Editing Democracy (section)

==Democratic transitions==
{{Main|Democratic transition}}
[[File:Number of countries experiencing autocratization and democratization, 1900–2000.jpg|thumb|upright=1.5|Since {{circa|2010}}, the [[Democratic backsliding by country|number of countries autocratizing]] (blue) is higher than those [[democratizing]] (yellow).]]

A democratic transition describes a phase in a country's [[political system]], often created as a result of an incomplete change from an [[authoritarian]] regime to a democratic one (or vice versa).<ref name="Arugay 2021 pp. 1–7">{{cite book|last=Arugay|first=Aries A.|title=The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Global Security Studies|chapter=Democratic Transitions|publisher=Springer International Publishing|publication-place=Cham|year=2021|isbn=978-3-319-74336-3|doi=10.1007/978-3-319-74336-3_190-1|pages=1–7|s2cid=240235199}}</ref><ref name="Munck 2001 pp. 3425–3428">{{cite book|last=Munck|first=G.L.|title=International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences|chapter=Democratic Transitions|publisher=Elsevier|year=2001|doi=10.1016/b0-08-043076-7/01135-9|pages=3425–3428|isbn=978-0-08-043076-8}}</ref>

===Democratization===
{{Main|Democratization}}
{{Excerpt|Democratization|only=paragraph|hat=no}}

Several philosophers and researchers have outlined historical and social factors seen as supporting the evolution of democracy. Other commentators have mentioned the influence of economic development.<ref>For example: {{Cite journal|doi=10.2307/1951731|author=Lipset, Seymour Martin.|s2cid=53686238|year=1959|title=Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy|journal=American Political Science Review|volume=53|issue=1|pages=69–105|jstor=1951731}}</ref> In a related theory, [[Ronald Inglehart]] suggests that improved living-standards in modern developed countries can convince people that they can take their basic survival for granted, leading to increased emphasis on [[self-expression values]], which correlates closely with democracy.<ref>Inglehart, Ronald. Welzel, Christian ''Modernisation, Cultural Change and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence'', 2005. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press</ref><ref>{{cite book|last1=Inglehart|first1=Ronald F.|title=Cultural Evolution: People's Motivations Are Changing, and Reshaping the World|date=2018|publisher=Cambridge University Press|doi=10.1017/9781108613880|isbn=978-1-108-61388-0}}</ref>

Douglas M. Gibler and Andrew Owsiak in their study argued about the importance of peace and stable borders for the development of democracy. It has often been assumed that [[democratic peace theory|democracy causes peace]], but this study shows that, historically, peace has almost always predated the establishment of democracy.<ref>{{cite journal|last1=Gibler|first1=Douglas M.|last2=Owsiak|first2=Andrew|title=Democracy and the Settlement of International Borders, 1919–2001|journal=Journal of Conflict Resolution|volume=62|issue=9|pages=1847–75|date=2017|doi=10.1177/0022002717708599|s2cid=158036471}}</ref>

[[Carroll Quigley]] concludes that the characteristics of weapons are the main predictor of democracy:<ref>Foreword, written by historian [http://paw.princeton.edu/memorials/24/79/index.xml Harry J Hogan] {{webarchive|url= https://web.archive.org/web/20130901040610/http://paw.princeton.edu/memorials/24/79/index.xml |date= 1 September 2013}} in 1982, to Quigley's ''Weapons Systems and Political Stability''</ref><ref>see also Chester G Starr, Review of ''Weapons Systems and Political Stability'', American Historical Review, Feb 1984, p. 98, available at [http://www.carrollquigley.net/book-reviews/Review-of-Weapons-Systems-Political-Stability-Starr.htm carrollquigley.net]</ref> Democracy—this scenario—tends to emerge only when the best weapons available are easy for individuals to obtain and use.<ref name="Quigley1983-38" /> By the 1800s, guns were the best personal weapons available, and in the United States of America (already nominally democratic), almost everyone could afford to buy a gun, and could learn how to use it fairly easily. Governments could not do any better: it became the age of mass armies of citizen soldiers with guns.<ref name="Quigley1983-38" /> Similarly, Periclean Greece was an age of the citizen soldier and democracy.<ref>{{cite book|author=Carroll Quigley|title=Weapons systems and political stability: a history|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=L6e2AAAAIAAJ|access-date=20 May 2013|year=1983|publisher=University Press of America|isbn=978-0-8191-2947-5|page=307}}</ref>

