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==Examples== ===Chicago=== The city of [[Chicago]], in [[Cook County, Illinois]], has a significant number of TIF districts and has become a prime location for examining the benefits and disadvantages of TIF districts. The city runs 131 districts with tax receipts totaling upwards of $500 million for 2006.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.cookcountyclerk.com/tsd/documentlibrary/chicago%20tif%20revenue%20totals%20by%20year.pdf|title=City of Chicago TIF Revenue Totals by Year 1986-2013|publisher=Cook County Clerk's Office|access-date=2014-08-19|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140821173248/http://www.cookcountyclerk.com/tsd/documentlibrary/chicago%20tif%20revenue%20totals%20by%20year.pdf|archive-date=2014-08-21}}</ref> [[Lori Healey]], appointed commissioner of the city's Planning and Development department in 2005 was instrumental in the process of approving TIF districts as first deputy commissioner. The [[Chicago Reader]], a [[Chicago]] [[alternative newspaper]] published weekly, has published articles regarding tax increment financing districts in and around Chicago. Written by staff writer Ben Joravsky, the articles are critical of tax increment financing districts as implemented in Chicago.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.chicagoreader.com/tifarchive/|title=articles by Reader staff writer Ben Joravsky on Chicago's TIF (tax increment financing) districts|publisher=Chicago Reader|access-date=2008-05-29}}</ref> Cook County Clerk [[David Orr]], in order to bring transparency to Chicago and Cook County tax increment financing districts, began to feature information regarding Chicago area districts on his office's website.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.cookcountyclerk.com/tsd/tifs/Pages/TIFs101.aspx|title=TIFs 101: A taxpayer's primer for understanding TIFs|access-date=2008-05-29|publisher=Cook County Clerk's Office|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20091215164012/http://www.cookcountyclerk.com/tsd/tifs/Pages/TIFs101.aspx|archive-date=2009-12-15}}</ref> The information featured includes City of Chicago TIF revenue by year, maps of Chicago and Cook County suburban municipalities' TIF districts. The Neighborhood Capital Budget Group of Chicago, Illinois, a non-profit organization, advocated for area resident participation in capital programs. The group also researched and analyzed the expansion of Chicago's TIF districts.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.ncbg.org/research.htm|title=Research|publisher=Neighborhood Capital Budget Group of Chicago, Illinois|access-date=2008-05-29|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080509133111/http://www.ncbg.org/research.htm|archive-date=2008-05-09}}</ref> In April 2009, the "TIF Sunshine Ordinance" introduced by Alderman Scott Waguespack and Alderman Manuel Flores (then 1st Ward Alderman) passed City Council. The ordinance made all TIF Redevelopment Agreements and attachments available on the city's website in a searchable electronic format. The proposal intended to improve the overall transparency of TIF Agreements, thereby facilitating significantly increased public accountability.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://ward32.org/about/legislation/tif/|title=Research|publisher=32ND WARD SERVICE OFFICE|access-date=2015-05-13}}</ref> According to an article published in the ''Journal of Property Tax Assessment & Administration'' in 2009, the increase in the use of TIF in Chicago resulted in a "substantial portion of Chicago's property tax base and the land area" being subsumed by these levy zones—"26 percent of the city's land area and almost a quarter of the total value of commercial property is in TIF districts" by 2007. The study notes the difficulties in establishing how effective TIF are.