Editing Arnold Potts (section)

====Battle of Brigade Hill====
{{See also|Kokoda Track Campaign#Battle_of_Brigade_Hill|l1=Battle of Brigade Hill}}
Maroubra Force dug in on Brigade Hill, and awaited an attack. After dark on 6 September Horii's pursuing force appeared, slowly and carefully coming down the steep slope opposite the Australian position, their way lit by "lanterns" made of pieces of smouldering Australian rubber-coated signal wire.  Horii patiently took his troops in a wide encircling movement around the Australians, despite a bombing raid called in by the alarmed Potts.<ref>Brune (2003), p. 201</ref> Next morning Potts signalled Allen; "Will not give ground if you guarantee my line of communication ... full of fight, but physically below par, mainly feet and dysentery ... Respectfully consider offensive ops require more than one Bde [brigade] task."

At 4.30 am on 8 September the attack came, initially frontal, then a flank attack of 5,000 men cut off Potts' Brigade HQ battalion from the rest of the force.<ref>Thompson (2008), pp. 350–351</ref> At times the enemy were just {{convert|15|m|yd}} from the edge of Potts' perimeter.<ref name=Brune204>Brune (2003), p. 204</ref> The signal wire had been cut by now, and communications with the battalions were shaky. A message got through by wireless transmitter, that if as seemed likely the HQ was wiped out, Major Anthony Caro, commander of 2/16th was to take command of the brigade and fall back to Menari.<ref name=Brune204/> Potts and his HQ were saved by the fact that Horii did not concentrate forces on eliminating them, instead maintaining overall pressure to try to annihilate all three battalions.<ref name=Brune204/> 2/14th and 2/16th charged the Japanese lines but failed to break through to HQ. However the damage inflicted on the enemy was crucial in slowing their pursuit, as Potts made his way to Menari. He left orders for the battalions to make their own way and rejoin him there. As the Japanese controlled the main trail, all three battalions had to take rough secondary tracks or go cross country.

One major difference from battles in other theatres of the war was the burden of the wounded on their unit. They could not be left for the enemy to care for, as had been the case in Syria. Years later Potts recalled "We had to sit in the jungle listening to the screams of comrades tortured by the Japanese in an attempt to provoke an attack".<ref>Edgar (1999), p. 168</ref> Papuan bearers were not used in battle zones, so the wounded had to be carried by their comrades, slowing them down. 2/14th and 2/16th left their wounded to be carried by 2/27th, the last battalion to withdraw. 120 men at a time were engaged carrying stretcher cases. Many severely wounded men walked to free a stretcher for someone worse off than themselves.<ref>Brune (2003), pp. 223–227</ref> The Japanese pursued the 2/27th, but an audacious counterattack by 'B' and 'D' Companies bought the Australian rearguard some time. The adjutant of the 2/27th, Captain Harry Katekar, was quoted as saying, "The Japs were so shocked they broke contact. We didn't see them again that day".<ref>Brune (2003), p. 208</ref>

The 2/14th and 2/16th Battalions slept where they fell on the trail on the night of 8 September, but managed to re-unite with Potts and 21st Brigade headquarters at Menari the next day. The 2/27th Battalion was unable to reach the village before the rest of the brigade was again forced to retreat by the advancing Japanese. Menari was extremely exposed to observation from further up the trail, and the village was already under barrage from Japanese artillery and light machine guns by the time the first 2/16th troops arrived. Potts waited for the 2/27th until 2.30 pm, then gave orders to abandon Menari. The 2/27th and their cargo of wounded from the other battalions were forced to follow paths parallel to the main trail, but eventually rejoined the main Australian force at Jawarere.<ref>Keogh (1965), p. 211</ref>