Editing Cairo Conference (section)

== The conference ==
The Cairo meeting was held at a residence of [[Alexander Comstock Kirk]], the [[List of ambassadors of the United States to Egypt|American ambassador]] to [[Kingdom of Egypt|Egypt]], near the [[Giza pyramid complex]], about 8 miles (13&nbsp;km) from the centre of [[Cairo]]. In addition to the leaders of the three countries, members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United Kingdom and the United States attended the meeting. Chinese generals included General Shang Zhen, Lieutenant General Lin Wei, Lieutenant General Zhou Zhirou, Lieutenant General Yang Xuancheng,<ref name=":2"/> Yu Jishi etc. Chiang Kai-shek also invited American Chief of Staff [[Joseph Stilwell|Joseph Warren Stilwell]] to attend the meeting.<ref name=":9">{{Cite book |last=Spence |first=J. D. |title=Changing China |publisher=[[Times Culture Publishing Enterprise]] |year=2004 |isbn=9571342270 |location=Taiwan |pages=275 |language=Chinese |translator-last=Wen |translator-first=Q. Y.}}</ref>

=== November 21–22 ===
On Saturday, November 20, 1943, Stilwell first arrived in Cairo, and on Sunday, November 21, Chiang arrived with his wife, the First Lady Soong Mei Ling, and with Churchill.<ref name=":7"/> Churchill arrived in Alexandria Harbour aboard HMS Wilhelm and then flew to Cairo.<ref name=":7"/> Churchill invited Chiang and his wife to dinner and then brought Chiang to the map room to brief him on the status and planning of British forces in the various theatres of war.<ref name=":12">{{Cite book |last=Huang |first=R. Y. |title=Reading Chiang Kai-shek's Diary from the Perspective of Big History |publisher=[[China Social Sciences Press]] |year=1998 |isbn=7500423861 |location=China |pages=324 |language=Chinese}}</ref> Roosevelt crossed the Atlantic on the battleship USS Iowa and arrived in Tunis that day on the Air Force One from Oran (modern-day Algeria) to meet General Eisenhower. That day, Stilwell met with Chiang, Marshall, Hurley, and General Blaine Somerville. Roosevelt arrived on Monday, November 22, and that afternoon, Chiang paid a visit to Roosevelt with Soong and Churchill. That evening, Churchill, Roosevelt, and their aides held a preliminary meeting.<ref name=":7"/> John Patton Davies, Second Secretary of the US Embassy in Chongqing, sent a memorandum to Roosevelt against the use of US troops to help the British, Dutch, and French rebuild their colonial empires by pointing out the levels of corruption and incompetence of the Chinese National Army and suggesting the value of opening an overland line of communication to China from northern Burma.<ref name=":7"/>

=== November 23 ===
On Tuesday, November 23, the conference officially began.<ref name=":6"/> Chiang, together with Soong and the other Chinese generals, paid an early morning visit to Roosevelt. He then met with the president's representative Patrick Hurley to discuss the Tehran Conference and other issues. At 11:00&nbsp;a.m., the preliminary session was held with Chiang, Roosevelt, Churchill, and the three men's aides. It was here that Chiang insisted on "strong and powerful naval operations" and that "Burma is the key to the entire Asian campaign." That afternoon, a meeting of the British and American Joint Chiefs of Staff was held to discuss plans for an offensive on Burma. Chiang eventually decided not to attend that meeting and was represented by his generals. He arrived at 3:30&nbsp;p.m. the British and American officials had believed that the Chinese would show up only while the Chiefs of Staff were discussing issues of interest to them. Marshall criticised Chiang for being too keen to acquire US transports. However, he could neither guarantee a stronger ground force, which prevented Chinese troops from being trained at Langga in India, nor agree to equip the army in Yunnan. Stilwell presented a memorandum proposing alternative actions: aid northern Burma; fight for overland lines of communication to China; train and increase the combat power of the Chinese Army; intensify bombing of Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines; prevent Japanese control of the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea; and recover Canton and Hong Kong. He suggested increasing the strength of three Army divisions, moving US troops in India to China after the occupation of northern Burma, and attacking Shanghai and Taiwan if necessary.<ref name=":7"/>

[[File:Chindit column, Operation Longcloth.jpg|alt=British Chindit Special Forces carrying their weapons and gears advance on a river in Burma.|thumb|British Chindit Special Forces Advancing in Burma]]
At the conference, Commander-in-Chief of the Southeast Asia Command Lord Louis Mountbatten presented an outline of a land campaign for Burma<ref name=":2"/> by proposing three plans of action: Operation Tarzan, an attack on Burma by British and Chinese forces; Operation Musket, the capture of Cape Sumatra; and Operation Buccaneer, an amphibious operation to seize the Andaman Islands located 300 miles south of Rangoon in the Bay of Bengal since the Andaman Islands would threaten Japanese Burma, Thailand, and Malaya and cut off the Japanese supply lines. Of the three options, Churchill was particularly fond of Operation Musket<ref name=":1"/> since he hoped to send troops to Achab Island and seize Sumatra in an attempt to recapture Singapore.<ref name=":8"/>

