Editing Vote counting (section)

===Time needed and cost of manual counts===
[[File:Time for hand counts.png|258px|thumb|Time for hand counts: Minutes per vote counted]]

Cost depends on pay levels and staff time needed, recognizing that staff generally work in teams of two to four (one to read, one to watch, and one or two to record votes). Teams of four, with two to read and two to record are more secure<ref name="goggin"/><ref name="tobi"/> and would increase costs. Three to record might more quickly resolve discrepancies, if 2 of the 3 agree.

Typical times in the table below range from a tenth to a quarter of a minute per vote tallied, so 24-60 ballots per hour per team, if there are 10 votes per ballot.

One experiment with identical ballots of various types and multiple teams found that sorting ballots into stacks took longer and had more errors than two people reading to two talliers.<ref name="goggin"/>

{| class="wikitable sortable" style="font-size: 75%; text-align: center; "
|+ class="nowrap" | Staff Time Needed for Hand Counts
|-
!||Team (Wall Clock) Minutes per Vote Checked|| Team Size ||Staff Minutes per Vote Checked||Number of Contests Checked per Ballot||Full Precincts /Batches, or Random Ballots|| Type of Paper Ballot || Number of Ballots Checked ||Total Staff Time, Minutes||Year||Sources|| Overheads Excluded & Notes
|-
|Searcy Cnty, AR|| || ||8.47||1||Full batches||Sheets||1,700||14,400||2024||<ref name="ar-sbec">{{Cite web |date=2024-08-23 |title=Post-Election Audit Report 2024 General Election [actually preference primary], pages 4,5,24,25 |url=https://static.ark.org/eeuploads/elections/2024_Preferential_Primary_Audit_Report_Final.pdf |access-date=2024-10-05 |website=Arkansas State Board of Election Commissioners}}</ref><ref name="arad">{{Cite web |last=Madison |first=Richard Chris |date=2024-06-27 |title=Re: March 2024 Preferential Primary Audit Process |url=https://arkansasadvocate.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/jpr-6.27.24.pdf |access-date=2024-10-05 |website=Arkansas Advocate}}</ref>||Team size & total errors not given. Hand & machine counts of Early Vote for Wes Bradford matched at 517, but certified results showed 520 and tally sheets showed 518. Two other ballots in a precinct batch were omitted from hand and machine counts. Total of 11 were uncounted.
|-
|Butler Cnty, PA, Butler City||0.02||6||0.09||8||Full batches||Sheets||600||450||2022|| <ref name="ppd">{{Cite news |last=McGoldrick |first=Gillian |date=2022-08-17 |title=Butler County finishes its review of 2020 election, finds no inaccuracies among 1,600 ballot |work=Pittsburgh Post-Dispatch |url=https://www.post-gazette.com/news/politics-local/2022/08/17/butler-county-ballots-review-2020-election-vote-recount-elections-staff-scanners-pennsylvania/stories/202208170125 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220829142351/https://www.post-gazette.com/news/politics-local/2022/08/17/butler-county-ballots-review-2020-election-vote-recount-elections-staff-scanners-pennsylvania/stories/202208170125 |archive-date=2022-08-29  |access-date=2022-09-24}}</ref><ref name="gov">{{Cite news |last=McGoldrick |first=Gillian |date=2022-08-18 |title=Butler County Finishes 2020 Election Review After 170 Hours |language=en |work=Governing |url=https://www.governing.com/now/butler-county-finishes-2020-election-review-after-170-hours |access-date=2022-09-24}}</ref> ||1 reads to 4–7. No report available, so times may be under-reported. Not on graph.
|-
|Butler Cnty, PA, Donegal Twp||0.02||4||0.08||8||Full batches||Sheets||1,061||660||2022|| <ref name="ppd"/><ref name="gov"/>||1 reads to 4–7. No report available, so times may be under-reported. Not on graph.