Other theories stressed the relevance of [[education]] and of [[human capital]]—and within them of [[intelligence|cognitive ability]] to increasing tolerance, rationality, political literacy and participation. Two effects of education and cognitive ability are distinguished:<ref>{{cite journal|last1=Glaeser|first1=E.|last2=Ponzetto|first2=G.|last3=Shleifer|first3=A.|year=2007|title=Why does democracy need education?|url=http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:27867132|journal=Journal of Economic Growth|volume=12|issue=2|pages=77–99|doi=10.1007/s10887-007-9015-1|access-date=3 July 2017}}</ref>{{request quotation|date=August 2018}}<ref>{{cite journal|last1=Deary|first1=I.J.|last2=Batty|first2=G.D.|last3=Gale|first3=C.R.|year=2008|title=Bright children become enlightened adults|url=https://www.pure.ed.ac.uk/ws/files/8896064/bright_children_become_enlightened_adults.pdf|journal=Psychological Science|volume=19|issue=1|pages=1–6|doi=10.1111/j.1467-9280.2008.02036.x|pmid=18181782|s2cid=21297949|hdl=20.500.11820/a86dbef4-60eb-44fa-add3-513841cdf81b|hdl-access=free}}</ref><ref>Compare: {{cite journal|last1=Rindermann|first1=H|year=2008|title=Relevance of education and intelligence for the political development of nations: Democracy, rule of law and political liberty|journal=Intelligence|volume=36|issue=4|pages=306–22|doi=10.1016/j.intell.2007.09.003|quote=Political theory has described a positive linkage between education, cognitive ability and democracy. This assumption is confirmed by positive correlations between education, cognitive ability, and positively valued political conditions (N = 183–130). [...] It is shown that in the second half of the 20th century, education and intelligence had a strong positive impact on democracy, rule of law and political liberty independent from wealth (GDP) and chosen country sample. One possible mediator of these relationships is the attainment of higher stages of moral judgment fostered by cognitive ability, which is necessary for the function of democratic rules in society. The other mediators for citizens as well as for leaders could be the increased competence and willingness to process and seek information necessary for political decisions due to greater cognitive ability. There are also weaker and less stable reverse effects of the rule of law and political freedom on cognitive ability.}}</ref>
* a cognitive effect (competence to make rational choices, better information-processing)
* an ethical effect (support of democratic values, freedom, human rights etc.), which itself depends on intelligence.

Evidence consistent with conventional theories of why democracy emerges and is sustained has been hard to come by. Statistical analyses have challenged [[modernisation theory]] by demonstrating that there is no reliable evidence for the claim that democracy is more likely to emerge when countries become wealthier, more educated, or less unequal.<ref>{{cite journal|last1=Albertus|first1=Michael|first2=Victor|last2=Menaldo|s2cid=153949862|title=Coercive Capacity and the Prospects for Democratisation|journal=Comparative Politics|volume=44|issue=2|year=2012|pages=151–69|doi=10.5129/001041512798838003}}</ref> In fact, empirical evidence shows that economic growth and education may not lead to increased demand for democratization as modernization theory suggests: historically, most countries attained high levels of access to primary education well before transitioning to democracy.<ref name="Paglayan 179–198">{{Cite journal|last=Paglayan|first=Agustina S.|date=February 2021|title=The Non-Democratic Roots of Mass Education: Evidence from 200 Years|journal=American Political Science Review|volume=115|issue=1|pages=179–198|doi=10.1017/S0003055420000647|issn=0003-0554|doi-access=free}}</ref> Rather than acting as a catalyst for democratization, in some situations education provision may instead be used by non-democratic regimes to indoctrinate their subjects and strengthen their power.<ref name="Paglayan 179–198"/>

The assumed link between education and economic growth is called into question when analyzing empirical evidence. Across different countries, the correlation between education attainment and math test scores is very weak (.07). A similarly weak relationship exists between per-pupil expenditures and math competency (.26). Additionally, historical evidence suggests that average human capital (measured using literacy rates) of the masses does not explain the onset of industrialization in France from 1750 to 1850 despite arguments to the contrary.<ref>Squicciarini, Mara and Voigtländer, Nico, Knowledge Elites and Modernization: Evidence from Revolutionary France (October 2016). NBER Working Paper No. w22779, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2861711</ref> Together, these findings show that education does not always promote human capital and economic growth as is generally argued to be the case. Instead, the evidence implies that education provision often falls short of its expressed goals, or, alternatively, that political actors use education to promote goals other than economic growth and development.

