Editing Deterrence theory (section)

==Concept==

The concept of deterrence can be defined as the use of threats in limited force by one party to convince another party to refrain from initiating some course of action.<ref name="Huth_1999">
{{Citation
|last=Huth
|first=P. K.
|year=1999
|title=Deterrence and International Conflict: Empirical Findings and Theoretical Debate
|journal=Annual Review of Political Science
|volume=2
|pages=25–48
|doi=10.1146/annurev.polisci.2.1.25|doi-access=free
}}</ref><ref name="Con Ana" /> In ''Arms and Influence'' (1966), Schelling offers a broader definition of deterrence, as he defines it as "to prevent from action by fear of consequences."'''<ref name="Arms" />''' Glenn Snyder also offers a broad definition of deterrence, as he argues that deterrence involves both the threat of sanction and the promise of reward.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Snyder|first=Glenn H.|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=0irWCgAAQBAJ|title=Deterrence and Defense|date=1966|publisher=Princeton University Press|isbn=978-1-4008-7716-4|language=en|access-date=2021-11-20|archive-date=2023-04-10|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230410172212/https://books.google.com/books?id=0irWCgAAQBAJ|url-status=live}}</ref>

A threat serves as a deterrent to the extent that it convinces its target not to carry out the intended action because of the costs and losses that target would incur. In international security, a policy of deterrence generally refers to threats of military retaliation directed by the leaders of one state to the leaders of another in an attempt to prevent the other state from resorting to the use of military force in pursuit of its foreign policy goals.

As outlined by Huth,<ref name="Huth_1999" /> a policy of deterrence can fit into two broad categories: preventing an armed attack against a state's own territory (known as direct deterrence) or preventing an armed attack against another state (known as extended deterrence). Situations of direct deterrence often occur if there is a [[territorial dispute]] between neighboring states in which major powers like the United States do not directly intervene. On the other hand, situations of extended deterrence often occur when a [[great power]] becomes involved. The latter case has generated most interest in academic literature. Building on the two broad categories, Huth goes on to outline that deterrence policies may be implemented in response to a pressing short-term threat (known as immediate deterrence) or as strategy to prevent a military conflict or short-term threat from arising (known as general deterrence).

A successful deterrence policy must be considered in military terms but also political terms: International relations, foreign policy and diplomacy. In military terms, deterrence success refers to preventing state leaders from issuing military threats and actions that escalate peacetime diplomatic and military co-operation into a crisis or militarized confrontation that threatens armed conflict and possibly war. The prevention of crises of wars, however, is not the only aim of deterrence. In addition, defending states must be able to resist the political and the military demands of a potential attacking nation. If armed conflict is avoided at the price of diplomatic concessions to the maximum demands of the potential attacking nation under the threat of war, it cannot be claimed that deterrence has succeeded.

Furthermore, as Jentleson ''et al.''<ref name="Jentleson">{{Citation
|last1=Jentleson
|first1=B.A.
|last2=Whytock
|first2=C.A.
|year=2005
|title=Who Won Libya
|journal=International Security
|volume=30
|number=3
|pages=47–86
|doi=10.1162/isec.2005.30.3.47
|s2cid=57572461
|url=https://scholarship.law.uci.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1752&context=faculty_scholarship
|access-date=2021-07-14
|archive-date=2021-04-26
|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210426205246/https://scholarship.law.uci.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1752&context=faculty_scholarship
|url-status=live
|url-access=subscription
}}</ref> argue, two key sets of factors for successful deterrence are important: a defending state strategy that balances credible coercion and deft diplomacy consistent with the three criteria of proportionality, reciprocity, and coercive credibility and minimizes international and domestic constraints and the extent of an attacking state's vulnerability as shaped by its domestic political and economic conditions. In broad terms, a state wishing to implement a strategy of deterrence is most likely to succeed if the costs of noncompliance that it can impose on and the benefits of compliance it can offer to another state are greater than the benefits of noncompliance and the costs of compliance.

Deterrence theory holds that nuclear weapons are intended to deter other states from attacking with their nuclear weapons, through the promise of retaliation and possibly [[mutually assured destruction]]. Nuclear deterrence can also be applied to an attack by conventional forces. For example, the doctrine of [[massive retaliation]] threatened to launch US nuclear weapons in response to Soviet attacks.

A successful nuclear deterrent requires a country to preserve its ability to retaliate by responding before its own weapons are destroyed or ensuring a [[second-strike]] capability. A nuclear deterrent is sometimes composed of a [[nuclear triad]], as in the case of the nuclear weapons owned by the [[United States]], [[Russia]], [[China]] and [[India]]. Other countries, such as the [[United Kingdom]] and [[France]], have only sea-based and air-based nuclear weapons.

===Proportionality===
Jentleson ''et al.'' provides further detail in relation to those factors.<ref name="Jentleson" /> Proportionality refers to the relationship between the defending state's scope and nature of the objectives being pursued and the instruments available for use to pursue them. The more the defending state demands of another state, the higher that state's costs of compliance and the greater need for the defending state's strategy to increase the costs of noncompliance and the benefits of compliance. That is a challenge, as deterrence is by definition a strategy of limited means. George (1991) goes on to explain that deterrence sometimes goes beyond threats to the actual use of military force, but if force is actually used, it must be limited and fall short of full-scale use to succeed.<ref name="George_1991">{{Citation
|last=George
|first=A
|year=1991
|title=The General Theory and Logic of Coercive Diplomacy
|work=Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War
|publisher=United States Institute of Peace Press
|place=Washington, D.C.
|pages=3–14
}}</ref>

The main source of disproportionality is an objective that goes beyond policy change to [[regime change]], which has been seen in Libya, Iraq, and North Korea. There, defending states have sought to change the leadership of a state and to policy changes relating primarily to their nuclear weapons programs.

===Reciprocity===
Secondly, Jentleson ''et al.''<ref name="Jentleson" /> outlines that reciprocity involves an explicit understanding of linkage between the defending state's carrots and the attacking state's concessions. The balance lies in not offering too little, too late or for too much in return and not offering too much, too soon, or for too little return.

===Coercive credibility===
Finally, coercive credibility requires that in addition to calculations about costs and benefits of co-operation, the defending state convincingly conveys to the attacking state that failure to co-operate has consequences. Threats, uses of force, and other coercive instruments such as [[economic sanctions]] must be sufficiently credible to raise the attacking state's perceived costs of noncompliance. A defending state having a superior military capability or economic strength in itself is not enough to ensure credibility. Indeed, all three elements of a balanced deterrence strategy are more likely to be achieved if other major international actors like the [[UN]] or [[NATO]] are supportive, and opposition within the defending state's domestic politics is limited.

The other important considerations outlined by Jentleson ''et al.''<ref name="Jentleson" /> that must be taken into consideration is the domestic political and economic conditions in the attacking state affecting its vulnerability to deterrence policies and the attacking state's ability to compensate unfavourable power balances. The first factor is whether internal political support and regime security are better served by defiance, or there are domestic political gains to be made from improving relations with the defending state. The second factor is an economic calculation of the costs that military force, sanctions, and other coercive instruments can impose and the benefits that trade and other economic incentives may carry. That is partly a function of the strength and flexibility of the attacking state's domestic economy and its capacity to absorb or counter the costs being imposed. The third factor is the role of elites and other key domestic political figures within the attacking state. To the extent that such actors' interests are threatened with the defending state's demands, they act to prevent or block the defending state's demands.