Editing Ronald Dworkin (section)

===The right answer thesis===
In Dworkin's own words, his "right answer thesis" may be interpreted through the following hypothetical:
<blockquote>Suppose the legislature has passed a statute stipulating that "sacrilegious contracts shall henceforth be invalid." The community is divided as to whether a contract signed on Sunday is, for that reason alone, sacrilegious. It is known that very few of the legislators had that question in mind when they voted, and that they are now equally divided on the question of whether it should be so interpreted. Tom and Tim have signed a contract on Sunday, and Tom now sues Tim to enforce the terms of the contract, whose validity Tim contests. Shall we say that the judge must look for the right answer to the question of whether Tom's contract is valid, even though the community is deeply divided about what the right answer is? Or is it more realistic to say that there simply is no right answer to the question?<ref>Dworkin, 1985, p. 119</ref></blockquote>

One of Dworkin's most interesting and controversial theses states that the law as properly interpreted will give an answer. This is not to say that everyone will have the same answer (a consensus of what is "right"), or if it did, the answer would not be justified exactly in the same way for every person; rather it means that there will be a necessary answer for each individual if he applies himself correctly to the legal question. For the correct method is that encapsulated by the metaphor of Judge Hercules, an ideal judge, immensely wise and with full knowledge of legal sources. Hercules (the name comes from a classical mythological [[Hercules|hero]]) would also have plenty of time to decide. Acting on the premise that the law is a seamless web, Hercules is required to construct the theory that best fits and justifies the law as a whole ([[law as integrity]]) in order to decide any particular case. Hercules is the perfect judge, but that doesn't mean he always reaches the right answer.<ref name="Dworkin, 1986, p. 239-40">Dworkin, 1986, pp. 239–240</ref>

Dworkin does not deny that competent lawyers often disagree on what is the solution to a given case. On the contrary, he claims that they are disagreeing about ''the'' right answer to the case, the answer Hercules would give.<ref name="Dworkin, 1986, p. 239-40"/>

Dworkin's critics argue not only that ''law proper'' (that is, the legal sources in a positivist sense) is full of gaps and inconsistencies, but also that other legal standards (including principles) may be insufficient to solve a hard case. Some of them are [[commensurability (philosophy of science)|incommensurable]]. In any of these situations, even Hercules would be in a [[dilemma]] and none of the possible answers would be the ''right'' one.{{Citation needed|date=August 2016}}