Editing Divine command theory (section)

===Robert Adams===
[[File:RobertMerrihewAdams20060625.jpg|thumb|Robert Merrihew Adams proposes what he calls a "modified divine command theory".]]

American philosopher [[Robert Merrihew Adams]] proposes what he calls a "modified divine command theory".<ref name=P&R2008>{{harvnb|Pojman|Rea|2008|p=558}}</ref> Adams presents the basic form of his theory by asserting that two statements are equivalent:

#It is wrong to do X.
#It is contrary to God's commands to do X.<ref name=P&R2008/>

He proposes that God's commands precede moral truths and must be explained in terms of moral truths, not the other way around. Adams writes that his theory is an attempt to define what being ethically 'wrong' consists of and accepts that it is only useful to those within a [[Judeo-Christian]] context. In dealing with the criticism that a seemingly immoral act would be obligatory if God commanded it, he proposes that God does not command cruelty for its own sake. Adams does not propose that it would be logically impossible for God to command cruelty, rather that it would be unthinkable for him to do so because of his nature. Adams emphasises the importance of [[faith]] in God, specifically faith in God's goodness, as well as his existence.<ref>{{harvnb|Pojman|Rea|2008|pp=558–559}}</ref>

Adams proposes that an action is morally wrong [[if and only if]] it defies the commands of a loving God. If cruelty was commanded, he would not be loving; Adams argued that, in this instance, God's commands would not have to be obeyed and also that his theory of ethical wrongness would break down. He proposed that divine command morality assumes that human concepts of right and wrong are met by God's commands and that the theory can only be applied if this is the case.<ref>{{harvnb|Harris|2003|pp=32–33}}</ref> Adams' theory attempts to counter the challenge that morality might be arbitrary, as moral commands are not based solely on the commands of God, but are founded on his [[omnibenevolence]]. It attempts to challenge the claim that an external standard of morality prevents God from being sovereign by making him the source of morality and his character the moral law.<ref name=austin/>

Adams proposes that in many Judeo-Christian contexts, the term 'wrong' is used to mean being contrary to God's commands. In ethical contexts, he believes that 'wrong' entails an [[emotivism|emotional]] attitude against an action and that these two uses of wrongness usually correlate.<ref>{{harvnb|Pojman|Rea|2008|pp=561–562}}</ref> Adams suggests that a believer's concept of morality is founded in their religious belief and that right and wrong are tied to their belief in God; this works because God always commands what believers accept to be right. If God commanded what a believer perceived as wrong, the believer would not say it is right or wrong to disobey him; rather their concept of morality would break down.<ref>{{harvnb|Pojman|Rea|2008|p=559}}</ref>

Michael Austin writes that an implication of this modified divine command theory is that God cannot command cruelty for its own sake; this could be argued to be inconsistent with God's omnipotence. Aquinas argued that God's omnipotence should be understood as the ability to do all things that are possible: he attempted to refute the idea that God's inability to perform illogical actions challenges his omnipotence. Austin contends that commanding cruelty for its own sake is not illogical, so is not covered by Aquinas' defence, although Aquinas had argued that sin is the falling short of a perfect action and thus not compatible with omnipotence.<ref name=austin/>