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Xi'an Incident
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===Renewed negotiations=== {{multiple image | align = left | total_width = 340 | image1 = Pan Hannian.jpg | caption1 = Pan Hannian | alt1 = Pan Hannian in a business suit | image2 = Chen Li-fu.jpg | alt2 = Colorized photo of Chen Lifu | caption2 = Chen Lifu | footer = The chief negotiators}} Over the course of the year, the Soviets had become more convinced that the united front should include Chiang. This created a problem when, in late June, the CCP re-established radio communications with Moscow. They transmitted the Wayaobu Manifesto and informed the Comintern of their alliance with Zhang. They asked for assistance in carrying out their plan to form an anti-Japan, anti-Chiang base.{{sfn|Yang|2020|p=64}} The Comintern responded with a telegram on August 15 admonishing the CCP for continuing to oppose Chiang. The Comintern did approve the other provisions of the Wayaobu Manifesto, agreeing that neither soviet power nor the independence of the Red Army should be sacrificed.{{sfn|Sheng|1992|p=157}} But they absolutely vetoed the CCP's plan to form a base in the northwest, knowing that such a move would scuttle any chance for a united front with the KMT.{{sfn|Yang|2020|p=64}} The CCP accepted the new directive from the Comintern. They adopted the new slogan "compelling Chiang to resist Japan," and [[Pan Hannian]] was sent to Nanjing to begin negotiating a truce with [[Chen Lifu]].{{sfn|Sheng|1992|p=158}} Chiang continued to try to resolve the civil war militarily. He had always considered negotiations with the CCP to be a last resort, and after bringing the Liangguang Incident to a peaceful conclusion in September, he could bring all his force to bear on wiping out the Communists entirely.{{sfn|Chen|2024|pp=161-162}} He was encouraged by the results of the Ningxia campaign in mid-to-late October. The Second and Fourth Corps of the Red Army marched north to pick up supplies dropped in Mongolia by the Soviet Union, but found themselves trapped on the wrong side of the Yellow River.{{sfn|Yang|2020|p=65}} They were cut to pieces by the [[Hui people|Hui]] cavalry allied with the Nationalists.{{sfn|Watt|2014|pp=111-112}} Chiang began making preparations for a sixth encirclement campaign, and instructed Zhang and Yang to participate.{{sfn|Itoh|2016|pp=129-130}} In early November, Chen Lifu presented Pan Hannian with a set of extremely harsh conditions for a deal.{{efn|The terms called for, among other things, reducing the Red Army to 3,000 men and sending all of its senior officers into exile.{{sfn|Peng|2023|p=476}}{{sfn|Sheng|1992|p=163}}}} Pan balked, calling them "conditions for surrender".{{sfn|Chen|2024|p=161}} In late November, Chiang ordered the Northeastern Army and forces from the central Nationalist Army, [[Hu Zongnan]]'s Right Route Army, to attack towards the Communist capital at [[Zhidan County|Bao'an]]. At the resulting Battle of Shanchengbao, the Northeastern Army withheld most of its forces from the attack. This allowed the Red Army to ambush and nearly wipe out Hu's 78th regiment.{{sfn|Dillon|2020|p=102}}{{sfn|Yang|1990|p=223}} This reversed the diplomatic situation: Chen Lifu moderated his conditions, but the CCP recalled Pan Hannian from Nanjing on December 10.{{sfn|Dillon|2020|pp=101-102}}{{sfn|Peng|2023|pp=476-477}} The tensions between Zhang and Chiang were reaching a breaking point. During Chiang's birthday celebrations on October 31, Zhang Xueliang attempted to convince Chiang to give up the bandit suppression campaign and focus on Japan instead. Zhang was supported by [[Yan Xishan]] and Feng Yuxiang, but Chiang angrily refused. He gave a speech the following day where he proclaimed that "the Communists are our greatest traitors".{{sfn|Pantsov|2023|p=237}}{{sfn|Itoh|2016|pp=129-130}}{{sfn|Spence|1990|p=384}} When Zhang returned to Xi'an and recounted the incident to Yang Hucheng, the latter suggested the idea of a ''bingjian'' ({{lang-zh|links=no|c=兵谏|p=bīngjiàn|tr=military remonstrance}}). In an episode in ancient Chinese history, a military officer had arrested the Emperor to force him to change a bad policy. The officer had been rewarded for his conduct rather than punished. Zhang, who historian Alexander Pantsov calls a "gallant cavalier", was intrigued by the nobility of the idea.{{sfn|Pantsov|2023|pp=241-242}}{{sfn|Pantsov|2012|p=302}} On November 23, Chiang ordered the arrest of seven leaders of the [[National Salvation Association]]. The move created an outcry across China.{{sfn|Coble|1991|p=339}} Zhang flew to Luoyang on December 3 and tried to convince Chiang to release the seven prisoners and to form a united front with the CCP against Japan, to no avail.{{sfn|Yang|2020|p=66}}{{sfn|Pantsov|2023|p=242}} Chiang declared "You are the only one in the whole country who sees things as you do. I am the revolutionary government; what I do is revolution!"{{sfn|Pantsov|2023|p=242}} When news arrived that day that Japanese marines had landed at [[Qingdao]], Chiang decided to redouble his efforts to defeat the Communists.{{sfn|Pantsov|2023|p=242}}
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