Editing Cognitive dissonance (section)

==Paradigms==
There are four theoretic paradigms of cognitive dissonance, the mental stress people experienced when exposed to information that is inconsistent with their [[belief]]s, [[Ideal (ethics)|ideal]]s or [[Value (ethics)|values]]: Belief Disconfirmation, Induced Compliance, Free Choice, and Effort Justification, which respectively explain what happens after a person acts inconsistently, relative to their intellectual perspectives; what happens after a person makes decisions and what are the effects upon a person who has expended much effort to achieve a goal. Common to each paradigm of cognitive-dissonance theory is the tenet: People invested in a given perspective shall—when confronted with contrary evidence—expend great effort to justify retaining the challenged perspective.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Brehm |first1=Jack W. |title=A Brief History of Dissonance Theory: A Brief History of Dissonance Theory |journal=Social and Personality Psychology Compass |date=November 2007 |volume=1 |issue=1 |pages=381–391 |doi=10.1111/j.1751-9004.2007.00035.x }}</ref>

===Belief disconfirmation===
{{main|Disconfirmed expectancy}}
The contradiction of a belief, ideal, or system of values causes cognitive dissonance that can be resolved by changing the challenged belief, yet, instead of affecting change, the resultant mental stress restores psychological consonance to the person by misperception, rejection, or refutation of the contradiction, seeking moral support from people who share the contradicted beliefs or acting to persuade other people that the contradiction is unreal.<ref name="Harmon-Jones 2002">{{cite book | vauthors = Harmon-Jones E |chapter=A Cognitive Dissonance Theory Perspective on Persuasion |pages=99–116 |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=I_ByAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA99 | veditors = Dillard JP, Pfau M |title=The Persuasion Handbook: Developments in Theory and Practice |date=23 July 2002 |publisher=SAGE Publications |isbn=978-1-4522-6159-1 }}</ref><ref>[[Christian Kracht|Kracht, C.]], & [[David Woodard|Woodard, D.]], [https://www.wehrhahn-verlag.de/public/index.php?ID_Section=3&ID_Product=577 ''Five Years''] ([[Hanover]]: [[:de:Wehrhahn Verlag|Wehrhahn Verlag]], 2011), p. 123.</ref>{{rp|123}}

The early hypothesis of belief contradiction presented in ''[[When Prophecy Fails]]'' (1956) reported that faith deepened among the members of an apocalyptic religious cult, despite the failed prophecy of an alien spacecraft soon to land on Earth to rescue them from earthly corruption. At the determined place and time, the cult assembled; they believed that only they would survive planetary destruction; yet the spaceship did not arrive to Earth. The confounded prophecy caused them acute cognitive-dissonance: Had they been victims of a hoax? Had they vainly donated away their material possessions? To resolve the dissonance between apocalyptic, end-of-the-world religious beliefs and earthly, [[Reality|material reality]], most of the cult restored their psychological consonance by choosing to believe a less mentally-stressful idea to explain the missed landing: that the aliens had given planet Earth a second chance at existence, which, in turn, empowered them to re-direct their religious cult to environmentalism and social advocacy to end human damage to planet Earth. On overcoming the confounded belief by changing to global environmentalism, the cult increased in numbers by [[proselytism]].<ref>Festinger, L., Riecken, H.W., Schachter, S. ''When Prophecy Fails'' (1956). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.{{page needed|date=November 2021}}</ref>

The study of ''The Rebbe, the Messiah, and the Scandal of Orthodox Indifference'' (2008) reported the belief contradiction that occurred in the [[Chabad]] Orthodox Jewish congregation, who believed that their [[Rebbe]], [[Menachem Mendel Schneerson]], was the [[Messiah in Judaism|Messiah]]. When he died of a stroke in 1994, instead of accepting that their Rebbe was not the Messiah, some of the congregation proved indifferent to that contradictory fact, and continued claiming that [[Chabad messianism#Belief in Schneerson as messiah following his death|Schneerson was the Messiah]] and that he would soon return from the dead.<ref>Berger, David (2008). ''The Rebbe, the Messiah, and the Scandal of Orthodox Indifference''. Portland: Litman Library of Jewish Civilization.{{page needed|date=November 2021}}</ref>