|-
|Dane County, WI||0.04||5||0.20||1||Full sets of images||Sheets||1000||200||2015||<ref name="wi-eo">{{Cite web |title=FOR ELECTION OFFICIALS |url=https://wisconsinelectionintegrity.org/for-election-officials/ |access-date=2020-06-25 |website=Wisconsin Election Integrity |language=en-US}}</ref><ref name="wi-pdf">{{Cite web |last=McKim |first=Karen |date=January 2016 |title=Using automatically created digital ballot images to verify voting-machine output in Wisconsin |url=https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/wiscgrassrootsnetwork/pages/1500/attachments/original/1452755405/DevelopmentReport-DigitalImageAudits.pdf?1452755405 |access-date=2020-06-25 |website=Wisconsin Election Integrity}}</ref>|| Organizing ballot scans for review, training, legal, supervision 
|-
|Mohave County, AZ, experiment||0.05||7||0.34||36||Full batches||Sheets||850||10,266||2023||<ref>Note this line includes 7-person teams to tally: 1 reader+2 watchers, 2 talliers+2 watchers; plus 3 people to enter write-ins @30 seconds per write-in, 15% write-ins. https://resources.mohave.gov/Repository/Calendar/08_01_2023BOSAgenda0fe47379-660b-465f-a8b5-4eb9fc976f30.pdf p.4 says 46 errors were missed by tally team, and only known because the 850 test ballots had been repeatedly counted in Logic & Accuracy Tests. "Some of the observed errors included:
*Caller called the wrong candidate and both watchers failed to notice the incorrect call;
*Tally markers tried to work out inconsistencies while tallying;
*Tally markers marked a vote for an incorrect candidate and the watchers failed to notice the error;
*Caller calling too fast resulted in double marking a candidate or missed marking a candidate;
*Caller missed calling a vote for a candidate and both watchers failed to notice the omission;
*Watchers not watching the process due to boredom or fatigue;
*Illegible tally marking caused incorrect tally totaling;
*Enunciation of names caused incorrect candidate tally; and
*Using incorrect precinct tally sheets to tally ballots resulted in incorrect precinct level results
</ref>|| {{small|Excludes: detecting & retallying errors missed by team, space rental, paying workers to attend training, entering data on computer for web & SOS, creating blank tally sheets for each precinct. They estimate the following would add 33% to direct tallying cost: supervision, summation, sorting ballots by precinct, guards, transportation, background checks, webcams, recruitment}} 
|-
|Maricopa County, AZ recount||0.08||5||0.42||2||Full batches||Sheets||1||0.83||2021||<ref name="polletta">{{Cite news |last=Polletta  |first=Maria and Piper Hansen |date=2021-04-28 |title=Here's what happened at the Arizona election audit of Maricopa County ballots |language=en-US |work=Arizona Republic |url=https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/politics/arizona/2021/04/28/arizona-election-audit-what-happened-ballot-counting-april-28/4876185001/ |access-date=2021-05-06}}</ref>|| Organizing ballots for review, training, legal, supervision, adding tally sheets 
|-
|New Hampshire||0.09||3||0.27||20||Full batches||Sheets||627||3,360||2007||<ref name="tobi">pp.21-22,44 {{Cite web |last=Tobi |first=Nancy |date=2007-09-06 |title=Hands-on Elections: (Condensed Version) |url=http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/files/Hand_Count_Elections_Steps_only_Sept_6_2007.pdf |access-date=2021-05-20 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080919152131/http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/files/Hand_Count_Elections_Steps_only_Sept_6_2007.pdf |archive-date=2008-09-19 }}</ref><ref name="tobibook">{{Cite book |last=Tobi |first=Nancy |url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/816513645 |title=Hands-on elections : an informational handbook for running real elections, using real paper ballots, counted by real people : lessons from New Hampshire |date=2011 |publisher=Healing Mountain Publications |isbn=978-1-4528-0612-9 |edition=2nd |location=Wilton, N.H. |oclc=816513645}}</ref>|| Add 60% to cover: supervision 43% + training 13% + sums 4% 
