Editing Channel Dash (section)

==Prelude==

===Operation Cerberus===
Hitler preferred the Channel route and responsibility was delegated to {{lang|de|Marine-Gruppenkommando West}} (Naval Command West, Admiral [[Alfred Saalwächter]]) for planning and operational directions; Ciliax was commander of the Brest Group (flagship, ''Scharnhorst''). Care was taken to choose the best route to avoid British minefields and to steam at high speed. Minesweepers cleared channels through the British mines and marked with buoys (from 3 to 9 February, Bomber Command laid 98 mines in the channels). U-boats were sent for meteorological observations and several destroyers steamed westward down the Channel to Brest to strengthen the escort screen.{{sfn|Martienssen|1949|pp=121–123}} To have the longest period of darkness possible, the departure was to be four days before the [[new moon]] and at {{nowrap|7:30 p.m.,}} to benefit from a [[spring tide]] flowing up the Channel, which would add speed and possibly lift the ships over mines.{{sfn|Roskill|1962|p=150}}

Air cover was to be provided by the {{lang|de|Luftwaffe}} and six destroyers would escort the Brest Group on the first leg, to be joined by ten E-boats at dawn; a mixture of E-boats, [[R-boat]]s and small craft would join at [[Cap Gris Nez]]. During January, the {{lang|de|Kriegsmarine}} and {{lang|de|Luftwaffe}} rehearsed for the operation but the ships had lost seaworthiness and many technicians and experts had been transferred from Brest to more pressing duties. By 9 February, the ships had completed their trials in Brest roads and the sortie was set for 11 February.{{sfn|Roskill|1962|p=150}} Morale of the crews was high, no sabotage had occurred at Brest and the crews went ashore freely. Among locals there was no doubt that the ships were preparing to depart and as a deception, tropical helmets were brought on board, French dock workers loaded oil barrels marked "For Use in the Tropics" and false rumours were spread around town.{{sfn|Ruge|1957|p=264}}

===={{lang|de|Unternehmen Donnerkeil}}====

{{see also|Operation Donnerkeil}}

Hans Jeschonnek, {{lang|de|Luftwaffe}} chief of staff, refused to guarantee the success of Cerberus or to reinforce the fighter forces in the west. [[Adolf Galland]] was given command of the air operation, to be called {{lang|de|Unternehmen Donnerkeil}} (Operation Thunderbolt).{{sfn|Hooton|1994|p=114}} Details of the plan were arranged with {{lang|de|[[Oberst]]}} ([[Colonel]]) [[Karl Koller (general)|Karl Koller]], chief of staff of {{lang|de|[[Luftflotte 3]]}} (Air Fleet 3 {{lang|de|[[Generalfeldmarschall]]}} [[Hugo Sperrle]]).{{sfn|Hooton|2010|p=121}} Some training units were mobilised to make up for the bulk of the {{lang|de|[[Jagdwaffe]]}} being absent in the [[Soviet Union]]. The {{lang|de|Funkhorchdienst}} (signals intelligence service, General [[Wolfgang Martini]]) attempted to jam British radio-telephone frequencies by using a technique to increase atmospheric interference and reduced the performance of British coastal radars by slowly increasing their jamming. [[Dornier Do 217]]s of {{lang|de|[[Kampfgeschwader 2]]}} (Bomber Wing 2) were to fly electronic deception sorties over the western Channel to divert British aircraft. {{lang|de|[[9th Air Corps (Germany)|Fliegerkorps IX]]}} ({{lang|de|[[General der Flieger]]}} [Air Force General] [[Joachim Coeler]]) prepared to bomb RAF bases in south-western England and to attack British naval forces attempting to intercept the Brest Group. [[Aufklärungsgruppe 123|''Fernaufklärungsgruppe'' 123]] (Long-range Reconnaissance Wing 123) was to keep watch on both ends of the Channel and support {{lang|de|Fliegerkorps IX}}.{{sfn|Hooton|1994|pp=114–115}}