Some scholars have searched for the "deep" determinants of contemporary political institutions, be they geographical or demographic.<ref>{{cite book|title=Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy|last1=Acemoglu|first1=Daron|author-link1=Daron Acemoglu|first2=James A.|last2=Robinson|year=2006|publisher=Cambridge University Press|isbn=978-0-521-85526-6}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.plawlotic.com/?p=102|title=Rainfall and Democracy}}</ref>

An example of this is the disease environment. Places with different mortality rates had different populations and productivity levels around the world. For example, in Africa, the [[tsetse fly]]—which afflicts humans and livestock—reduced the ability of Africans to plough the land. This made Africa less settled. As a consequence, political power was less concentrated.<ref>{{cite journal|author=Alsan, Marcella|doi=10.1257/aer.20130604|url=https://www.dartmouth.edu/~neudc2012/docs/paper_285.pdf|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150924201234/http://www.dartmouth.edu/~neudc2012/docs/paper_285.pdf|archive-date=2015-09-24|url-status=live|year=2015|title=The Effect of the TseTse Fly on African Development|journal=American Economic Review|volume=105|issue=1|pages=382–410|citeseerx=10.1.1.1010.2955}}</ref> This also affected the colonial institutions European countries established in Africa.<ref>{{cite book|author1=Acemoglu, Daron|author2=Johnson, Simon|author3=Robinson, James|year=2005|chapter=Institutions as a fundamental cause of long-run growth|title=Handbook of Economic Growth|volume=1|pages=385–472, Sections 1 to 4|doi=10.1016/S1574-0684(05)01006-3|isbn=978-0-444-52041-8}}</ref> Whether colonial settlers could live or not in a place made them develop different institutions which led to different economic and social paths. This also affected the distribution of power and the collective actions people could take. As a result, some African countries ended up having democracies and others [[autocracies]].

An example of geographical determinants for democracy is having access to coastal areas and rivers. This natural endowment has a positive relation with economic development thanks to the benefits of [[trade]].<ref>Mellinger, Andrew D., Jeffrey Sachs, and John L. Gallup. (1999). [http://www.earthinstitute.columbia.edu/sitefiles/file/about/director/pubs/024.pdf "Climate, Water Navigability, and Economic Development"]. Working Paper.</ref> Trade brought economic development, which in turn, broadened power. Rulers wanting to increase revenues had to protect property-rights to create incentives for people to invest. As more people had more power, more concessions had to be made by the ruler and in many{{quantify|date=August 2018}} places this process lead to democracy. These determinants defined the structure of the society moving the balance of political power.<ref>{{cite book|author1=Acemoglu, Daron|author2=Johnson, Simon|author3=Robinson, James|year=2005|chapter=Institutions as a fundamental cause of long-run growth|title=Handbook of Economic Growth|volume=1|pages=385–472, Sections 5 to 10|doi=10.1016/S1574-0684(05)01006-3|isbn=978-0-444-52041-8}}</ref>

Robert Michels asserts that although democracy can never be fully realised, democracy may be developed automatically in the act of striving for democracy:

<blockquote>The peasant in the fable, when on his deathbed, tells his sons that a treasure is buried in the field. After the old man's death the sons dig everywhere in order to discover the treasure. They do not find it. But their indefatigable labor improves the soil and secures for them a comparative well-being. The treasure in the fable may well symbolise democracy.<ref>{{cite book|author=Robert Michels|title=Political Parties|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ijae_UIez38C|access-date=5 June 2013|date=1999|orig-year=1962 by [[Collier's|Crowell-Collier]]|publisher=[[Transaction Publishers]]|isbn=978-1-4128-3116-1|page=243}}</ref></blockquote>

Democracy in modern times has almost always faced opposition from the previously existing government, and many times it has faced opposition from social elites. The implementation of a democratic government from a non-democratic state is typically brought by peaceful or violent [[democratic revolution]].

===Autocratization===
{{Further|Democratic backsliding by country}}
[[File:Putin's speech on Crocus City Hall attack.jpg|thumb|[[Russia under Vladimir Putin]] has turned into an [[Authoritarianism|authoritarian]] state]]
{{Excerpt|Democratic backsliding|only=paragraph|hat=no}}

[[Steven Levitsky]] says: “It's not up to voters to defend a democracy. That’s asking far, far too much of voters, to cast their ballot on the basis of some set of abstract principles or procedures. With the exception of a handful of cases, voters never, ever — in any society, in any culture — prioritize democracy over all else. Individual voters worry about much more mundane things, as is their right. It is up to élites and institutions to protect democracy — not voters.” <ref>
[[David Remnick]]: [https://www.newyorker.com/podcast/the-new-yorker-radio-hour/the-authors-of-how-democracies-die-on-the-new-democratic-minority ''The Authors of “How Democracies Die” on the New Democratic Minority - Two leading political scientists explain why voters failed to defend democracy: We never do.''], Podcast ''[[The New Yorker]] Radio Hour'', 15. November, 2024.<br />
Ursula Sommer discusses David Remnicks podcast with [[Steven Levitsky]] and [[Daniel Ziblatt]] in: [https://www.wnycstudios.org/podcasts/tnyradiohour/articles/the-authors-of-how-democracies-die-on-the-new-democratic-minority ''The Authors of “How Democracies Die” on the New Democratic Minority''], November 15, 2024.</ref>

