Editing SWAT (section)

=== The War on Drugs: 1980s and 1990s ===
[[File:Members of the 60th Security Police Squadron's Base Swat Team.jpg|thumb|[[USAF Security Forces]] SWAT officers during a training exercise at [[Travis Air Force Base]] in 1995]]
In 1981 [[United States Congress|U.S. Congress]] passed the Military Cooperation with Law Enforcement Act, giving police access to military intelligence, infrastructure, and weaponry in the fight against drugs. [[Ronald Reagan|Reagan]] subsequently declared drugs to be a threat to U.S. national security.<ref name="alexander" />{{rp|76–77}} In 1988 the Reagan administration encouraged Congress to create the Edward Byrne Memorial State and Local Law Enforcement Program. The program modified existing federal aid structures to local police, making it easier to transfer money and equipment to fight the War on Drugs. Police forces also received increased assistance from the [[Drug Enforcement Administration|DEA]]. The money resulted in the creation of many narcotics task forces, and SWAT teams became an important part of these forces.<ref name="alexander">{{cite book
| last1     = Alexander
| first1    = Michelle
| title     = The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness
| date      = 2013
| publisher = The New Press
| isbn      = 978-1-59558-819-7
| title-link = The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness
}}</ref>{{rp|73–75}}

In 1972, paramilitary police units launched a few hundred drug raids annually within the United States. In the early 1980s, SWAT drug raid numbers increased to 3000 annually, and by 1996, 30,000 raids annually.<ref name="alexander" />{{rp|73–75}} During the 1990s, according to ''[[The Capital Times]]'' in [[Madison, Wisconsin]], weapons donations from the [[United States Department of Defense|Department of Defense]] greatly bolstered the number of SWAT teams and the extent of their operations. The paper reported that the military transferred nearly 100,000 pieces of military equipment to Wisconsin police departments in the 1990s.<ref name="alexander" />{{rp|77}}

[[Criminal justice]] professors Peter Kraska and Victor Kappeler, in their study ''Militarizing American Police: The Rise and Normalization of Paramilitary Units'', surveyed police departments nationwide and found that their deployment of paramilitary units had grown tenfold between the early 1980s and late 1990s.<ref name=Kraska>{{cite journal
| last      = Kraska
| first     = Peter B.
| author2   = Victor E. Kaeppler
| date      = Feb 1997
| title     = Militarizing American Police: The Rise and Normalization of Paramilitary Units
| journal   = Social Problems
| volume    = 44
| issue     = 1
| pages     = 1–18
| publisher = University of California Press
| jstor     = 3096870
| doi       = 10.1525/sp.1997.44.1.03x0209a
}}</ref>

==== Columbine shooting ====
{{further|Columbine effect}}
The [[Columbine High School massacre]] in Colorado on April&nbsp;20, 1999 was another seminal event in SWAT tactics and police response. As perpetrators [[Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold]] were shooting students and staff inside the school, officers did not intervene in the shooting, but instead set a perimeter as they were trained to do. By the time they did enter the school, 12 people were killed and Harris and Klebold had committed suicide. They were also heavily criticized for not saving teacher Dave Sanders, who had died from [[Bleeding#Blood loss|blood loss]], three hours after the SWAT first entered the school.<ref>{{Cite web | url=https://www.westword.com/news/swat-leaders-defense-of-columbine-response-too-little-much-too-late-8028541 | title=SWAT Leader's Defense of Columbine Response: Too Little, Much Too Late| date=June 22, 2016}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.acolumbinesite.com/victim/sanders.php|title=Coach William "Dave" Sanders}}</ref> As noted in an article in the ''[[The Christian Science Monitor|Christian Science Monitor]]'', "Instead of being taught to wait for the SWAT team to arrive, street officers are receiving the training and weaponry to take immediate action during incidents that clearly involve suspects' use of deadly force."<ref name="SWAT03">{{cite web
| url         = http://csmonitor.com/cgi-bin/durableRedirect.pl?/durable/2000/05/31/fp2s2-csm.shtml
| title       = Report following the Columbine High School Massacre
| work        = The Christian Science Monitor
| access-date  = June 19, 2006
| archive-url  = https://web.archive.org/web/20050904193551/http://csmonitor.com/cgi-bin/durableRedirect.pl?%2Fdurable%2F2000%2F05%2F31%2Ffp2s2-csm.shtml
| archive-date = September 4, 2005
| url-status     = dead
}}</ref> The article further reported that street officers were increasingly being armed with rifles, and issued heavy body armor and ballistic helmets, items traditionally associated with SWAT units. The idea was to train and equip street officers to make a rapid response to so-called [[active shooter]] situations. In these situations, it was no longer acceptable to simply set up a perimeter and wait for SWAT. As an example, in the policy and procedure manual of the [[Minneapolis Police Department]], it is stated, "MPD personnel shall remain cognizant of the fact that in many active shooter incidents, innocent lives are lost within the first few minutes of the incident. In some situations, this dictates the need to rapidly assess the situation and act quickly in order to save lives."<ref name="SWAT04">{{cite web
| url        = http://www.ci.minneapolis.mn.us/mpdpolicy/7-900/7-900.asp#P94_7168
| title        = Policy & Procedure Manual
| publisher        = Minneapolis, Minnesota, Police Department
| access-date        = June 19, 2006
| archive-date        = July 25, 2006
| archive-url        = https://web.archive.org/web/20060725004357/http://www.ci.minneapolis.mn.us/mpdpolicy/7-900/7-900.asp#P94_7168
| url-status        = dead
}}</ref>