Editing Signaling game (section)

===Beer-Quiche game===
The Beer-Quiche game of Cho and Kreps<ref>{{Cite journal  | last1 = Cho  | first1 = In-Koo  | last2 = Kreps  | first2 = David M.  | date = May 1987
  | title = Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria  | journal = The Quarterly Journal of Economics  | volume = 102 | issue = 2  | pages = 179–222  | doi = 10.2307/1885060  | jstor = 1885060| citeseerx = 10.1.1.407.5013  }}</ref> draws on the stereotype of [[Real Men Don't Eat Quiche|quiche eaters being less masculine]]. In this game, an individual B is considering whether to [[duel]] with another individual A. B knows that A is either a ''[[wikt:wimp|wimp]]'' or is ''surly'' but not which. B would prefer a duel if A is a ''wimp'' but not if A is ''surly''. Player A, regardless of type, wants to avoid a duel. Before making the decision, B has the opportunity to see whether A chooses to have [[beer]] or [[quiche]] for breakfast. Both players know that ''wimps'' prefer quiche while ''surlies'' prefer beer. The point of the game is to analyze the choice of breakfast by each kind of A. This has become a standard example of a signaling game. See<ref>{{cite web | url=http://www.econ.ohio-state.edu/jpeck/Econ601/Econ601L15.pdf | title=Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium | author=James Peck | publisher=Ohio State University | access-date=2 September 2016}}</ref>{{rp|14–18}} for more details.