Editing Self-deception (section)

===Paradoxes===
The works of philosopher [[Alfred Mele|Alfred R. Mele]] have provided insight into some of the more prominent paradoxes regarding self-deception. Two of these paradoxes include the self-deceiver's state of mind and the dynamics of self-deception, coined the "static" paradox and the "dynamic/strategic" paradox, respectively.

Mele formulates an example of the "static" paradox as the following:
<blockquote>If ever a person ''A'' deceives a person ''B'' into believing that something, ''p'', is true, ''A'' knows or truly believes that ''p'' is false while causing ''B'' to believe that ''p'' is true. So when ''A'' deceives ''A'' (i.e., himself) into believing that ''p'' is true, he knows or truly believes that ''p'' is false while causing himself to believe that ''p'' is true. Thus, ''A'' must simultaneously believe that ''p'' is false and believe that ''p'' is true. But how is this possible?<ref name="Mele">''Two Paradoxes of Self-Deception'' by Alfred R. Mele. [[PhilPapers]]: [http://philpapers.org/rec/MELTPO-5 MELTPO-5]</ref></blockquote>

Mele then describes the "dynamic/strategy" paradox:
<blockquote>In general, ''A'' cannot successfully employ a deceptive strategy against ''B'' if ''B'' knows ''A'''s intention and plan. This seems plausible as well when ''A'' and ''B'' are the same person. A potential self-deceiver's knowledge of his intention and strategy would seem typically to render them ineffective. On the other hand, the suggestion that self-deceivers typically successfully execute their self-deceptive strategies without knowing what they are up to may seem absurd; for an agent's effective execution of his plans seems generally to depend on his cognizance of them and their goals. So how, in general, can an agent deceive himself by employing a self-deceptive strategy?<ref name="Mele"/></blockquote>

These models call into question how one can simultaneously hold contradictory beliefs ("static" paradox) and deceive oneself without rendering one's intentions ineffective ("dynamic/strategic" paradox). Attempts at a resolution to these have created two schools of thought: one that maintains that paradigmatic cases of self-deception are intentional and one that denies the notion—''intentionalists'' and ''non-intentionalists'', respectively.<ref name="stanford"/>

Intentionalists tend to agree that self-deception is intentional, but divide over whether it requires the holding of contradictory beliefs.<ref name="stanford"/> This school of thought incorporates elements of temporal partitioning (extended over time to benefit the self-deceiver, increasing the chance of forgetting the deception altogether) and psychological partitioning (incorporating various aspects of the "self").

Non-intentionalists, in contrast, tend to believe that cases of self-deception are not necessarily accidental, but motivated by desire, anxiety, or some other emotion regarding ''p'' or related to ''p''.<ref name="stanford"/> This notion distinguishes self-deception from misunderstanding. Furthermore, "[[wishful thinking]]" is distinguished from self-deception in that the self-deceivers recognize evidence against their self-deceptive belief or possess, without recognizing, greater counterevidence than wishful thinkers.<ref name="stanford"/>

Numerous questions and debates remain in play with respect to the paradoxes of self-deception, and a consensual paradigm has yet to appear.