Editing Collective action (section)

==Public good==
The economic theory of collective action is concerned with the provision of [[Public good (economics)|public good]]s (and other collective consumption) through the [[collaboration]] of two or more individuals, and the impact of [[externality|externalities]] on group behavior. It is more commonly referred to as [[Public Choice]].  [[Mancur Olson]]'s 1965 book ''[[The Logic of Collective Action|The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups]],'' is an important early analysis of the problems of public good cost.

Besides economics, the theory has found many applications in [[political science]], [[sociology]], [[communication]], [[anthropology]] and [[environmentalism]].

===Collective action problem===
{{main|Collective action problem}}
The term collective action problem describes the situation in which multiple individuals would all benefit from a certain action, but has an associated cost making it implausible that any individual can or will undertake and solve it alone. The ideal solution is then to undertake this as a collective action, the cost of which is shared. Situations like this include the [[prisoner's dilemma]], a collective action problem in which no communication is allowed, the [[free rider problem]], and the [[tragedy of the commons]], also known as the problem with open access.<ref>Archived at [https://ghostarchive.org/varchive/youtube/20211211/WYA1y405JW0 Ghostarchive]{{cbignore}} and the [https://web.archive.org/web/20160409041214/https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WYA1y405JW0 Wayback Machine]{{cbignore}}: {{cite web|last1=Agar|first1=Jesse|title=Tragedy of the Commons │ The Problem with Open Access|url=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WYA1y405JW0|website=Youtube|date=9 June 2015 |publisher=This Place (youtube channel)|access-date=Jun 9, 2015}}{{cbignore}}</ref>  An allegorical metaphor often used to describe the problem is "[[belling the cat]]".<ref>{{Cite book |last=Dowding |first=Keith |author-link=Keith Dowding |year=1996 |title=Power |pages=31&nbsp;''ff.'' |publisher=University of Minnesota Press |isbn= 978-0-8166-2941-1 }}</ref>

Solutions to collective action problems include mutually binding agreements, government regulation, privatisation, and [[assurance contract]]s, also known as crowdacting.<ref>Archived at [https://ghostarchive.org/varchive/youtube/20211211/u6tqZqoh8DY Ghostarchive]{{cbignore}} and the [https://web.archive.org/web/20170609234457/https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u6tqZqoh8DY&list=PLhZIV92at14Sq0eEvvgSFpyMHnK269pNj Wayback Machine]{{cbignore}}: {{cite web|last1=van den Akker|first1=Ron|title=Crowdacting|url=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u6tqZqoh8DY|website=YouTube|date=7 September 2016 |publisher=Bord&Stift|access-date=Sep 7, 2016}}{{cbignore}}</ref>

===Exploitation of the great by the small===
[[Mancur Olson]] made the claim that individual [[Rational choice theory|rational choice]] leads to situations where individuals with more resources will carry a higher burden in the provision of the public good than poorer ones.<ref>{{Cite document|last=Olson|first=Mancur|title=logic of collective action: Public goods and the theory of groups|year=1965|publisher=Harvard University Press|location=Cambridge, MA}}</ref><!-- why exactly is this so controversial? --> Poorer individuals will usually have little choice but to opt for the [[Free rider problem|free rider]] strategy, i.e., they will attempt to benefit from the public good without contributing to its provision. This may also encourage the under-production (inefficient production) of the public good.

===Institutional design===
While public goods are often provided by governments, this is not always the case.  Various institutional designs have been studied with the aim of reducing the collaborative failure.  The best design for a given situation depends on the production costs, the utility function, and the collaborative effects, amongst other things.  Here are only some examples:

====Joint products====
A joint-product model analyzes the collaborative effect of joining a private good to a public good.  For example, a tax deduction (private good) can be tied to a donation to a charity (public good).

It can be shown that the provision of the public good increases when tied to the private good, as long as the private good is provided by a monopoly (otherwise the private good would be provided by competitors without the link to the public good).

====Clubs====
Some institutional design, e.g., [[Intellectual property|intellectual property rights]], can introduce an exclusion mechanism and turn a pure [[Public good (economics)|public good]] into an impure public good artificially.

If the costs of the exclusion mechanism are not higher than the gain from the [[collaboration]], clubs can emerge.  [[James M. Buchanan]] showed in his seminal paper that clubs can be an efficient alternative to government interventions.<ref>{{cite journal|last=Buchanan|first=James M.|title=An Economic Theory of Clubs|journal=Economica|year=1965|volume=32|pages=1–14|jstor=2552442|doi=10.2307/2552442|issue=125}}</ref>

A [[nation]] can be seen as a club whose members are its citizens. Government would then be the manager of this club.

====Federated structure====
In some cases, theory shows that collaboration emerges spontaneously in smaller groups rather than in large ones (see e.g. [[Dunbar's number]]). This explains why [[trade union|labor unions]] or [[Charitable organization|charities]] often have a federated structure.