned Helms to the [[White House Situation Room]]. Soviet Premier [[Alexei Kosygin]] had called to threaten military intervention if the war continued. Defense Secretary [[Robert S. McNamara]] suggested that the [[United States Sixth Fleet|Sixth Fleet]] be sent east, from the mid Mediterranean to the Levant. Johnson agreed. Helms remembered the "visceral physical reaction" to the strategic tension, similar to the emotions of the 1962 [[Cuban Missile Crisis]]. "It was the world's good fortune that hostilities on the [[Golan Heights]] ended before the day was out," wrote Helms later.<ref>Lyndon Johnson, ''The Vantage Point: Perspectives on the Presidency, 1963–1968'' (New York: Holt Rinehart and Winston 1971) at 302.</ref><ref>Helms (2003) pp. 301–303, quote at 303. Helms then had remarked that Soviet "fishing trawlers" trailing the Sixth Fleet "would signal Moscow the moment it was apparent that the aircraft carriers and support ships were on the move." Helms at 303.</ref>