Editing C. D. Broad (section)

=== Free will ===
In his essay "Determinism, Indeterminism, and Libertarianism", Broad argued for ''non-occurrent causation'' as "literally determined by the agent or self." The agent could be considered as a substance or continuant, and not by a total cause which contains as factors events in and dispositions of the agent. Thus, our efforts would be completely determined, but their causes would not be prior events. New series of events would then originate, which he called "continuants", which are essentially ''[[causa sui]]''.

[[Peter van Inwagen]] says that Broad formulated an excellent version of what van Inwagen has called the "Consequence Argument" in defence of [[incompatibilism]].<ref>{{Cite journal|last=van Inwagen|first=Peter|date=2008-09-01|title=How to Think about the Problem of Free Will|url=https://andrewmbailey.com/pvi/How_to_Think_About_Free_Will.pdf|journal=The Journal of Ethics|language=en|volume=12|issue=3|pages=337|doi=10.1007/s10892-008-9038-7|s2cid=144635471|issn=1572-8609}}</ref>