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Distant Early Warning Line
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==Canadian perception== From the beginning of the development of the DEW Line idea, Canadian concerns over political perception grew enormously. Noted [[Northern Canada|Canadian Arctic]] historian P. Whitney Lackenbauer argues that the Canadian Government saw little intrinsic value in the Arctic, but due to fear of Americanization and American penetration into the Canadian Arctic, brought significant changes and a more militaristic role to the north.<ref>Lackenbauer, Whitney. P. and Peter Kikkert. "The Canadian Forces & Arctic Sovereignty: Debating Roles, Interests and Requirements, 1968β1974". Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2010. 7.</ref> This shift into a more military role began with a transition of authority, shifting responsibility of Arctic defence in Canada from the [[Royal Canadian Mounted Police]] to the Canadian Armed Forces. This "active defence" had three key elements: minimizing the extent of the American presence in the Canadian Arctic, Canadian government input into the management of the DEW Line, and full Canadian participation in Arctic defence.<ref>Lackenbauer, Whitney. P. and Peter Kikkert. "The Canadian Forces & Arctic Sovereignty: Debating Roles, Interests and Requirements, 1968β1974". Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2010. 56.</ref> Funding problems for the DEW Line also played a role in perception of the project. American investment in building and operating the DEW Line system declined as the ICBM threat refocused priorities, but Canada did not fill the void with commensurate additional funding. In 1968 a [[Department of National Defence (Canada)|Canadian Department of National Defence]] Paper (27 November 1968) stated no further funding for research on the DEW Line or air space would be allocated due in part to lack of commercial activity<ref>Lackenbauer, Whitney. P. and Peter Kikkert. "The Canadian Forces & Arctic Sovereignty: Debating Roles, Interests and Requirements, 1968β1974". Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2010. 68.</ref> The Canadian Government also limited United States air activity, base activity, soldier numbers, and contractor numbers; and the overall operation would be considered and called in all formalities a "joint operation".<ref>Lajeunesse, Adam. "The Distant Early Warning Line and The Canadian Battle For Public Perception". Thesis Calgary: University of Calgary. ''Canadian Military Journal'', Summer. 2007. 51.</ref>
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