The convoy route was divided into three sectors using the {{lang|de|Jafü}} (Fighter Sector) boundaries but to ensure local control [[Max Ibel]], the former commander of {{lang|de|[[Jagdgeschwader 27]]}} (Fighter Group 27) was appointed {{lang|de|Jagdfliegerführer Schiff}} ({{lang|de|Jafü Schiff}}, Fighter Controller: Ship) and embarked on ''Scharnhorst'' as a signals officer to communicate with {{lang|de|Luftwaffe}} units during the operation. Eight rehearsals, involving around {{nowrap|450 sorties,}} were made from 22 January to 10 February. The {{lang|de|[[Jagdgeschwader]]}} (day fighter wings) and the night fighters of {{lang|de|[[Nachtjagdgeschwader 1]]}} (Night Fighter Wing 1), were swiftly to prepare aircraft for the next sortie by rearming and refuelling in no more than thirty minutes.{{sfn|Hooton|1994|pp=114–115}} Galland decided that the aircraft should fly high and low cover, the low groups flying under British coastal radar. A standing patrol of least {{nowrap|16 fighters}} was to be maintained, in two formations of eight aircraft for their patrol altitudes, with each formation in two {{lang|de|Schwärme}} of four aircraft. One {{lang|de|Schwarm}} was to fly out to sea and one towards land in a zigzag and all {{lang|de|Schwärme}} were to fly back and forth along the line of ships in wide figures of eight, in radio silence. Every sortie was timed to allow the fighters {{nowrap|30 minutes}} over the ships, just enough time for relieved units to refuel, rearm and return. During {{lang|de|Donnerkeil}}, the relieving sortie arrived after only 20 minutes which meant that fighter cover for half the dash would be {{nowrap|32 fighters.}}{{sfn|Weal|1996|p=16}}

===Operation Fuller===

[[File:Coccoliths in the Celtic Sea-NASA.jpg|thumb|{{centre|Satellite photograph of the western English Channel between south-west England and north-west France}}]]
In April 1941, the Royal Navy and the RAF devised Operation Fuller, a plan for combined operations against the ships in Brest should they sortie. Vice-Admiral [[Bertram Ramsay]] of the Dover Command was to be responsible for operations to confront a German squadron sailing up the Channel, with continuous co-ordinated attacks by Coastal Command, the Navy and RAF.{{sfn|Ford|2012|p=28}} British coastal radar had a range of about {{cvt|80|nmi|mi+km}} and with the five standing air patrols, the planners expected a dash up the Channel easily to be discovered, even at night or in bad weather. As soon as the alarm was raised, the offensive provisions of Fuller would begin. The {{nowrap|32 [[Motor Torpedo Boat]]s}} of the [[Dover]] and [[Ramsgate]] flotillas, with a [[Motor Gun Boat]] (MGB) escort, would make torpedo attacks from {{cvt|4000|yd|mi+km}}.{{sfn|Kemp|1957|p=196}} The boats would be followed up by [[Fairey Swordfish]] torpedo-bombers with fighter escorts and by Beaufort torpedo-bombers; the [[Dover Strait coastal guns#British guns|coastal guns at Dover]] would fire for as long as the ships were in range; Bomber Command would attack any ship damaged enough to have been slowed or brought to a stop.{{sfn|Ford|2012|p=27}}

As the German ships moved beyond the Straits of Dover, six [[Harwich]]-based destroyers of the [[Commander-in-Chief, The Nore|Nore Command]] would make torpedo attacks and the RAF would continue bombing and also lay mines in the paths of the ships. Bomber Command intended to have {{nowrap|100 aircraft}} at four hours' notice (about {{frac|1|3}} of its operational strength), by reserving around {{nowrap|20 aircraft}} from each group. Of the other {{nowrap|200 aircraft,}} half would continue operations against Germany and the rest would be preparing for operations next day. The aircraft reserved for Fuller were rotated and weather permitting, {{nowrap|20–25 would}} bomb Brest. Fighter Command would escort the torpedo-bombers with fighters from [[No. 10 Group RAF|10 Group]] in the south-west and the {{nowrap|16 fighter}} squadrons of 11 Group in the south-east.{{sfn|Ford|2012|p=27}} Each service arm had exchanged liaison officers at headquarters and operations rooms but did not use a common communications system.{{sfn|Ford|2012|p=28}}

