Editing Truth-conditional semantics (section)

===Pragmatic intrusion===
Some authors working within the field of [[pragmatics]] have argued that linguistic meaning, understood as the output of a purely formal analysis of a sentence-type, underdetermines truth-conditions.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Recanati|first=François|authorlink = François Recanati|date=2001|title=What is said|journal=Synthese|language=en|volume=128|issue=1/2|pages=75–91|doi=10.1023/A:1010383405105|s2cid=46235399 }}</ref><ref>{{cite book|author1=Dan Sperber|author2=Deirdre Wilson|title=Relevance: Communication and Cognition|year=1986|publisher=Wiley-Blackwell|isbn=978-0-631-19878-9}}</ref> These authors, sometimes labeled 'contextualists',<ref>{{cite book|author1=Hermann Cappelen|author2=Ernst Lepore|title=Insensitive Semantics: a Defence of Semantic Minimalism and Speech Act Pluralism|year=2005|publisher=Wiley-Blackwell|isbn=9781405126748}}</ref> argue that the role of pragmatic processes is not just pre-semantic (disambiguation or reference assignment) or post-semantic (drawing [[Implicature|implicatures]], determining [[Speech act|speech acts]]), but is also key to determining the truth-conditions of an utterance. That is why some contextualists prefer to talk about 'truth-conditional pragmatics' instead of semantics.<ref>{{cite book|author1=François Recanati|title=Literal Meaning|year=2004|publisher=Cambridge University Press|isbn=9780511615382}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|author1=François Recanati|title=
Truth-conditional pragmatics|year=2011|publisher=Oxford University Press|isbn=9780199226986}}</ref>