====Disruption====
Some democratic governments have experienced sudden [[state collapse]] and [[regime change]] to an undemocratic form of government. Domestic military coups or rebellions are the most common means by which democratic governments have been overthrown.<ref name="Siaroff">{{cite book|title=Comparing Political Regimes: A Thematic Introduction to Comparative Politics|author=Alan Siaroff|isbn=978-1-4426-0012-6|publisher=University of Toronto Press|year=2009|page=285}}</ref> (See [[List of coups and coup attempts by country]] and [[List of civil wars]].) Examples include the [[Spanish Civil War]], the [[Coup of 18 Brumaire]] that ended the [[French First Republic]], and the [[28 May 1926 coup d'état]] which ended the [[First Portuguese Republic]]. Some military coups are supported by foreign governments, such as the [[1954 Guatemalan coup d'état]] and the [[1953 Iranian coup d'état]]. Other types of a sudden end to democracy include:
* [[Invasion]], for example the [[German occupation of Czechoslovakia]], and the fall of [[South Vietnam]].
* [[Self-coup]], in which the leader of the government extra-legally seizes all power or unlawfully extends the term in office. This can be done through:
** Suspension of the constitution by decree, such as with the [[1992 Peruvian coup d'état]]
** An "electoral self-coup" using [[election fraud]] to obtain re-election of a previously fairly elected official or political party. For example, in the [[1999 Ukrainian presidential election]], [[2003 Russian legislative election]], and [[2004 Russian presidential election]].<ref name="Siaroff" />
* Royal coup, in which a monarch not normally involved in government seizes all power. For example, the [[6 January Dictatorship]], begun in 1929 when King [[Alexander I of Yugoslavia]] dismissed parliament and started ruling by decree.<ref>{{cite web|work=The New York Times|author=[[Edwin Leland James]]|title=King of Yugoslavia Assumes All Power|url=https://www.nytimes.com/1929/01/07/archives/king-of-yugoslavia-assumes-all-power-in-midnight-coup-alexander.html|date=7 January 1929|access-date=10 October 2023}}</ref>

[[Democratic backsliding]] can end democracy in a gradual manner, by increasing emphasis on [[national security]] and eroding [[free and fair election]]s, [[freedom of expression]], [[independence of the judiciary]], [[rule of law]]. A famous example is the [[Enabling Act of 1933]], which lawfully ended democracy in [[Weimar Germany]] and marked the transition to [[Nazi Germany]].<ref>{{cite book|last1=Pinfield|first1=Nick|title=A/AS Level History for AQA Democracy and Nazism: Germany, 1918–1945 Student Book|date=2015|publisher=Cambridge University Press|page=98}}</ref>

Temporary or long-term [[political violence]] and government interference can prevent [[free and fair election]]s, which erode the democratic nature of governments. This has happened on a local level even in well-established democracies like the United States; for example, the [[Wilmington insurrection of 1898]] and African-American [[disfranchisement after the Reconstruction era]].

===Debates on democracy===
{{Excerpt|Criticism of democracy|templates=-democracy}}

===Influence of the media===
{{Further|Mediatization (media)|Crowd manipulation|Media manipulation|Post-truth politics}}

The theory of democracy relies on the implicit assumption that voters are well informed about [[social issue]]s, policies, and candidates so that they can make a truly informed decision. Since the late 20th century there has been a growing concern that voters may be poorly informed due to the [[news media]]'s focusing more on entertainment and gossip and less on serious journalistic research on political issues.<ref name="MacChesney1999">{{cite book|last1=MacChesney|first1=Robert W|title=Rich media, poor democracy: Communication politics in dubious times|date=1999|publisher=University of Illinois Press}}</ref><ref name="Barnett2002">{{cite journal|last1=Barnett|first1=Steven|title=Will a crisis in journalism provoke a crisis in democracy?|journal=The Political Quarterly|date=2002|volume=73|issue=4|pages=400–408|doi=10.1111/1467-923X.00494}}</ref>