===Induced compliance===
{{see also|Forced compliance theory}}
[[File:Clark Stanley's Snake Oil Liniment.png|thumb|After performing dissonant behavior ([[lie|lying]]) a person might find external, consonant elements. Therefore, a [[snake oil]] salesman might find a psychological self-justification (great profit) for promoting medical falsehoods, but, otherwise, might need to change his beliefs about the falsehoods.]]
In the ''Cognitive Consequences of Forced Compliance'' (1959), the investigators [[Leon Festinger]] and [[Merrill Carlsmith]] asked students to spend an hour doing tedious tasks; e.g. turning pegs a quarter-turn, at fixed intervals. This procedure included seventy-one male students attending Stanford University. Students were asked to complete a series of repetitive, mundane tasks, then asked to convince a separate group of participants that the task was fun and exciting. Once the subjects had done the tasks, the experimenters asked one group of subjects to speak with another subject (an actor) and persuade that impostor-subject that the tedious tasks were interesting and engaging. Subjects of one group were paid twenty dollars ($20); those in a second group were paid one dollar ($1) and those in the control group were not asked to speak with the imposter-subject.<ref name=FestingerCarlsmith1959>{{cite journal | vauthors = Festinger L, Carlsmith JM | title = Cognitive consequences of forced compliance | journal = Journal of Abnormal Psychology | volume = 58 | issue = 2 | pages = 203–210 | date = March 1959 | pmid = 13640824 | doi = 10.1037/h0041593 | s2cid = 232294 | citeseerx = 10.1.1.497.2779 }}</ref>

At the conclusion of the study, when asked to rate the tedious tasks, the subjects of the second group (paid $1) rated the tasks more positively than did the subjects in the first group (paid $20), and the first group (paid $20) rated the tasks just slightly more positively than did the subjects of the control group; the responses of the paid subjects were evidence of cognitive dissonance. The researchers, Festinger and Carlsmith, proposed that the subjects experienced dissonance between the conflicting cognitions. "I told someone that the task was interesting" and "I actually found it boring." The subjects paid one dollar were induced to comply, compelled to internalize the "interesting task" mental attitude because they had no other justification. The subjects paid twenty dollars were induced to comply by way of an obvious, external justification for internalizing the "interesting task" mental attitude and experienced a lower degree of cognitive dissonance than did those only paid one dollar.<ref name=FestingerCarlsmith1959 /> They did not receive sufficient compensation for the lie they were asked to tell. Because of this insufficiency, the participants convinced themselves to believe that what they were doing was exciting. This way, they felt better about telling the next group of participants that it was exciting because, technically, they weren't lying.<ref name=":03">{{Cite journal |last1=Festinger |first1=Leon |last2=Carlsmith |first2=James M. |date=March 1959 |title=Cognitive consequences of forced compliance. |url=http://doi.apa.org/getdoi.cfm?doi=10.1037/h0041593 |journal=The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology |language=en |volume=58 |issue=2 |pages=203–210 |doi=10.1037/h0041593 |pmid=13640824 |issn=0096-851X|url-access=subscription }}</ref>

====Forbidden behavior paradigm====

In the ''Effect of the Severity of Threat on the Devaluation of Forbidden Behavior'' (1963), a variant of the induced-compliance paradigm, by [[Elliot Aronson]] and Carlsmith, examined [[self-justification]] in children.<ref name="aronson1963">{{cite journal | vauthors = Aronson E, Carlsmith JM | year = 1963 | title = Effect of the Severity of Threat on the Devaluation of Forbidden Behavior | journal = Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology | volume = 66 | issue = 6| pages = 584–588 | doi = 10.1037/h0039901 | citeseerx = 10.1.1.378.884 }}</ref> Children were left in a room with toys, including a greatly desirable steam shovel, the forbidden toy. Upon leaving the room, the experimenter told one-half of the group of children that there would be severe punishment if they played with the steam-shovel toy and told the second half of the group that there would be a mild punishment for playing with the forbidden toy. All of the children refrained from playing with the forbidden toy (the steam shovel).<ref name= "aronson1963"/>

Later, when the children were told that they could freely play with any toy they wanted, the children in the mild-punishment group were less likely to play with the steam shovel (the forbidden toy), despite the removal of the threat of mild punishment. The children threatened with mild punishment had to justify, to themselves, why they did not play with the forbidden toy. The degree of punishment was insufficiently strong to resolve their cognitive dissonance; the children had to convince themselves that playing with the forbidden toy was not worth the effort.<ref name=aronson1963 />