====Readiness====
[[File:Rade de Brest.svg|thumb|upright=1.4|{{centre|Brest Roads ({{lang|fr|Rade de Brest}})}}]]
The preliminaries of the German manoeuvre, especially minesweeping in the Channel and the transit of destroyers to Brest, led the Admiralty to issue a forecast that a sortie into the Atlantic was improbable and that a move to sheltered waters by a dash up the Channel rather than via the Denmark Strait or into the Mediterranean to Italian ports was to be expected. Next day the Nore Command was ordered to keep six destroyers on call in the [[Thames]] and be ready to send six torpedo boats to reinforce those at Dover. The fast {{sclass|Abdiel|minelayer|1}}s {{HMS|Manxman|M70|6}} and {{HMS|Welshman|M84|6}} were detached to Plymouth Command to mine the Brest approaches and to Dover to mine the eastern exit of the Channel respectively. Most submarines were in the Mediterranean but two training boats were sent into the [[Bay of Biscay]]. On 6 February, {{HMS|Sealion|72S|6}} the only modern submarine in home waters, was allowed to sail into Brest Roads, the commander using information supplied through Ultra on minefields, swept channels and training areas. The six operational Swordfish torpedo-bombers of 825 Squadron FAA (Lieutenant-Commander [[Eugene Esmonde]]) were moved from [[RNAS Lee-on-Solent (HMS Daedalus)|RNAS Lee-on-Solent]] to [[RAF Manston]] in [[Kent]], closer to Dover.{{sfn|Roskill|1962|pp=150–153}}

The RAF alerted its forces involved in Operation Fuller to indefinite readiness and on 3 February, 19 Group, Coastal Command began night reconnaissance patrols by [[ASV Mark II radar|Air to Surface Vessel Mk II radar]] (ASV) equipped [[Lockheed Hudson]]s, supposedly able to detect ships at {{cvt|30|nmi|mi+km}} range.{{sfn|Hinsley|1994|p=135}} Patrol line ''Stopper'' was already being flown off Brest and ''Line South East'' from [[Ushant]] to the Isle de Bréhat and ''Habo'' from Le Havre to Boulogne began. Coastal Command had three Beaufort torpedo-bomber squadrons in Britain, [[No. 42 Squadron RAF|42 Squadron]] at [[Leuchars Station|RAF Leuchars]] in Scotland, {{nowrap|12 Beauforts}} of [[No. 86 Squadron RAF|86 Squadron]] and [[No. 217 Squadron RAF|217 Squadron]] in Cornwall and seven 217 Squadron aircraft at Thorney Island (Portsmouth).{{sfn|Roskill|1962|p=153}}{{sfn|Richards|1974|p=366}} Two days later, Enigma showed that Ciliax had joined ''Scharnhorst'' and with the recent exercises, led the Admiralty to predict an impending departure. On 8 February, in a break in the weather, PR found that the ships were still in harbour, ''Scharnhorst'' was in dock and that another two destroyers had arrived.{{sfn|Hinsley|1994|pp=135–136}}

[[Air Chief Marshal]] [[Philip Joubert de la Ferté]], [[Air Officer Commanding]] (AOC) Coastal Command, sent an appreciation to Fighter and Bomber commands, that a sortie could be expected any time after 10 February. The Coastal Command groups were alerted and 42 Squadron was ordered to fly its {{nowrap|14 Beauforts}} south to [[Norfolk]] (the move was delayed until next day by snow on the airfields in [[East Anglia]]). Air Vice Marshal [[Jack Baldwin (RAF officer)|J. E. A. Baldwin]], AOC Bomber Command, stood down half of its bombers and reduced the other {{nowrap|100 aircraft}} from four to two hours' notice, without informing the Admiralty.{{sfn|Hinsley|1994|pp=135–136}} On 11 February, ''Sealion'' moved towards Brest on the afternoon tide, found nothing and returned at {{nowrap|8:35 p.m.}} to re-charge batteries, ready for another try the next day. The German ships had been scheduled to depart Brest at {{nowrap|7:30 p.m.}} but were delayed by a Bomber Command raid, which had been ordered after photo-reconnaissance had found the ships still in harbour with [[torpedo net]]s deployed at {{nowrap|4:15 p.m.}} For the previous week, Enigma had been providing information that the Germans were minesweeping on a route that made a dash up the Channel a certainty and with reference to captured charts gave away the German route, which was passed on by the Admiralty at {{nowrap|12:29 p.m.}} on 12 February. (The daily naval Enigma Home Waters settings for {{nowrap|10–12 February}} took Bletchley Park until 15 February to break.){{sfn|Hinsley|1994|p=136}}