The media professors Michael Gurevitch and [[Jay Blumler]] have proposed a number of functions that the mass media are expected to fulfill in a democracy:<ref name="GurevitchBlumler1990">{{cite book|last1=Gurevitch|first1=Michael|last2=Blumler|first2=Jay G.|editor1-last=Lichtenberg|editor1-first=Judith|title=Democracy and the mass media: A collection of essays|date=1990|publisher=Cambridge University Press|pages=269–289|chapter=Political Communication Systems and Democratic Values}}</ref>
* Surveillance of the sociopolitical environment
* Meaningful [[agenda setting]]
* Platforms for an intelligible and illuminating advocacy
* Dialogue across a diverse range of views
* Mechanisms for holding officials to account for how they have exercised power
* Incentives for citizens to learn, choose, and become involved
* A principled resistance to the efforts of forces outside the media to subvert their independence, integrity, and ability to serve the audience
* A sense of respect for the audience member, as potentially concerned and able to make sense of his or her political environment

This proposal has inspired a lot of discussions over whether the news media are actually fulfilling the requirements that a well functioning democracy requires.<ref name="Bucy1999">{{cite journal|last1=Bucy|first1=Erik P.|last2=D'Angelo|first2=Paul|title=The Crisis of Political Communication: Normative Critiques of News and Democratic Processes|journal=Communication Yearbook|date=1999|volume=22|pages=301–339}}</ref>
Commercial mass media are generally not accountable to anybody but their owners, and they have no obligation to serve a democratic function.<ref name="Bucy1999" /><ref name="Blumler2014">{{cite book|last1=Blumler|first1=Jay G.|editor1-last=Esser|editor1-first=Frank|editor2-last=Strömbäck|editor2-first=Jesper|title=Mediatization of politics: Understanding the transformation of Western democracies|date=2014|publisher=Springer|pages=31–41|chapter=Mediatization and Democracy}}</ref> They are controlled mainly by economic [[market forces]]. Fierce economic competition may force the mass media to divert themselves from any democratic ideals and focus entirely on how to survive the competition.<ref name="Donges2014">{{cite book|last1=Donges|first1=Patrick|last2=Jarren|first2=Otfried|editor1-last=Esser|editor1-first=Frank|editor2-last=Strömbäck|editor2-first=Jesper|title=Mediatization of politics: Understanding the transformation of Western democracies|date=2014|publisher=Springer|pages=31–41|chapter=Mediatization of Organizations: Changing Parties and Interest Groups?}}</ref><ref name="Esser2013">{{cite book|last1=Esser|first1=Frank|editor1-last=Kriesi|editor1-first=Hanspeter|editor2-last=Esser|editor2-first=Frank|editor3-last=Bühlmann|editor3-first=Marc|title=Democracy in the Age of Globalization and Mediatization|date=2013|publisher=Palgrave Macmillan|pages=155–176|chapter=Mediatization as a Challenge: Media Logic versus Political Logic}}</ref>

The [[Tabloid journalism|tabloidization]] and popularization of the news media is seen in an increasing focus on human examples rather than statistics and principles. There is more focus on politicians as personalities and less focus on political issues in the popular media. Election campaigns are covered more as [[horse race journalism|horse races]] and less as debates about ideologies and issues. The dominating media focus on [[Spin (propaganda)|spin]], conflict, and competitive strategies has made voters perceive the politicians as egoists rather than idealists. This fosters mistrust and a [[Cynicism (contemporary)|cynical]] attitude to politics, less [[civic engagement]], and less interest in voting.<ref name="CappellaJamieson1997">{{cite book|last1=Cappella|first1=Joseph N.|last2=Jamieson|first2=Kathleen Hall|title=Spiral of cynicism: The press and the public good|date=1997|publisher=Oxford University Press}}</ref><ref name="Vreese2014">{{cite book|last1=Vreese|first1=Claes H. de|editor1-last=Esser|editor1-first=Frank|editor2-last=Strömbäck|editor2-first=Jesper|title=Mediatization of politics: Understanding the transformation of Western democracies|date=2014|publisher=Springer|pages=137–155|chapter=Mediatization of News: The Role of Journalistic Framing}}</ref><ref name="EsserMatthes2013" />
The ability to find effective political solutions to social problems is hampered when problems tend to be blamed on individuals rather than on [[Social structure|structural causes]].<ref name="Vreese2014" />
This person-centered focus may have far-reaching consequences not only for domestic problems but also for foreign policy when international conflicts are blamed on foreign heads of state rather than on political and economic structures.<ref name="Baum2003">{{cite book|last1=Baum|first1=Matthew A.|title=Soft news goes to war. Public opinion and american foreign policy in the new media era|date=2003|publisher=Princeton University Press}}</ref><ref name="Altheide2002">{{cite book|last1=Altheide|first1=David L.|title=Creating fear: News and the construction of crisis|date=2002|publisher=Aldine de Gruyter|isbn=978-1-138-52143-8}}</ref>
A strong media focus on fear and [[terrorism]] has allowed military logic to penetrate public institutions, leading to increased [[surveillance]] and the erosion of [[civil rights]].<ref name="Altheide2014" />