In ''The Efficacy of Musical Emotions Provoked by Mozart's Music for the Reconciliation of Cognitive Dissonance'' (2012), a variant of the forbidden-toy paradigm, indicated that listening to music reduces the development of cognitive dissonance.<ref name="MasatakaPerlovsky_MusicReducesCognitiveDissonance">{{cite journal |vauthors=Masataka N, Perlovsky L |date=December 2012 |title=The efficacy of musical emotions provoked by Mozart's music for the reconciliation of cognitive dissonance |journal=Scientific Reports |volume=2 |issue=1 |pages=694 |bibcode=2012NatSR...2..694M |doi=10.1038/srep00694 |pmc=3457076 |pmid=23012648}}</ref> Without music in the background, the control group of four-year-old children were told to avoid playing with a forbidden toy. After playing alone, the control-group children later devalued the importance of the forbidden toy. In the variable group, classical music played in the background while the children played alone. In the second group, the children did not later devalue the forbidden toy. The researchers, Nobuo Masataka and Leonid Perlovsky, concluded that music might inhibit cognitions that induce cognitive dissonance.<ref name="MasatakaPerlovsky_MusicReducesCognitiveDissonance" />

Music is a stimulus that can diminish post-decisional dissonance; in an earlier experiment, ''Washing Away Postdecisional Dissonance'' (2010), the researchers indicated that the actions of hand-washing might inhibit the cognitions that induce cognitive dissonance.<ref name = leeschwarz>{{cite journal | vauthors = Lee SW, Schwarz N | title = Washing away pos-decisional dissonance | journal = Science | volume = 328 | issue = 5979 | pages = 709 | date = May 2010 | pmid = 20448177 | doi = 10.1126/science.1186799 | s2cid = 18611420 | bibcode = 2010Sci...328..709L }}</ref> That study later failed to replicate.<ref>{{cite news | vauthors = Resnick B  |title= More social science studies just failed to replicate. Here's why this is good. |url= https://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2018/8/27/17761466/psychology-replication-crisis-nature-social-science |work=Vox |date=27 August 2018 }}</ref>

=== Free choice===
In the study ''Post-decision Changes in Desirability of Alternatives'' (1956) 225 female students rated domestic appliances and then were asked to choose one of two appliances as a gift. The results of the second round of ratings indicated that the women students increased their ratings of the domestic appliance they had selected as a gift and decreased their ratings of the appliances they rejected.<ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Brehm JW | title = Postdecision changes in the desirability of alternatives | journal = Journal of Abnormal Psychology | volume = 52 | issue = 3 | pages = 384–389 | date = May 1956 | pmid = 13318848 | doi = 10.1037/h0041006 | s2cid = 8764837 }}</ref>

This type of cognitive dissonance occurs in a person who is faced with a difficult decision and when the rejected choice may still have desirable characteristics to the chooser. The action of deciding provokes the psychological dissonance consequent to choosing X instead of Y, despite little difference between X and Y; the decision "I chose X" is dissonant with the cognition that "There are some aspects of Y that I like". The study ''Choice-induced Preferences in the Absence of Choice: Evidence from a Blind Two-choice Paradigm with Young Children and Capuchin Monkeys'' (2010) reports similar results in the occurrence of cognitive dissonance in human beings and in animals.<ref name="Egan et al.">{{cite journal | vauthors = Egan LC, Bloom P, Santos LR |title=Choice-induced preferences in the absence of choice: Evidence from a blind two choice paradigm with young children and capuchin monkeys |journal=Journal of Experimental Social Psychology |date=January 2010 |volume=46 |issue=1 |pages=204–207 |doi=10.1016/j.jesp.2009.08.014 }}</ref>

''Peer Effects in Pro-Social Behavior: Social Norms or Social Preferences?'' (2013) indicated that with internal deliberation, the structuring of decisions among people can influence how a person acts. The study suggested that social preferences and social norms can explain peer effects in decision making. The study observed that choices made by the second participant would influence the first participant's effort to make choices and that inequity aversion, the preference for fairness, is the paramount concern of the participants.<ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Gächter S, Nosenzo D, Sefton M | title = Peer Effects in Pro-Social Behavior: Social Norms or Social Preferences? | journal = Journal of the European Economic Association | volume = 11 | issue = 3 | pages = 548–573 | date = June 2013 | pmid = 28553193 | pmc = 5443401 | doi = 10.1111/jeea.12015 | ssrn = 2010940 }}
</ref>

