Editing Sense and reference (section)

==Precursors==
===Antisthenes===
The Greek philosopher [[Antisthenes]], a pupil of [[Socrates]], apparently distinguished "a general object that can be aligned with the meaning of the utterance” from “a particular object of extensional reference". According to Susan Prince, this "suggests that he makes a distinction between sense and reference".<ref>{{cite book|last=Prince|first=S. H. |title=Antisthenes of Athens: Texts, Translations, and Commentary|publisher=[[University of Michigan Press]]|year=2015}} [https://books.google.com/books?id=i8IhCwAAQBAJ&pg=PA20 p. 20].</ref>{{rp|20}} The principal basis of Prince's claim is a passage in [[Alexander of Aphrodisias]]' “Comments on [[Aristotle]]'s 'Topics'” with a three-way distinction: 
# the semantic medium, δι' ὧν λέγουσι
# an object external to the semantic medium, περὶ οὗ λέγουσιν
# the direct indication of a thing, σημαίνειν ... τὸ ...<ref>Prince 2015, [https://books.google.com/books?id=i8IhCwAAQBAJ&pg=PA518 pp. 518–522] (Antisthenes' literary remains: t. 153B.1).</ref>{{rp|518–522}}

===Stoicism===
The [[Stoicism|Stoic]] doctrine of {{transliteration|grc|[[Philosophy of language#Ancient philosophy|lekta]]}} refers to a correspondence between speech and the object referred to in speech, as distinct from the speech itself. British classicist [[Robert Sharples (classicist)|R. W. Sharples]] cites ''lekta'' as an anticipation of the distinction between sense and reference.<ref>R. W. Sharples (1996), ''Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics: An Introduction to Hellenistic Philosophy''. Routledge, [https://books.google.com/books?id=KlmKAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA23 p. 23].</ref>{{rp|23}}

===John Stuart Mill===
The sense-reference distinction is commonly confused with that between [[connotation]] and [[denotation]], which originates with [[John Stuart Mill]].<ref>See section §5 of Book I, Chapter II of Mill's [[A System of Logic]].</ref> According to Mill, a common term like 'white' ''denotes'' all white things, as snow, paper.<ref>[[:nl:Willem Remmelt de Jong|Jong, W. R. de]], ''The Semantics of John Stuart Mill'' ([[Dordrecht]]: [[D. Reidel]], 1982), [https://books.google.com/books?id=q2gqBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA11 pp. 11–13].</ref>{{rp|11–13}} But according to Frege, a common term does not refer to any individual white thing, but rather to an abstract concept ([[wikt:Begriff|''Begriff'']]). We must distinguish between the relation of reference, which holds between a proper name and the object it refers to, such as between the name 'Earth' and the planet [[Earth]], and the relation of 'falling under', such as when the Earth falls under the concept ''planet''. The relation of a proper name to the object it designates is direct, whereas a word like 'planet' does not have such a direct relation to the Earth; instead, it refers to a concept under which the Earth falls. Moreover, judging of anything that it falls under this concept is not in any way part of our knowledge of what the word 'planet' means.<ref>Frege, A Critical Elucidation of Some Points in E. Schroeder's [https://books.google.com/books?id=P95LAAAAYAAJ ''Vorlesungen Ueber Die Algebra der Logik''], ''Archiv für systematische Philosophie'' 1895, pp. 433-456, transl. [[Peter Geach|P. T. Geach]], in Geach & [[Max Black|Black]] pp. 86-106.</ref> The distinction between connotation and denotation is closer to that between concept and object than to that between 'sense' and 'reference'.