The responsiveness<ref>{{cite journal|url=https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414016633226|doi=10.1177/0010414016633226|title=Advances in the Study of Democratic Responsiveness: An Introduction|year=2017|last1=Esaiasson|first1=Peter|last2=Wlezien|first2=Christopher|journal=Comparative Political Studies|volume=50|issue=6|pages=699–710|s2cid=155126179}}</ref> and [[accountability]] of the democratic system is compromised when lack of access to substantive, diverse, and undistorted information is handicapping the citizens' capability of evaluating the political process.<ref name="Blumler2014" /><ref name="EsserMatthes2013">{{cite book|last1=Esser|first1=Frank|last2=Matthes|first2=Jörg|editor1-last=Kriesi|editor1-first=Hanspeter|editor2-last=Esser|editor2-first=Frank|editor3-last=Bühlmann|editor3-first=Marc|title=Democracy in the Age of Globalization and Mediatization|date=2013|publisher=Palgrave Macmillan|pages=177–201|chapter=Mediatization Effects on Political News, Political Actors, Political Decisions, and Political Audiences}}</ref>
The fast pace and trivialization in the competitive news media is [[dumbing down]] the political debate. Thorough and balanced investigation of complex political issues does not fit into this format. The political communication is characterized by short time horizons, short slogans, simple explanations, and simple solutions. This is conducive to political [[populism]] rather than serious deliberation.<ref name="Blumler2014" /><ref name="Altheide2014">{{cite book|last1=Altheide|first1=David L.|title=Media edge: Media logic and social reality|date=2014|publisher=Peter Lang}}</ref>

Commercial mass media are often differentiated along the political spectrum so that people can hear mainly opinions that they already agree with. Too much controversy and diverse opinions are not always profitable for the commercial news media.<ref name="Nielsen2016">{{cite book|last1=Nielsen|first1=Rasmus Kleis|editor1-last=Witschge|editor1-first=Tamara|editor2-last=Anderson|editor2-first=Christopher William|editor3-last=Domingo|editor3-first=David|editor4-last=Hermida|editor4-first=Alfred|title=The SAGE Handbook of Digital Journalism|date=2016|publisher=Sage|pages=51–67|chapter=The Business of News}}</ref>
[[Political polarization]] is emerging when different people read different news and watch different TV channels. This polarization has been worsened by the emergence of the [[social media]] that allow people to communicate mainly with groups of like-minded people, the so-called [[echo chamber]]s.<ref name="Cinelli2021">{{cite journal|last1=Cinelli|first1=Matteo|last2=Morales|first2=Gianmarco De Francisci|last3=Galeazzi|first3=Alessandro|last4=Quattrociocchi|first4=Walter|last5=Starnini|first5=Michele|title=The echo chamber effect on social media|journal=Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences|date=2021|volume=18|issue=9|pages=e2023301118|doi=10.1073/pnas.2023301118|pmid=33622786|pmc=7936330|bibcode=2021PNAS..11823301C|doi-access=free}}</ref>
Extreme political polarization may undermine the trust in democratic institutions, leading to erosion of [[civil rights]] and [[free speech]] and in some cases even reversion to [[autocracy]].<ref name="McCoySomer2019">{{cite journal|last1=McCoy|first1=Jennifer|last2=Somer|first2=Murat|title=Toward a Theory of Pernicious Polarization and How It Harms Democracies: Comparative Evidence and Possible Remedies|journal=The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science|date=2019|volume=681|issue=1|pages=234–271|doi=10.1177/0002716218818782|s2cid=150169330|doi-access=free}}</ref>

