Editing Sorites paradox (section)

===Denying the existence of heaps===
One may [[Denying the antecedent|object to the first premise]] by denying that {{val|1000000|fmt=commas}} grains of sand make a heap. But {{val|1000000|fmt=commas}} is just an arbitrary large number, and the argument will apply with any such number. So the response must deny outright that there are such things as heaps. [[Peter Unger]] defends this solution.<ref>{{cite journal |last=Unger |first=Peter |title=There Are No Ordinary Things |journal=[[Synthese]] |year=1979 |volume=41 |issue=2 |pages=117–154 |doi=10.1007/bf00869568 |jstor=20115446|s2cid=46956605 }}</ref> However, [[A. J. Ayer]] repudiated it when presented with it by Unger: "If we regard everything as being composed of atoms, and think of Unger as consisting not of cells but of the atoms which compose the cells, then, as [[David Wiggins]] has pointed out to me, a similar argument could be used to prove that Unger, so far from being non-existent, is identical with everything that there is. We have only to substitute for the premise that the subtraction of one atom from Unger's body never makes any difference to his existence the premise that the addition of one atom to it never makes any difference either."<ref>{{cite book |last1=Ayer |first1=A.J. |title=Perception and identity: Essays presented to A. J. Ayer, With His Replies. |date=1979 |publisher=Cornell University Press. |location=Ithica, NY |page=324}}</ref>