<ref name="True Costs of TIF">{{cite journal | url=http://www.cookcountyassessor.com/forms/creationvscapture.pdf | title=Creation vs. Capture: Evaluating the True Costs of Tax Increment Financing | date=2008 | access-date=28 August 2015 | author1=Sherri Farris | author2=John Horbas | journal=Journal of Property Tax Assessment & Administration | volume=6 | issue=4 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150923210409/http://www.cookcountyassessor.com/forms/creationvscapture.pdf | archive-date=23 September 2015 | df=dmy-all }}</ref> ===Albuquerque=== Currently, the 2nd largest TIF project in America is located in [[Albuquerque, New Mexico]]: the $500 million [[Mesa del Sol]] development. Mesa del Sol is controversial in that the proposed development would be built upon a "green field" that presently generates little tax revenue and any increase in tax revenue would be diverted into a tax increment financing fund. This "increment" thus would leave governmental bodies without funding from the developed area that is necessary for the governmental bodies' operation. ===Detroit=== In July 2014, Detroit's Downtown Development Authority announced TIF financing to build [[Little Caesars Arena|a new arena]] for the [[Detroit Red Wings]]. The total project cost, including additional private investments in retail and housing, is estimated at $650 million, of which $250 million will be financed using TIF capture to repay 30-year tax exempt bonds purchased by the Michigan Strategic Fund, the state's economic development arm. ===California=== In an article published in 1998 by Public Policy Institute of California, Michael Dardia challenged the governing [[Redevelopment agency|redevelopment agencies']] (RDAs) assumption "that redevelopment pays for itself through tax increment financing. The claim is that RDAs "receive any increase in property tax revenues (above a two percent inflation factor) in project areas because their investment in area improvements is responsible for increasing property values."<ref name="ppic_1998">{{citation |author=Michael Dardia |url=http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/R_298MDR.pdf |title=Subsidizing Redevelopment in California |date=January 1998 |publisher=Public Policy Institute of California |access-date=28 August 2015}}</ref>{{rp|ii}} Dardia argued that property tax revenues channeled to tax increment financing results in revenues lost to "other local jurisdictions—the county, schools, and special districts"<ref name="ppic_1998" /> and if the RDAs "are not largely responsible for the increase in property values, those jurisdictions are, in effect, subsidizing redevelopment, with no say in how the revenues are used."<ref name="ppic_1998" /> {{Blockquote|In fiscal year 1994–1995—the most recent year for which figures are available—redevelopment agencies (RDAs) received 8 percent of the property tax revenues collected in the state of California, amounting to $1.5 billion. These are revenues that, absent the RDAs, would have gone to other public agencies such as the state and counties.|Michael Dardia 1998}} By December 6, 2010, Governor [[Arnold Schwarzenegger]] issued a fiscal emergency<ref name="fiscalER">{{cite web | url=http://gov.ca.gov/news.php?id=16882 | title=Fiscal Emergency Proclamation by the Governor of the State of California | publisher=Governor of the State of California | date=20 January 2011 | access-date=28 August 2015 | archive-date=6 September 2015 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150906174734/http://gov.ca.gov/news.php?id=16882 | url-status=dead }}</ref> which was reaffirmed by Governor [[Jerry Brown]] in December 2011 to underscore "the need for immediate legislative action to address California's massive budget deficit." Governor Brown enacted measures to stabilize school funding by reducing or eliminating the diversion of property taxes from the public sector including, school districts, to RDAs. New legislation including Assembly Bill 26 and Assembly Bill 27 were passed, which led to the elimination of California's nearly 400 redevelopment agencies thereby stopping the diversion of property tax revenues from public funding. The RDAs appealed the decision, however they were eventually eliminated.<ref name="lawsuit">{{Cite court |litigants=City of Cerritos v. State of California |vol=239 Cal. App. 4th 1020 |reporter=Cal: Court of Appeal, 3rd Appellate Dist. 2015 |opinion= |pinpoint= |court=California Courts - State of California |date=25 August 2015 |url=https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=1420299108184705098&hl=en&as_sdt=6&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr}}</ref> The state reintroduced the option of tax-increment financing for the funding of Community Revitalization and Investment Authorities (CRIAs) in 2015, the latter being authorities created by local governments to create or upgrade infrastructure and create or preserve affordable housing for low and moderate income households.