Editing Accountability (section)

==== Common goods ====
Politicians may be incentivized to provide [[common good]]s as a means of accountability.{{clarify|reason=how is providing public goods a means of accountability?|date=July 2023}}<ref name=":15">{{cite journal|last1=Batley|first1=Richard|last2=Mcloughlin|first2=Claire|date=October 2015|title=The Politics of Public Services: A Service Characteristics Approach|journal=World Development|language=en|volume=74|pages=275–285|doi=10.1016/j.worlddev.2015.05.018|doi-access=free}}</ref> The ability of voters to attribute the credit and blame of outcomes also determines the extent of public goods provision.<ref name=":15" /><ref name=":16">{{cite journal | last1=Martin | first1=Lucy | last2=Raffler | first2=Pia J. | title=Fault Lines: The Effects of Bureaucratic Power on Electoral Accountability | journal=American Journal of Political Science | publisher=Wiley | volume=65 | issue=1 | date=7 June 2020 | issn=0092-5853 | doi=10.1111/ajps.12530 | pages=210–224| s2cid=209526364 }}</ref> Research suggests that public goods provision {{vague|text=is conditional on|reason=conditional in what way? provision to whom by whom? who attributes the outcomes?|date=July 2023}} being able to attribute outcomes to politicians as opposed to civil servants.<ref name=":16" /> This attribution can be enhanced by more short-run and visible inputs and outcomes such as famine relief or access to drinking water, whereas lower-visibility issues such as sanitation and education may be more difficult to attribute credit for and thus less likely to provide for.<ref name=":15" />

Another condition determining how voters use the provision of public goods to hold leaders accountable is whether the prioritization of public goods is determined either directly via vote or delegated to a governing body.<ref name=":17">{{cite journal|last=Butler|first=Daniel M.|s2cid=155004601|date=22 August 2011|title=Can Learning Constituency Opinion Affect How Legislators Vote? Results from a Field Experiment|journal=Quarterly Journal of Political Science|volume=6|issue=1|pages=55–83|doi=10.1561/100.00011019}}</ref><ref name=":18">{{cite journal | last1=Beath | first1=Andrew | last2=Christia | first2=Fotini | last3=Enikolopov | first3=Ruben | title=Direct democracy and resource allocation: Experimental evidence from Afghanistan | journal=Journal of Development Economics | publisher=Elsevier BV | volume=124 | year=2017 | issn=0304-3878 | doi=10.1016/j.jdeveco.2016.10.001 | pages=199–213| hdl=1721.1/127650 | url=http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2012/07/16/000158349_20120716094426/Rendered/PDF/WPS6133.pdf | hdl-access=free }}</ref> An experiment in New Mexico regarding proposed spending during the state's 2008 special summer legislative session provides evidence that legislators update their positions when learning about voters' policy preferences, indicating that a representative democracy can increase accountability when politicians learn about voters' preferences.<ref name=":17" /> A 2016 experiment in Afghanistan regarding rural development projects, however, finds that when voters directly prioritize their preferences at the ballot box, they perceive the quality of local government to be higher than when a governing committee prioritizes development projects.<ref name=":18" /> These contrasting outcomes highlight a debate between trustees and delegates, though the lack of objective superior outcomes in projects decided by vote as opposed to committee in the Afghanistan experiment indicate neither is superior to the other in determining which public goods should be given priority.<ref>{{multiref2
|1={{cite journal|last=Rehfeld|first=Andrew|date=May 2009|title=Representation Rethought: On Trustees, Delegates, and Gyroscopes in the Study of Political Representation and Democracy|journal=American Political Science Review|language=en|volume=103|issue=2|pages=214–230|doi=10.1017/S0003055409090261|s2cid=53957756|issn=0003-0554}}
|2={{cite journal|last1=Fox|first1=Justin|last2=Shotts|first2=Kenneth W.|date=October 2009|title=Delegates or Trustees? A Theory of Political Accountability|journal=The Journal of Politics|language=en|volume=71|issue=4|pages=1225–1237|doi=10.1017/S0022381609990260|s2cid=9879793|issn=0022-3816}}
}}</ref>

Other research indicates that voters use elections to hold politicians accountable for the provision of public goods.<ref name=":19">{{cite journal |last1=Min |first1=Brian |last2=Golden |first2=Miriam |author-link2=Miriam A. Golden |date=February 2014 |title=Electoral cycles in electricity losses in India |journal=Energy Policy |language=en |volume=65 |pages=619–625 |bibcode=2014EnPol..65..619M |doi=10.1016/j.enpol.2013.09.060}}</ref><ref name=":20">{{cite journal|last=Harding|first=Robin|date=October 2015|title=Attribution And Accountability: Voting for roads in Ghana|journal=World Politics|language=en|volume=67|issue=4|pages=656–689|doi=10.1017/S0043887115000209|s2cid=20470554|issn=0043-8871|url=https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:219e71c2-1b53-41de-b418-b61f10bf2039}}</ref> In India, rural areas are charged a flat rate for electricity, but in the province of Uttar Pradesh, line loss—electricity that is consumed but not billed—is significantly higher in election years than non-election years, and increases in line loss reliably predict electoral gains.<ref name=":19" /> Voters rewarded incumbent politicians with a 12% increase in party seats in response to a 10% increase of unbilled electricity, in 2007 elections.<ref name=":19" /> In Ghana, the improvement of road conditions is linked to an increasing vote share for incumbent parties.<ref name=":20" /> Both of these research outcomes hinge on voters being able to attribute the service of public goods to politicians.<ref name=":19" /><ref name=":20" /><ref name=":16" />

Politicians may also have incentives to respond to pressure for public goods provision in electoral autocracies.<ref name=":21">{{cite journal|last=Miller|first=Michael K.|date=October 2015|title=Electoral Authoritarianism and Human Development|journal=Comparative Political Studies|language=en|volume=48|issue=12|pages=1526–1562|doi=10.1177/0010414015582051|s2cid=154285722|issn=0010-4140}}</ref><ref name=":23">{{cite journal|last=Miller|first=Michael K.|date=May 2015|title=Elections, Information, and Policy Responsiveness in Autocratic Regimes|journal=Comparative Political Studies|language=en|volume=48|issue=6|pages=691–727|doi=10.1177/0010414014555443|s2cid=154879177|issn=0010-4140}}</ref> There is evidence that as autocratic governments lose seats in their party's legislatures, they respond by increasing spending on public goods such as education, healthcare, and pensions.<ref name=":21" /> There is further evidence suggesting higher quality of life, civil liberties, and human development in electoral autocracies, lending credence to the theory that autocratic rulers use elections as a bellwether against popular discontent and citizen opposition, and in turn increase public goods provision to dampen the grievances of disgruntled citizens, even in non-democracies.<ref name=":23" />

While the introduction of elections is generally thought to improve public goods provision, in some cases, researchers have shown that it may reduce its quality.<ref name=":30">{{Cite journal|last1=Pierskalla|first1=Jan H.|last2=Sacks|first2=Audrey|date=October 2020|title=Personnel Politics: Elections, Clientelistic Competition and Teacher Hiring in Indonesia|journal=British Journal of Political Science|language=en|volume=50|issue=4|pages=1283–1305|doi=10.1017/S0007123418000601|s2cid=149452970|issn=0007-1234|doi-access=free}}</ref> For example, the introduction of direct elections for local district office in Indonesia resulted in political interference in the hiring process for bureaucrats in the public education sector, reducing the quality of education provision; politicians were incentivized to dole out patronage positions in the education sector, especially in election years, and where such positions were added, student test scores were lower.<ref name=":30" />