Operation Tarzan called for four Indian divisions of the British [[Fourteenth Army (United Kingdom)|Fourteenth Army]]'s [[XV Corps (United Kingdom)|XV Corps]] to concentrate their men in Chittagong and cross the Maungdaw-Buthidaung line in mid-January and, the following year, to capture the Burmese coast in order to defend Chittagong and occupy Sittwe on the Burmese coast. Three divisions of [[IV Corps (United Kingdom)|IV Corps]], assembled at Imphal, would then move east with the objective of destroying Japanese lines of communication<ref name=":1"/> and advancing to Arak and various parts of Sidon in northern Burma.<ref name=":2"/> In March, the British long-range infiltration force "Chindit" Special Forces would be parachuted into Burma, behind the Japanese lines. The Chinese Expeditionary Force (CEF) in India would cross the Ho Kang Valley and advance eastward into Myitkyina. The Chindit special forces would then support the Chinese forces and occupy Bhamo in April, while the Yunnan Army would begin operations on 15 March and advance to Lashio in April to join the British forces at Lashio and Bhamo. In the Bay of Bengal, a massive amphibious offensive would be launched, with 3,000 British and American long-range infiltration troops participating.<ref name=":1"/>

Lord Mountbatten pointed out that overland communications to China depended on the army in Yunnan operating in conjunction with the British. Stilwell, on the other hand, was optimistic and insisted that they could compensate for the Chinese Army's personnel shortage.<ref name=":7"/> The Chinese generals present did not comment on Mountbatten's plans but repeatedly stressed the need to plan for an early counteroffensive against the Japanese in Burma and the reopening of Chinese supply lines.<ref name=":2"/> Chiang believed that any offensive on land should be timed with naval operations, because the Japanese were very motivated to defend and reinforce their important position in Burma and would also benefit from the new infrastructure and supply lines that they had been building. The British, however, believed that land and naval operations could run separately from each other, citing the long distances separating inland Burma from its seas and the time it would take for the British Navy to prepare due to its existing engagements in the Atlantic.<ref>{{cite book |author=U.S. Department of State Bureau of Public Affairs Historical Office |date=1961 |title=Foreign relations of the United States diplomatic papers: The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran 1943 |url=https://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/DFRXSHIYSKS2S8Z |location=Washington, D.C. |publisher=United States Government Printing Office}}</ref>

That evening, Roosevelt held a banquet for Chiang and Soong. The two spoke of the establishment of a coalition government in China as well as issues such as British interests in Shanghai and Canton, the use of American warships rather than British warships in subsequent military operations, and the future status of Malaya, Burma, and India.<ref name=":7"/>

=== November 24 ===
On November 24, Churchill, Mountbatten and Chiang met. Chiang demanded for land operations in northern Burma and amphibious operations to be conducted simultaneously.<ref name=":7"/> He expressed support for Operation Tarzan and was willing to include troops from Langga and Yunnan, but he insisted for it to be coupled with a massive naval operation in the Bay of Bengal to establish air and sea superiority for the operation to succeed. The problem with the operation was that the troops lacked the tools for amphibious landing operations.

Although the British supported Operation Tarzan, they were not keen on a large-scale naval offensive in the Bay of Bengal, and Churchill told Chiang that the navy could not be dispatched to the Indian Ocean until after the defeat of Italy.<ref name=":1"/> Churchill further insisted that land operations in northern Burma were not necessarily dependent on naval operations in the Bay of Bengal<ref name=":2"/> and that amphibious operations did not affect land operations. Chiang disagreed by pointing out that amphibious operations could attract some of the enemy's air power.<ref name=":7"/> British Chief of the Imperial General Staff Alan Brooke, on the other hand, pointed out that if amphibious landings were to be pursued, the landing of the Maharajah in France would have to be postponed.

Admiral Ernest King of the US Navy was less enthusiastic about a counteroffensive on Burma and was reluctant to push hard for large-scale operations in the Southeast Asia Command. He pointed out that those operations had to be considered in the context of an overall plan to defeat Japan, but that the overall plan had not been negotiated at all. King stated that to defeat Japan, the main theatre of operations should be in the Pacific, and land operations on the continental Asia were not strictly necessary.<ref name=":1"/>

Churchill explained that Britain could dispatch large fleets, but no date was set for an amphibious pincer attack. As the US representatives pressured him over amphibious operations, Churchill eventually agreed to land on the Andaman Islands.<ref name=":2"/> The Chiefs of Staff then agreed to drive Japan out of Burma and reopen land links with China, with Stilwell conducting the ground attack in the north and Mountbatten commanding the amphibious landing in the south, attacking the Andaman Islands in the Bay of Bengal.<ref name=":7"/> The amphibious landing in Burma would be pursued "as soon as possible," but it was not appropriate to set a date. The Southeast Asia Command could propose changes to the planned operations.