<ref name=":0" /><ref name=":1" /> Enhanced Infrastructure Financing Districts (EIFDs) in the state are also financed by a tax-increment bond and their purposes are largely similar, though the requirement for use and the projects covered are somewhat different.<ref name=":2" /> ====Alameda==== In 2009, SunCal Companies, an Irvine, California-based developer, introduced a ballot initiative that embodied a redevelopment plan for the former [[Naval Air Station Alameda]] and a financial plan based in part on roughly $200 million worth of tax increment financing to pay for public amenities. SunCal structured the initiative so that the provision of public amenities was contingent on receiving tax increment financing, and on the creation of a community facilities (Mello-Roos) district, which would levy a special (extra) tax on property owners within the development.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.ci.alameda.ca.us/news/pdf/0905_latest_report.pdf|title=Alameda Point Development Initiative Election Report Executive Summary Part I|publisher=City of Alameda|access-date=2009-12-04|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20091229044820/http://www.ci.alameda.ca.us/news/pdf/0905_latest_report.pdf|archive-date=2009-12-29}}</ref> Since Alameda City Council did not extend the Exclusive Negotiation Agreement with Suncal, this project will not move forward. In California, Community Redevelopment Law governs the use of tax increment financing by public agencies.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.hcd.ca.gov/hpd/rda/rdalaw.html|title=California Community Redevelopment Law|access-date=2009-12-05|archive-date=2010-01-10|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100110045224/http://www.hcd.ca.gov/hpd/rda/rdalaw.html|url-status=dead}}</ref> ===Iowa=== In 2002 economists at Department of Economics Iowa State University, claimed that "existing taxpayers, its householders, wage earners, and retirees are aggressively subsidizing business growth and population" TIF designated zones in Iowa.<ref name="IAstate">{{cite web |author1=David Swenson |author2=Liesl Eathington |name-list-style=amp |date=2002 |title=* David Swenson and Liesl Eathington, "Do Tax Increment Finance Districts in Iowa Spur Regional Economic and Demographic Growth?" (2002). |url=http://www.americandreamcoalition.org/landuse/TIFsinIowa.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071020000417/http://www.americandreamcoalition.org/landuse/TIFsinIowa.pdf |archive-date=Oct 20, 2007 |access-date=9 June 2016 |work=Department of Economics Iowa State University}}</ref> ===Wisconsin=== TIFs were established in Wisconsin in 1975. In 2001 critics argued that TIF supported developers to develop in green spaces citing a 2000 ''1,000 Friends of Wisconsin'' report which stated that 45% of tax incremental financing districts were used to develop open space land.<ref>{{citation |work=Center on Wisconsin Strategy, University of Wisconsin–Madison |url=http://www.cows.org/pdf/rp-stumps.pdf |title=From Stumps to Dumps: Wisconsin's Anti-Environmental Subsidies |access-date=28 August 2015 |author=David E. Wood |author2=Mary Beth Hughes |date=April 2001 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120301121920/http://www.cows.org/pdf/rp-stumps.pdf |archive-date=1 March 2012 |df=dmy-all }}</ref><ref>{{cite report |author=Matthew Mayrl |work=Center on Wisconsin Strategy, University of Wisconsin–Madison) titled |url=http://www.cows.org/pdf/econdev/tif/rp-tif_2005.pdf |title=Refocusing Wisconsin's TIF System On Urban Redevelopment: Three Reforms |date=2005 |access-date=2006-09-09 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060812104229/http://www.cows.org/pdf/econdev/tif/rp-tif_2005.pdf |archive-date=2006-08-12 }}</ref> ===Denver=== From 1995 through 2005 Denver tax payers were able to leverage over $5 billion in private investment by committing to over half a billion dollars of TIF subsidies. At that time new TIF subsidized projects under consideration included the "redevelopment of the old Gates Rubber Factory complex at I-25 and Broadway, and the realization of Denver's ambitious plans for the downtown Union Station area."