Many media scholars have discussed non-commercial news media with [[Public service broadcasting|public service]] obligations as a means to improve the democratic process by providing the kind of political contents that a free market does not provide.<ref name="Cushion2012">{{cite book|last1=Cushion|first1=Stephen|title=The Democratic Value of News: Why Public Service Media Matter|date=2012|publisher=Macmillan}}</ref><ref name="CushionFranklin2015">{{cite book|last1=Cushion|first1=Stephen|last2=Franklin|first2=Bob|editor1-last=Coleman|editor1-first=Stephen|editor2-last=Moss|editor2-first=Giles|editor3-last=Parry|editor3-first=Katy|editor4-last=Halperin|editor4-first=John|editor5-last=Ryan|editor5-first=Michael|title=Can the Media Serve Democracy?: Essays in Honour of Jay G. Blumler|date=2015|publisher=Springer|pages=65–75|chapter=Public Service Broadcasting: Markets and Vulnerable Values in Broadcast and Print Journalism}}</ref>
The [[World Bank]] has recommended public service broadcasting in order to strengthen democracy in [[developing countries]]. These broadcasting services should be accountable to an independent regulatory body that is adequately protected from interference from political and economic interests.<ref name="Buckley2008">{{cite book|last1=Buckley|first1=Steve|last2=Duer|first2=Kreszentia|last3=Mendel|first3=Toby|last4=Siochrú|first4=Seán Ó|title=Broadcasting, voice, and accountability: A public interest approach to policy, law, and regulation|date=2008|publisher=World Bank and University of Michigan Press}}</ref>
Public service media have an obligation to provide reliable information to voters. Many countries have publicly funded radio and television stations with public service obligations, especially in Europe and Japan,<ref name="GuntherMugham">{{cite book|last1=Gunther|first1=Richard|last2=Mugham|first2=Anthony|editor1-last=Gunther|editor1-first=Richard|editor2-last=Mugham|editor2-first=Anthony|title=Democracy and the Media: A Comparative Perspective|date=2000|publisher=Cambridge University Press|pages=402–448|chapter=The Political Impact of the Media: A Reassessment}}</ref> while such media are weak or non-existent in other countries including the US.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Pickard|first1=Victor|editor1-last=Bennett|editor1-first=W. Lance|editor2-last=Livingston|editor2-first=Steven|title=The Disinformation Age: Politics, Technology, and Disruptive Communication in the United States|date=2020|publisher=Cambridge University Press|pages=238–258|chapter=The Public Media Option: Confronting Policy Failure in an Age of Misinformation}}</ref>
Several studies have shown that the stronger the dominance of commercial broadcast media over public service media, the less the amount of policy-relevant information in the media and the more focus on [[horse race journalism]], personalities, and the pecadillos of politicians. Public service broadcasters are characterized by more policy-relevant information and more respect for [[Journalism ethics and standards|journalistic norms]] and [[impartiality]] than the commercial media. However, the trend of [[deregulation]] has put the public service model under increased pressure from competition with commercial media.<ref name="GuntherMugham" /><ref name="Udris2014">{{cite book|last1=Udris|first1=Linards|last2=Lucht|first2=Jens|editor1-last=Esser|editor1-first=Frank|editor2-last=Strömbäck|editor2-first=Jesper|title=Mediatization of politics: Understanding the transformation of Western democracies|chapter=Mediatization at the Structural Level: Independence from Politics, Dependence on the Market|date=2014|publisher=Springer|pages=114–136}}</ref><ref name="Thoday2018">{{cite book|last1=Thoday|first1=Jon|editor1-last=Freedman|editor1-first=Des|editor2-last=Goblot|editor2-first=Vana|title=A Future for Public Service Television|date=2018|publisher=MIT Press|pages=29–39|chapter=Public Service Television and the Crisis of Content}}</ref>

The emergence of the [[internet]] and the [[social media]] has profoundly altered the conditions for political communication. The social media have given ordinary citizens easy access to voice their opinion and share information while bypassing the [[Gatekeeping (communication)|filters]] of the large news media. This is often seen as an advantage for democracy.<ref name="Schulz2014">{{cite book|last1=Schulz|first1=Winfried|editor1-last=Esser|editor1-first=Frank|editor2-last=Strömbäck|editor2-first=Jesper|title=Mediatization of politics: Understanding the transformation of Western democracies|chapter=Mediatization and New Media|date=2014|publisher=Springer|pages=114–136}}</ref> The new possibilities for communication have fundamentally changed the way [[social movement]]s and [[protest movements]] operate and organize. The internet and social media have provided powerful new tools for democracy movements in developing countries and [[emerging democracies]], enabling them to bypass [[censorship]], voice their opinions, and organize protests.<ref name="Zhuravskaya2020">{{cite journal|last1=Zhuravskaya|first1=Ekaterina|last2=Petrova|first2=Maria|author2-link=Maria Petrova (economist)|last3=Enikolopov|first3=Ruben|title=Political effects of the internet and social media|journal=Annual Review of Economics|date=2020|volume=12|pages=415–438|doi=10.1146/annurev-economics-081919-050239|s2cid=219769484|doi-access=free}}</ref><ref name="Voltmer2019">{{cite book|last1=Voltmer|first1=Katrin|last2=Sorensen|first2=Lone|editor1-last=Voltmer|editor1-first=Katrin|display-editors=etal|title=Media, Communication and the Struggle for Democratic Change|date=2019|publisher=Palgrave Macmillan|pages=35–58|chapter=Media, Power, Citizenship: The Mediatization of Democratic Change}}</ref>

