Editing Unconditional surrender (section)

===World War II===
{{see also|German Instrument of Surrender|Japanese Instrument of Surrender}}
[[File:Surrender of Japan - USS Missouri.jpg|right|thumb| The Japanese delegation, headed by [[Mamoru Shigemitsu]], prepares to sign the instrument of surrender aboard the [[USS Missouri (BB-63)|USS ''Missouri'']] in [[Tokyo Bay]], 2 September 1945.]]
[[File:Field Marshall Keitel signs German surrender terms in Berlin 8 May 1945 - Restoration.jpg|right|thumb|[[Wilhelm Keitel|Field-Marshal Wilhelm Keitel]] signing the definitive act of unconditional surrender for the German military in Berlin, 8 May 1945]]
The use of the term was revived during [[World War II]] at the [[Casablanca conference]] in January 1943 when American President [[Franklin D. Roosevelt]] stated it to the press as the objective of the war against the Axis Powers of [[Nazi Germany|Germany]], [[Kingdom of Italy|Italy]], and [[Empire of Japan|Japan]]. When Roosevelt made the announcement at Casablanca, he referred to General Grant's use of the term during the American Civil War.

The term was also used in the [[Potsdam Declaration]] issued to Japan on July 26, 1945. Near the end of the declaration, it said, "We call upon the government of Japan to proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces" and warned that the alternative was "prompt and utter destruction."

It has been claimed that it prolonged the war in Europe by its usefulness to [[Themes in Nazi propaganda#War|German domestic propaganda]], which used it to encourage further resistance against the Allied armies, and by its suppressive effect on the [[German resistance to Nazism|German resistance]] movement since even after a coup against [[Adolf Hitler]]:
{{quotation| "those Germans – and particularly those German generals – who might have been ready to throw Hitler over, and were able to do so, were discouraged from making the attempt by their inability to extract from the Allies any sort of assurance that such action would improve the treatment meted out to their country."<ref name="balfour1970">Michael Balfour, "[https://www.jstor.org/pss/2614534 Another Look at 'Unconditional Surrender'"], ''International Affairs'' (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944–), Vol. 46, No. 4 (Oct., 1970), pp. 719–736</ref>}} It has also been argued that without the demand for unconditional surrender, [[Central Europe]] might not have fallen behind the [[Iron Curtain]].<ref name="balfour1970"/> "It was a policy that the [[Soviet Union]] accepted with alacrity, probably because a completely destroyed Germany would facilitate Russia's postwar expansion program."<ref>Deane, John R.  1947.  The Strange Alliance, The Story of our Efforts at Wartime Co-operation with Russia. The Viking Press.</ref> It has also been claimed to have prolonged the war with Japan or to be a cause of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki (see [[debate over the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki]]).

One reason for the policy was that the Allies wished to avoid a repetition of the [[stab-in-the-back myth]], which had arisen in Germany after [[World War I]] and attributed Germany's loss to betrayal by Jews, Bolsheviks, and Socialists, as well as the fact that the war ended before the [[Allies of World War I|Allies]] had reached Germany. The myth was used by the Nazis in their propaganda. An unconditional surrender was felt to ensure that the Germans knew that they had lost the war themselves.<ref>{{cite book |last=Wheeler-Bennett |first=John W. |title=The Nemesis of Power: The German Army in Politics, 1918–1945 |year=1954 |location=London |publisher=Macmillan |page=559}}</ref>