<ref name="TIF-Subsidized" />{{rp|6}} Denver's urban landscape was transformed from 1995 through 2005 through TIF-subsidized projects such as "the landmark resurrection" of the Denver Dry Goods building, the Adams Mark hotel, [[Denver Pavilions]], and REI flagship store, Broadway Marketplace shopping area and the demolition of the old Woolworth's building, the relocation and expansion of Elitch's into the Six Flags Elitch Gardens Amusement park, the redevelopment of Lowry Air Force Base and the redevelopment of the old Stapleton airport – "the largest urban infill project in the nation."<ref name="TIF-Subsidized" />{{rp|6}} By 2005 the City of Denver had already "mortgaged over $500 million in future tax revenue to pay off existing TIF subsidies to private developers" and was preparing to "increase that sum substantially with several new TIF projects in the next five years." In 2005 the "diversions of tax revenue to pay for TIF subsidies [represented] an annual cost of almost $30 million to Denver taxpayers, and [were] rising rapidly."<ref name="TIF-Subsidized">{{cite web |author1=Tony Robinson |author2=Chris Nevitt |author3=Robin Kniech |date=2005 |title=Are We Getting Our Money's Worth? Tax-Increment Financing and New Ideas New Priorities New Economy Urban Redevelopment in Denver Part III: Are We Building a Better Denver?: Job Quality & Housing Affordability at TIF-Subsidized Projects |url=http://fresc.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/TIF-III.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170921125358/http://fresc.org:80/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/TIF-III.pdf |archive-date=21 September 2017 |location=Denver, CO |publisher=Front Range Economic Strategy Center |access-date=1 February 2024}}</ref>{{rp|57}} By 2007 TIF tax expenditures in the form of forgone tax revenue totaled nearly "$30 million annually – equal to almost 7% of Denver's entire annual General Fund revenues" and at that time the amount was rapidly increasing.<ref name="TIF-Subsidized" />{{rp|6}} In a 2005 study it was revealed through wage surveys at TIF projects "that jobs there pay substantially less than Denver average wages, and 14%-27% less even than average wages for comparable occupational categories."<ref name="TIF-Subsidized" />{{rp|2}} In part 1 of a three part series researchers "explained the history and mechanics of TIF, and analyzed the total cost of TIF to Denver taxpayers, including "hidden" costs from increased public service burdens that TIF projects do not pay for."<ref name="TIF_Denver_1">{{cite web |author1=Tony Robinson |author2=Chris Nevitt |author3=Robin Kniech |date=2005 |title=Are We Getting Our Money's Worth? Tax-Increment Financing and Urban Redevelopment in Denver Part I: What Do TIF Subsidies Cost Denver?: The Increasing Scale of TIF and Its Budget Impacts |url=https://www.readkong.com/page/are-we-getting-our-money-s-worth-tax-increment-financing-4785115 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240201064127/https://www.readkong.com/page/are-we-getting-our-money-s-worth-tax-increment-financing-4785115 |archive-date=1 February 2024 |url-status=live |location=Denver, CO |publisher=Front Range Economic Strategy Center}}</ref> In "Who Profits from TIF Subsidies?" researchers "examined the types of businesses Denver attracts through TIF, and the profit rates of developers with whom Denver partners to bring TIF projects into existence, and the transparency of the TIF approval process."<ref name="TIF_Denver_2">{{cite web |author1=Tony Robinson |author2=Chris Nevitt |author3=Robin Kniech |date=2005 |title=Are We Getting Our Money's Worth? Tax-Increment Financing and Urban Redevelopment in Denver Part II: Who Profits from TIF Subsidies? |url=http://fresc.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/TIF-II.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170921170646/http://fresc.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/TIF-II.pdf |archive-date=21 September 2017 |url-status=dead |location=Denver, CO |publisher=Front Range Economic Strategy Center}}</ref> In part three of the study researchers examined "quality and housing affordability at TIF-subsidized projects."<ref name="TIF-Subsidized" />{{rp|2}}
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