Editing Zero-sum game (section)

=== Universal solution ===

If avoiding a zero-sum game is an action choice with some probability for players, avoiding is always an equilibrium strategy for at least one player at a zero-sum game. For any two players zero-sum game where a zero-zero draw is impossible or non-credible after the play is started, such as poker, there is no Nash equilibrium strategy other than avoiding the play. Even if there is a credible zero-zero draw after a zero-sum game is started, it is not better than the avoiding strategy. In this sense, it's interesting to find reward-as-you-go in optimal choice computation shall prevail over all two players zero-sum games concerning starting the game or not.<ref>Wenliang Wang (2015). Pooling Game Theory and Public Pension Plan. {{ISBN|978-1507658246}}. Chapter 4.</ref>

The most common or simple example from the subfield of [[social psychology]] is the concept of "[[social trap]]s". In some cases pursuing individual personal interest can enhance the collective well-being of the group, but in other situations, all parties pursuing personal interest results in mutually destructive behaviour.

Copeland's review notes that an n-player non-zero-sum game can be converted into an (n+1)-player zero-sum game, where the n+1st player, denoted the ''fictitious player'', receives the negative of the sum of the gains of the other n-players (the global gain / loss).<ref>[https://www.ams.org/journals/bull/1945-51-07/S0002-9904-1945-08391-8/S0002-9904-1945-08391-8.pdf Arthur H. Copeland (July 1945) Book review, ''Theory of games and economic behavior''. By John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern (1944).] Review published in the ''Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society'' '''51'''(7) pp 498–504 (July 1945)</ref>