Editing Special operations (section)

===United States===
[[File:Colonel Benjamin Church.jpg|thumb|200px|[[Benjamin Church (ranger)|Colonel Benjamin Church]] (1639–1718) from the [[Plymouth Colony]], father of American Ranging and Rangers]]

Between the 17th and 18th centuries, there were wars between American colonists and Native American tribes. The United States established specialized [[United States Army Rangers|Rangers]]. Learning frontier skills from friendly Native Americans the Rangers helped carry out offensive strikes "frontier combat" against hostile Natives. Thus Ranger companies were formed to provide reconnaissance, intelligence, light infantry, and scouting. [[Benjamin Church (ranger)|Colonel Benjamin Church]] (c. 1639–1718) was the captain of the first Ranger force in America (1676). Several Ranger companies were established in the American colonies, including [[Knowlton's Rangers]], an elite corps of Rangers who supplied reconnaissance and espionage for [[George Washington]]'s Continental Army. [[Rogers' Rangers]] on Roger's Island, in modern-day Fort Edward, New York, is regarded as the "spiritual home" of the [[United States Special Operations Forces]], specifically the United States Army Rangers. These early American light infantry battalions were trained under [[Robert Rogers' 28 "Rules of Ranging"]], which is considered the first known manual of modern [[asymmetric warfare]] tactics used in modern special operations. <ref name="Grenier2005">{{Cite book |last=Grenier |first=John |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=JGCin1JJp8cC |title=The First Way of War: American War Making on the Frontier, 1607–1814 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |year=2005 |isbn=978-1-139-44470-5 |pages=35}}</ref> 

[[75th Ranger Regiment|Army Rangers]] were essential to several [[World War II]] campaigns such as [[Operation Torch|North Africa campaign "Operation Torch"]], [[Tunisian campaign]], [[Allied invasion of Sicily|Sicily campaign "Operation Husky"]], and [[Normandy landings]] during D-day, Ranger companies landed at [[Pointe du Hoc]].

[[File:Marine-raiders.jpg|thumb|Marine Raiders gathered in front of a Japanese dugout on [[Bougainville Island|Bougainville]].]]

In WWII, more elite units were needed to carry out special operations, raids, and reconnaissance, especially behind enemy lines. [[President Franklin D. Roosevelt]] established the [[Marine Raiders]] in February 1942 after Admiral Chester Nimitz requested commando units to raid Japanese-held islands. Major General Thomas Holcomb, the Marine Commandant, chose the name "Raiders" and created two battalions. Other specialized units such as [[Seabee#Naval Combat Demolition Units|Naval Combat Demolition Units]] and [[Underwater Demolition Team|Underwater Demolition Teams (UDTs)]], the predecessors of the Navy's current [[United States Navy SEALs|SEALs]], were formed in   1943.

Many more US special operation units had developed after and had fought in every major 20th-century  conflict. In the 21st century, 2003–2012 saw U.S. national security strategy rely on special operations to an unprecedented degree. Identifying, hunting, and killing terrorists became a central task in the [[Global War on Terrorism]] (GWOT). Linda Robinson, Adjunct Senior Fellow for U.S. National Security and Foreign Policy at the [[Council on Foreign Relations]], argued that the organizational structure became flatter and cooperation with the intelligence community was stronger, allowing special operations to move at the "speed of war".<ref name="Robinson SPECOPS">{{cite journal|last=Robinson|first=Linda|title=The Future of Special Operations: Beyond Kill and Capture|journal=Foreign Affairs|date=November–December 2012|volume=91|issue=6|pages=110–122}}</ref> Special operations appropriations are costly: Its budget went from $2.3 billion in 2001 to $10.5 billion in 2012.<ref name="Robinson SPECOPS" /> Some experts argued the investment was worthwhile, pointing to [[Killing of Osama bin Laden|the raid]] in May 2011 that killed [[Osama bin Laden]] in [[Abbottabad]], Pakistan. 

That raid was organized and overseen by Admiral [[William H. McRaven]], who was both a student and practitioner of special operations, having published a thesis on them in the 1990s.  McRaven's theory of special operations was that they had the potential to achieve significant operational, political, or strategic effects.  This potential required such units to be organized and commanded by special operations professionals rather than being subsumed into larger military units or operations, and required that "relative superiority" be gained during the special operation in question via characteristics such as simplicity, security, rehearsals, surprise, speed, and clearly but narrowly defined purpose.<ref>{{cite journal|last=Wirtz|first=James J.|title=The Abbottabad raid and the theory of special operations|url=https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01402390.2021.1933953|journal=Journal of Strategic Studies|date=2021|volume=45|issue=6–7|pages=972–992|doi=10.1080/01402390.2021.1933953|s2cid=236352806|access-date=2021-10-16|archive-date=2021-10-16|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211016151337/https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01402390.2021.1933953|url-status=live|url-access=subscription}}</ref>

Others claimed that special operations' emphasis precipitated a misconception that it was a substitute for prolonged conflict. "Raids and drone strikes are rarely decisive tactics and often incur significant political and diplomatic costs for the United States. Although raids and drone strikes are necessary to disrupt dire and imminent threats... special operations leaders readily admit that they should not be the central pillar of U.S. military strategy."<ref name="Robinson SPECOPS" /> Instead, special operations advocates stated that grand strategy should include their "indirect approach", suggesting that "the ability to operate with a small footprint and low-visibility, invest time and resources to foster interagency and foreign partnerships, develop deep cultural expertise, and rapidly adapt emerging technologies" was vital for maintaining deterrence and countering aggression.<ref>{{cite journal|last=Bilms|first=Kevin|title=Past as Prelude? Envisioning the Future of Special Operations|url=https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2021/11/12/past-as-prelude-envisioning-the-future-of-special-operations|journal=The Strategy Bridge|date=2021|pages=1|access-date=2022-02-10|archive-date=2022-02-10|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220210152826/https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2021/11/12/past-as-prelude-envisioning-the-future-of-special-operations|url-status=live}}</ref> "Special operations forces forge relationships that can last for decades with a diverse collection of groups: training, advising, and operating alongside other countries' militaries, police forces, tribes, militias or other information groups."<ref name="Robinson SPECOPS" />