|-
|Carlisle, MA||0.11||2||0.22||9||Full batches||Sheets||3,670||7,200||2020|||| 8 teams of 2 plus 4 extra 
|-
|Hancock, MA||0.13||2||0.26||9||Full batches||Sheets||513||1,200||2020|||| Organizing ballots for review, training, legal, supervision, adding tally sheets (10 teams of 2 
|-
|Provincetown, MA||0.14||2||0.28||11||Full batches||Sheets||2,616||7,980||2020|||| 16 teams of 2+2 runners+4 tallies 
|-
|Tolland, CT||||||0.11||7||Full batches||Sheets||3851||2,880||2012||<ref name="tigran"/>||
|-
|Bloomfield, CT||||||0.15||7||Full batches||Sheets||2272||2,400||2012||<ref name="tigran"/>||
|-
|Vernon, CT||||||0.31||6||Full batches||Sheets||2544||4,740||2012||<ref name="tigran"/>||
|-
|Bridgeport, CT||0.40||5||2.01||1||Full batches||Sheets||23860||48,000||2010||<ref name="ctb">{{Cite web|last=Connecticut Citizen Election Audit Coalition|date=2011-01-12 |title=Report and Feedback December 2010 Bridgeport Connecticut Coalition Recount |url=http://www.ctelectionaudit.org/bridgeport-recount-details/ |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120419084153/http://www.ctelectionaudit.org/bridgeport-recount-details/ |archive-date=2012-04-19 }}</ref>|| Includes counting number of voters who checked in at polling places, and comparing those counts to ballot counts. 
|-
|Bibb County, GA||0.18||3||0.54||39||Full batches||Rolls||592||12,480||2006||<ref name="ga">{{Cite web |url=http://sos.georgia.gov/elections/VVPATreport.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20081126235810/http://sos.georgia.gov/elections/VVPATreport.pdf |url-status=dead |archive-date=November 26, 2008 |title=Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail Pilot Project Report. Pages 18-22, 42-63. |last=Georgia Secretary of State |first=Elections Division. (2007-04). " |date=April 1, 2007 |access-date=August 17, 2019}}</ref>||
|-
|Camden County, GA||0.11||3||0.33||34||Full batches||Rolls||470||5,220||2006||<ref name="ga"/>||
|-
|Cobb County, GA||0.20||3||0.60||42||Full batches||Rolls||976||24,480||2006||<ref name="ga"/>||
|-
|San Diego precincts||0.22||3||0.67||19||Full batches||Sheets||2,425||30,573||2016||<ref name="sd-cops">{{Cite web |last=Lutz |first=Ray |date=2019-01-28 |title=White Paper: Election Audit Strategy |url=https://copswiki.org/w/pub/Common/M1879/WhitePaper-Election%20Audits%20Part%202-V0.4.pdf |access-date=2021-04-13 |website=Citizens' Oversight Projects}}</ref>||
|-
|Clark County, NV||||||0.72||21||Full batches||Rolls||1,268||19,200||2004||<ref name="theisen"/>||
|-
|Washington State recount||||||1.49||1||Full batches||Sheets||1,842,136||2,741,460||2004||<ref name="theisen">{{Cite web |url=http://www.votersunite.org/info/CostEstimateforHandCounting.pdf |title=Cost Estimate for Hand Counting 2% of the Precincts in the U.S. |last=Theisen |first=Ellen |date=2004 |website=votersunite.org |access-date=May 4, 2018}}</ref>||
|-
|Orange County, CA||||||1.93||1||Full, mostly||Rolls mostly||467||900||2011||<ref name="ca"/>|| Independent count, done by graduate student on university computer 
|-
|Read to Talliers Experiment Second Contest||0.07||4||0.30||1||Full batches||Sheets||1800||537||2012||<ref name="goggin"/>|| Organizing ballots for review, training, legal, supervision, adding tally sheets 
|-
|Read to Talliers Experiment First Contest||0.12||4||0.48||1||Full batches||Sheets||1800||861||2012||<ref name="goggin"/>|| Organizing ballots for review, training, legal, supervision, adding tally sheets 
|-