A serious problem with the social media is that they have no truth filters. The established news media have to guard their reputation as trustworthy, while ordinary citizens may post unreliable information.<ref name="Zhuravskaya2020" /> In fact, studies show that false stories are going more [[Viral phenomenon|viral]] than true stories.<ref name="Vosoughi2018">{{cite journal|last1=Vosoughi|first1=Soroush|last2=Roy|first2=Deb|last3=Aral|first3=Sinan|title=The spread of true and false news online|journal=Science|date=2018|volume=359|issue=6380|pages=1146–1151|doi=10.1126/science.aap9559|pmid=29590045|bibcode=2018Sci...359.1146V|s2cid=4549072|url=http://vermontcomplexsystems.org/share/papershredder/vosoughi2018a.pdf|access-date=12 October 2021|archive-date=29 April 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190429073158/http://vermontcomplexsystems.org/share/papershredder/vosoughi2018a.pdf|url-status=dead}}</ref><ref name="Prooijen2021">{{cite journal|last1=Prooijen|first1=Jan-Willem van|last2=Ligthart|first2=Joline|last3=Rosema|first3=Sabine|title=The entertainment value of conspiracy theories|journal=British Journal of Psychology|date=2021|volume=113|issue=1|pages=25–48|doi=10.1111/bjop.12522|pmid=34260744|pmc=9290699|doi-access=free}}</ref>
The proliferation of false stories and [[conspiracy theories]] may undermine public trust in the political system and public officials.<ref name="Prooijen2021" /><ref name="McCoySomer2019" />

Reliable information sources are essential for the democratic process. Less democratic governments rely heavily on [[censorship]], [[propaganda]], and [[misinformation]] in order to stay in power, while independent sources of information are able to undermine their legitimacy.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Egorov|first1=Georgy|last2=Sonin|first2=Konstantin|title=The political economics of non-democracy|date=2020|publisher=National Bureau of Economic Research|id=NBER Working Paper No. w27949|url=https://ssrn.com/abstract=3714441}}</ref>

===Democracy promotion===
[[File:Hong Kong P1066634 (48678676473).jpg|thumb|Banner in Hong Kong asking for democracy, August 2019]]

[[Democracy promotion]] can increase the quality of already existing democracies, reduce [[political apathy]], and the chance of democratic backsliding. Democracy promotion measures include [[voting advice application]]s,<ref>{{cite journal|url=https://doi.org/10.1080/10584609.2018.1526237|doi=10.1080/10584609.2018.1526237|title=Getting Out the Vote with Voting Advice Applications|year=2019|last1=Germann|first1=Micha|last2=Gemenis|first2=Kostas|journal=Political Communication|volume=36|pages=149–170|s2cid=149640396}}</ref> [[participatory democracy]],<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/lsereviewofbooks/2016/10/20/book-review-against-elections-the-case-for-democracy-by-david-van-reybrouck/|title=Book Review: Against Elections: The Case for Democracy by David Van Reybrouck|date=20 October 2016|access-date=2019-03-10}}</ref> increasing [[youth suffrage]], increasing civic education,<ref>{{Cite web|last=Wong|first=Alia|date=2018-10-05|title=Civics Education Helps Create Young Voters and Activists|url=https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2018/10/civics-education-helps-form-young-voters-and-activists/572299/|access-date=2020-09-17|website=The Atlantic}}</ref> reducing [[barriers to entry]] for new political parties,<ref>{{cite journal|url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/1816288|jstor=1816288|last1=Tullock|first1=Gordon|title=Entry Barriers in Politics|journal=The American Economic Review|year=1965|volume=55|issue=1/2|pages=458–466}}</ref> increasing [[proportional representation|proportionality]]<ref>{{cite journal|url=https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123408000161|doi=10.1017/S0007123408000161|title=Political Efficacy and Participation in Twenty-Seven Democracies: How Electoral Systems Shape Political Behaviour|year=2008|last1=Karp|first1=Jeffrey A.|last2=Banducci|first2=Susan A.|journal=British Journal of Political Science|volume=38|issue=2|pages=311–334|hdl=10036/64393|s2cid=55486399|hdl-access=free}}</ref> and reducing [[presidential system|presidentialism]].<ref>{{Cite book|editor-last1=Hawkins|editor-first1=Kirk Andrew|editor-last2=Carlin|editor-first2=Ryan E.|editor-last3=Littvay|editor-first3=Levente|editor-last4=Rovira Kaltwasser|editor-first4=Cristóbal|title=The ideational approach to populism: concept, theory, and analysis|isbn=978-1-315-19692-3|pages=281|oclc=1053623603}}</ref>