===Effort justification===
{{further|Effort justification}}
Cognitive dissonance occurs in a person who voluntarily engages in (physically or ethically) unpleasant activities to achieve a goal. The [[Psychological stress|mental stress]] caused by the dissonance can be reduced by the person exaggerating the desirability of the goal. In ''The Effect of Severity of Initiation on Liking for a Group'' (1956), to qualify for admission to a discussion group, two groups of people underwent an embarrassing initiation of varied psychological severity. The first group of subjects were to read aloud twelve sexual words considered obscene; the second group of subjects were to read aloud twelve sexual words not considered obscene.<ref name="Aronson & Mills 1959">{{cite journal | vauthors = Aronson E, Mills J |title=The effect of severity of initiation on liking for a group |journal=The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology |date=1959 |volume=59 |issue=2 |pages=177–181 |doi=10.1037/h0047195 |citeseerx=10.1.1.368.1481 }}</ref>

Both groups were given headphones to unknowingly listen to a recorded discussion about animal sexual behaviour, which the researchers designed to be dull and banal. As the subjects of the experiment, the groups of people were told that the animal-sexuality discussion actually was occurring in the next room. The subjects whose strong initiation required reading aloud obscene words evaluated the people of their group as more-interesting persons than the people of the group who underwent the mild initiation to the discussion group.<ref name="Aronson & Mills 1959"/>

In ''Washing Away Your Sins: Threatened Morality and Physical Cleansing'' (2006), the results indicated that a person washing their hands is an action that helps resolve post-decisional cognitive dissonance because the mental stress usually was caused by the person's ethical–moral self-disgust, which is an emotion related to the physical disgust caused by a dirty environment.<ref name="leeschwarz" /><ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Zhong CB, Liljenquist K | title = Washing away your sins: threatened morality and physical cleansing | journal = Science | volume = 313 | issue = 5792 | pages = 1451–1452 | date = September 2006 | pmid = 16960010 | doi = 10.1126/science.1130726 | s2cid = 33103635 | citeseerx = 10.1.1.181.571 | bibcode = 2006Sci...313.1451Z }}</ref>
 
The study ''The Neural Basis of Rationalization: Cognitive Dissonance Reduction During Decision-making'' (2011) indicated that participants rated 80 names and 80 paintings based on how much they liked the names and paintings. To give meaning to the decisions, the participants were asked to select names that they might give to their children. For rating the paintings, the participants were asked to base their ratings on whether or not they would display such art at home.<ref name=JarchoEtAl_NeuralBasisRationalization/>

The results indicated that when the decision is meaningful to the person deciding value, the likely rating is based on their attitudes (positive, neutral or negative) towards the name and towards the painting in question. The participants also were asked to rate some of the objects twice and believed that, at session's end, they would receive two of the paintings they had positively rated. The results indicated a great increase in the positive attitude of the participant towards the liked pair of things, whilst also increasing the negative attitude towards the disliked pair of things. The double-ratings of pairs of things, towards which the rating participant had a neutral attitude, showed no changes during the rating period. The existing attitudes of the participant were reinforced during the rating period and the participants experienced cognitive dissonance when confronted by a liked-name paired with a disliked-painting.<ref name="JarchoEtAl_NeuralBasisRationalization" />

In the study, ''Does effort increase or decrease reward validation? Considerations from cognitive dissonance theory'' (2024), the authors discovered that effort justification and effort discounting may determine the amount of reward valuation a person feels after completing a task.<ref name=":5">{{Cite journal |last1=Harmon-Jones |first1=Eddie |last2=Matis |first2=Sophie |last3=Angus |first3=Douglas J. |last4=Harmon-Jones |first4=Cindy |date=June 2024 |title=Does effort increase or decrease reward valuation? Considerations from cognitive dissonance theory |url=https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/psyp.14536 |journal=Psychophysiology |language=en |volume=61 |issue=6 |doi=10.1111/psyp.14536 |pmid=38323360 |issn=0048-5772}}</ref> Effort justification is the term used for high efforts leading to high rewards. Effort discounting is the term used for high efforts leading to low rewards. These terms relate to Cognitive Dissonance because humans enjoy controlling the efforts that may lead to rewards. This study determined that having high control can lead to higher efforts, leading to higher rewards. Similarly, having low control can lead to higher efforts yet lower rewards.<ref name=":5" /> These results indicate that humans seek highly controllable situations and actions to receive rewards for their efforts. The ability to control one’s actions is crucial for eliminating the effects of Cognitive Dissonance. It is also essential in the process of decision-making without any influence, whether positive or negative, from others.