The US delegation also told Chiang that for the following six months, only 8,900 tonnes of supplies could be flown to China via the Hump route each month. Chiang demanded that the US raise that number to 10,000 tonnes. The US delegation made it clear to Chiang he had to choose between opening the Yunnan-Burma highway and having 10,000 tons of military aid flown in. Chiang was also told that the US military could not provide any more transport or aircraft. However, Chiang continued to demand for the US to provide more transport planes and to commence large-scale operations to supply China.<ref name=":7"/>

On that same day, British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden met with former Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Tsung-Hui.<ref name=":6"/>

=== November 25 ===
On the afternoon of November 25, Mountbatten reported the results of his talks with Chiang the previous day to the British-American Joint Chiefs of Staff, who asked that Mountbatten draft a paper to Chiang, asking him to agree in writing to the plan on the counteroffensive of Burma, which were still under discussion.

Roosevelt met with Marshall and Stilwell, who indicated that Chiang had agreed to the Burma plan and requested the use American heavy bombers in the Andaman Islands. However, Stilwell pointed out that Chiang had backtracked on his request and Roosevelt promised to pressure Chiang.<ref name=":7"/>

At a meeting of US Army officers, Marshall made clear his disapproval of Chiang's insistence for the US Air Force to airlift 10,000 tonnes of supplies to China each month despite British and American opposition. He further disapproved of the use of American ground troops, but Roosevelt overruled the military's decision.

At a later meeting,<ref name=":1"/> Roosevelt promised an early amphibious landing to attack Burma.<ref name=":2"/> He also promised Chiang that Operation Tarzan would be supplemented by a massive amphibious offensive in the Bay of Bengal and to support Chiang in his struggle against imperialism. Both men agreed that the Indochina Peninsula should not be returned to the French as a colony. They also discussed Soviet interests in East Asia, especially the Soviet desire to have access to the sea in north-eastern China. Roosevelt tried to persuade Chiang to negotiate with the communists, and Chiang countered by demanding that Roosevelt obtain assurances from Stalin that he would not interfere with Chiang's relations with the communists' Mao Zedong. Chiang also wanted Stalin to respect Chinese sovereignty in the north-eastern China.<ref name=":1"/>

=== November 26–27 ===
[[File:Winston Churchill with his daughter Sarah, on a visit to his old regiment, the 4th Queen's Own Hussars, in Egypt, 5 December 1943. E26681.jpg|alt=Winston Churchill visits his old regiment near the pyramids with his daughter, Sarah Churchill (actress).|thumb|[[Winston Churchill]] visits his old regiment in Cairo with his daughter, [[Sarah Churchill (actress)]].]]
On November 26, Soong Mei-ling met Roosevelt to discuss a $US1 billion loan plan, and Roosevelt immediately agreed.<ref name=":10">{{Cite book |last=Huang |first=R.Y. |title=Reading Chiang Kai-shek's Diary from the Perspective of Big History |publisher=[[China Social Sciences Press]] |year=1998 |isbn=7500423861 |edition=1st |location=China |pages=327 |language=Chinese}}</ref> Chiang then met with Admiral Ernest King to finalise plans for a joint counterattack on Burma the following March.<ref name=":6" /> In the afternoon, Roosevelt invited the leaders of China and Britain to his residence for tea, where the plan of action was finalised for the following March. Chiang met Mountbatten<ref name=":8"/> and thanked Roosevelt in person for his promise to lend China money.<ref name=":10"/>

On November 27, Chiang met with Dwight Eisenhower, the commander-in-chief of the Allied Forces in North Africa, and then left Cairo [10]:3128. Soong wrote to Roosevelt to express Chiang's great gratitude.<ref name=":9"/> Roosevelt and Chiang had long and cordial talks, with Soong acting as the interpreter.<ref name=":4"/>

Soong's chic costumes became one of the focal points of the press.<ref name=":7"/> During the meeting, Churchill was said to have visited the Sphinx and the Pyramids with his daughter Sarah Churchill and with Roosevelt.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Meacham |first=Jon |title=Roosevelt and Churchill |publisher=[[CITIC Press]] |year=2005 |isbn=7508604210 |edition=1st |location=China |pages=216 |language=Chinese}}</ref>

On November 28, Churchill and Roosevelt arrived in Tehran for the Tehran Conference.<ref name=":5"/>