Editing Traffic message channel (section)

== Security ==
In April 2007, two Italian security researchers presented research about RDS-TMC<ref name=inversepath>{{citation|url=http://dev.inversepath.com/rds/cansecwest_2007.pdf|title=Unusual Car Navigation Tricks: Injecting RDS-TMC Traffic Information Signals|first1=Andrea|last1=Barisani|first2=Daniele|last2=Bianco|publisher=Inverse Path|date=18–20 April 2007|access-date=2 November 2012|archive-date=8 January 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160108151839/http://dev.inversepath.com/rds/cansecwest_2007.pdf|url-status=dead}}</ref> at the CanSecWest<ref>{{cite web|url=http://cansecwest.com |title=CanSecWest Applied Security Conference: Interact with the security community |publisher=CanSecWest |access-date=2012-10-19}}</ref> security conference. The presentation, entitled "Unusual Car Navigation Tricks", raised the point that RDS-TMC is a wireless cleartext protocol and showed how to build a receiver and transmitter with inexpensive electronics capable of injecting false and potentially dangerous messages.<ref name=inversepath/>

Detailed instructions and schematics were published in Issue No. 64 of ''[[Phrack]]'' hacking magazine.<ref>{{cite journal | url = http://www.phrack.org/issues.html?issue=64&id=5#article | title = Hijacking RDS-TMC Traffic Information signals | first1 = Andrea "lcars" | last1 = Barisani | first2= Daniele "danbia" | last2= Bianco | journal = Phrack | date = 27 May 2007 | issue = 64 | access-date = 2 November 2012}}</ref>

The TMC Forum responded by stating that the effects of any 'pirate' TMC broadcasts would be non-existent on users not on routes affected by fake obstruction messages and that such broadcasts would directly interfere with that country's TMC carrier station, which would lead to criminal or civil liability. They stated that it was therefore unlikely that such activity would take place.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.tmcforum.com/en/about_tmc/tmc_news/hacking_tmc_-_unsuccessfully.htm |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070514153650/http://www.tmcforum.com/en/about_tmc/tmc_news/hacking_tmc_-_unsuccessfully.htm |url-status=dead |archive-date=14 May 2007 |title=Hacking TMC – Unsuccessfully |publisher=TISA: Traveler Information Services Association}}</ref>

Actual RDS-TMC attacks have been known to occur, for instance in Belgium in 2019 where road users were warned of "air raids on the E40 road" in March and that "firefights broke out on the E17" in August
.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.hln.be/nieuws/binnenland/verkeersinformatie-op-gps-opnieuw-gehackt-vuurgevecht-tussen-kortrijk-en-uz-gent~ab0d0fd4/|title=Verkeersinformatie op gps opnieuw gehackt: "Vuurgevecht tussen Kortrijk en UZ Gent"|publisher=Het Laatste Nieuws|access-date=14 August 2019}}</ref> Official government advice was to ignore these messages, local police services admitted that locating the source of the transmissions was going to be difficult and that – even though clearly communication laws were broken – arrests or convictions were unlikely.