|Sort & Stack Experiment Second Contest||0.17||3||0.51||1||Full batches||Sheets||1920||972||2012||<ref name="goggin"/>|| Organizing ballots for review, training, legal, supervision, adding tally sheets 
|-
|Sort & Stack Experiment First Contest||0.24||3||0.71||1||Full batches||Sheets||1920||1,369||2012||<ref name="goggin">{{Cite journal |last=Goggin |first=Stephen N. |display-authors=et al. |date=March 2012 |title=Post-Election Auditing: Effects of Procedure and Ballot Type on Manual Counting Accuracy, Efficiency, and Auditor Satisfaction and Confidence |url=http://www.liebertpub.com/doi/10.1089/elj.2010.0098 |journal=Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy |language=en |volume=11 |issue=1 |pages=36–51 |doi=10.1089/elj.2010.0098 |issn=1533-1296|url-access=subscription }}</ref>|| Organizing ballots for review, training, legal, supervision, adding tally sheets 
|-
|'''COUNTING  BALLOTS IN RANDOM ORDER'''||||||||||||||||||||||
|-
|Carroll County, MD||1.03||2||2.06||3||Random images||Sheets||247||1,526||2016||<ref name="md-audit">{{Cite web |url=https://www.elections.maryland.gov/press_room/documents/Post%20Election%20Tabulation%20Audit%20Pilot%20Program%20Report.pdf |title=Post-Election Tabulation Audit Pilot Program Report |last=Maryland State Board of Elections |date=October 21, 2016 |website=elections.maryland.gov |access-date=June 29, 2019}}</ref>|| Organizing ballot scans for review, training, legal, supervision 
|-
|Montgomery County MD||0.88||2||1.76||3||Random images||Sheets||82||432||2016||<ref name="md-audit"/>|| Organizing ballot scans for review, training, legal, supervision 
|-
|Merced County, CA||||||1.82||2||Random ballots||Sheets||198||720||2011||<ref name="ca"/>|| Independent count, done by graduate student on university computer 
|-
|Humboldt County, CA||||||5.87||3||Random ballots||Sheets||143||2,520||2011||<ref name="ca">{{Cite web |last=Bowen |first=Debra |date=2011-03-01 |title=AB 2023 (Saldaña), Chapter 122, Statutes of 2010 Post-Election Risk-Limiting Audit Pilot Program March 1, 2012, Report to the Legislature |url=https://admin.cdn.sos.ca.gov/reports/2012/post-election-audit-report-20120301.pdf |access-date=2021-05-30 |website=California Secretary of State}} and {{Cite web |title=Post-Election Risk-Limiting Audit Pilot Program 2011-2013, Final Report to the United States Election Assistance Commission |last=California Secretary of State |date=July 30, 2014 |url=https://votingsystems.cdn.sos.ca.gov/oversight/risk-pilot/final-report-073014.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190602155902/https://votingsystems.cdn.sos.ca.gov/oversight/risk-pilot/final-report-073014.pdf |url-status=dead|website=Internet Archive|archive-date=2019-06-02 }} AND {{Cite journal |last=California Secretary of State |date=July 30, 2014 |title=Appendices, Post-Election Risk-Limiting Audit Pilot Program 2011-2013 Final Report to the United States Election Assistance Commission." Pages 81-90  |url=https://votingsystems.cdn.sos.ca.gov/oversight/risk-pilot/appendices-073014.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190602160636/https://votingsystems.cdn.sos.ca.gov/oversight/risk-pilot/appendices-073014.pdf |url-status=dead|journal=Internet Archive|archive-date=2019-06-02 }} AND [https://web.archive.org/web/20190602155902/http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/voting-systems/oversight/post-election-auditing-regulations-and-reports/post-election-risk-limiting-audit-pilot-program/ Overview]. The time estimates of other California counties in the study included time to scan ballots to enable ballot comparison audits, so their costs were not comparable. None of the 11 California counties doing audits chose a close race or needed a 100% hand-count.</ref>|| Independent count, done by graduate student on university computer
|-
|}